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This essay argues that the behavioral-advertising business model under which an 
internet platform, such as Google or Facebook, provides free services in exchange 
for the user’s personal data is immoral and illegal. It is immoral because it relies 
on addiction, surveillance, and manipulation of the user to deplete the user’s 
autonomy. The contract between the company and the user is immoral. It can also 
be plausibly argued that the contract is illegal under California law because it is 
contrary to good morals, is unconscionable, and is against public policy. As society 
becomes more aware of these moral and legal defects, courts in the future should 
be more willing to find these contracts illegal and thus void. In such case, the user’s 
consent to the contract would be nullified and the company would have no legal 
right to gather and monetize the personal data of the user. The companies should 
then be forced to convert to a subscription model with a fiduciary duty to users to 
restrict the gathering and monetizing of personal data. This essay employs 
perspectives not only from morality and law, but also from philosophy, history, 
political theory, and neuroscience. Part One covers morality, Part Two legality. 
 
* I am indebted to Harvard Law Professor Charles Fried and his son, Suffolk University 
Philosophy Professor Gregory Fried, for the phrase “Because it is Wrong.” See BECAUSE IT IS 
WRONG: TORTURE, PRIVACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2010). I use the 
word “Essay” in the sense used by Michel de Montaigne—a trial or attempt, not something 
definitive. 
† Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School, and Visiting Professor, Peking University 
School of Transnational Law. 
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PART ONE: MORALITY 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
 Many internet service companies have a business model that relies on 
advertising. A user enters into a contract with the company by accessing the 
appropriate web page and clicking on the consent button to confirm that the user 
agrees to the company’s Terms of Service. A contract between the user and the 
company is established.1 Under the contract, the user consents to the company’s 
collection, aggregation, and handling of the user’s personal data and the company 
sells the attention 2  of the user to advertisers, political parties, and others. 
Essentially, the user barters his or her personal information in exchange for free use 
of the service. Under this model, the users are not the company’s customers, the 
advertisers are.3 This has become the predominant business model for internet 
service companies.  
 
 This business model has attracted criticism. Some say that the model will 
inevitably be misused; that it is harmful to the health of the public sphere and 
politics; that under it crucial decisions are made unilaterally, without recourse, and 
 
1 The validity of the clickwrap license was first recognized in California in the case Hotmail Corp. 
v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW 1998 WL388389 (N.D. Cal. 
1998). For a discussion on clickwrap licenses see generally Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: 
The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 578, 579-81 (2007). See also, E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2004). More recently, courts have 
been moving away from the idea that a click on an icon is the same as a signature on a page. See 
Nancy S. Kim, Online Contracting: New Developments, 72 BUS. LAWYER 243, 244 (Winter 2016-
2017). Professor Robin B. Kar and Margaret Jane Radin have proposed that certain terms, such as 
an arbitration clause, should be precluded from legal effect because they are not part of the 
“shared meaning” of the parties. Robin B. Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract & Shared 
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). The Google and Facebook user contracts do 
not provide for arbitration and the courts have so far assumed the contracts are properly formed 
and inclusive. For example, see In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 
MDL 2843, Case No. 18-md-02843-VC, Pretrial Order No. 20: Granting in Part and Denying in 
Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, at 38 (“the contract between Facebook and its 
users does not merely consist of the SRR [Statement of Rights and Responsibilities], . . . . It also 
includes the Data Use Policy”). If a contract were not formed, Google or Facebook could be liable 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90; see 
also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2004).  
2 Some have said that Facebook “sells your data.” Mark Zuckerberg has denied this. “[W]e 
[Facebook] don’t sell people’s data . . .” Mark Zuckerberg, The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 25, 2019, at A15. But see ANTONIO GARCIA MARTINEZ, CHAOS MONKEYS: OBSCENE 
FORTUNE AND RANDOM FAILURE IN SILICON VALLEY 328-29 (2018) (asserting that Facebook 
does “buy” your data). See also note 194 infra. 
3 A popular digital-age axiom is that “if you’re not paying for the product, you are the product.” 
JACOB SILVERMAN, TERMS OF SERVICE 254 (2015). 
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without accountability;4 that it leads the companies to consciously addict their 
users;5 that it is at cross-purposes with healthy technology usage;6 that it involves 
surveillance marketing;7 and that it involves mass behavior modification.8 But it 
seems that no commentator has overtly criticized the morality of this business 
model and questioned the validity of the contracts that underly it.9 Many critics 
have suggested legislative or administrative solutions to the problems noted above, 
but no one seems to have suggested a judicial solution through the interpretation of 
contract law. That is what this article does for the contracts of the two giants of 
internet advertising, Google and Facebook.10  
 
 These two companies were chosen for two reasons: (1) they developed the 
current model of behavioral advertising, take in over half of all worldwide digital 
advertising, and earn the overwhelming percentage of their revenues from 
advertising (about 90% for Google, 95% for Facebook); 11  (2) they are very 
powerful. According to Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director of the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, “[i]t’s difficult to imagine a more complete hegemony. 
Google and Facebook control eight of the top 10 internet services . . . They are 
among the five largest corporations in the world. They face no competition. And 
their power came about through the unregulated collection and use of personal 
data.” 12  It has been said that they have reengineered the internet into vast 
 
4 Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html. 
5 Roger McNamee, Foreword in VIVEK WADHWA & ALEX SALKEVER, YOUR HAPPINESS WAS 
HACKED vi (2018). 
6 Id. at 161. 
7 See JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS 144 (2017). 
8 See JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT 
NOW 10, 26 (2018). 
9 WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES  172 (2018) (suggesting that the extension of the contract doctrine of 
unconscionability represents an opportunity for users of online agreements to regain at least some 
autonomy over the flow of personal information).  
10 This essay refers to “Google” and “Facebook” generically to include all companies owned by 
Alphabet, Inc. and Facebook, Inc. 
11 MARTIN MOORE, DEMOCRACY HACKED: POLITICAL TURMOIL AND INFORMATION WARFARE IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 140-41 (2018). Cf. KEN AULETTA, FRENEMIES: THE EPIC DISRUPTION OF THE 
AD BUSINESS (AND EVERYTHING ELSE) 23 (2018) (giving a slightly different revenue figure for 
Google (87%)). Google’s revenue of $135 billion from advertising is almost double Facebook’s. 
Laura Forman, From Google: What You Didn’t Know to Look For, WALL ST. J., May 18-19, 2019, 
at B16.  
12 Marc Rotenberg, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2018, at A21 (emphasis added). A 
further demonstration of Google’s power is the fact that it has seven services that each have 1 
billion users. Xavier Harding, Google Has 7 Products With 1 Billion Users, POPULAR SCIENCE 
 




preference manipulation platforms13 on which “Google defines what we think” and 
“Facebook defines who we are.”14 
 
II.  MARKETS AND MORALS 
 
 What are the moral limits of the market in a liberal democracy? Do we want 
market forces to spread into the most “intimate spheres of life”?15 These are the 
fundamental moral questions behind the behavioral-advertising business model. 
Unfortunately, they have not been raised or publicly debated since the creation of 
these digital platforms. In the legal field, the immediate reason for this silence may 
be “market imperialism,”16 the triumph in the law schools during the last fifty years 
of market reasoning17 and its role as the predominant analytical tool. This market 
view of life also lies at the heart of computer-centered technology and culture; 
internet boosters often speak in the language of economics. 18  The major 
presumption of market reasoning certainly is not without justification: that people 
in their market roles express important motivations and attitudes and even some 
fundamental truths of human nature.19 But it has been extended to the supposition 
that in all spheres of life, human behavior can be explained by assuming that people 
decide how to act by weighing the costs and benefits of the choices before them 
and choosing the one that will give them the greatest welfare or utility.20 This 
extension is the concept of “universal commodification.”21 This presumption and 
 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/google-has-7-products-with-1-billion-users/. Washington 
and Lee Law Professor Joshua A. T. Fairfield has written, “[t]o exaggerate only slightly: the most 
important social contract of the twenty-first century is not the U. S. Constitution, it is the 
Facebook Terms of Service.” JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY AND THE 
NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM 43 (2017). 
13 YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA 345(2018). 
14 GEORGE DYSON, TURING’S CATHEDRAL: THE ORGINS OF THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE 308 (2012). 
15 See NICHOLAS CARR, UTPOPIA IS CREEPY AND OTHER PROVOCATIONS 85 (2016); see also 
STEPHEN A. MARGLIN, THE DISMAL SCIENCE: HOW THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST UNDERMINES 
COMMUNITY 1-2, 71, 255 (2008) (suggesting that a concern for community should limit the 
application of market principles and has pointed to the Amish as an example). 
16 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 120 (1983). 
17Jon D. Hansen & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 
640 (1999). 
18 LEE SPIEGEL, AGAINST THE MACHINE 31 (2008). 
19 ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 219 (1995). 
20 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 48 (2012).   
21 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1901 (1987). Political 
Science Professor C. B. MacPherson of the University of Toronto suggested that universal 
commodification is inherent in Locke’s philosophy. He has suggested that if you accept Locke’s 
premise that a man is human only as sole proprietor of himself only in so far as he is free from all 
but market relations, “you must convert all moral values into market values.” C.B. MACPHERSON, 
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 266 (1962). 
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supposition, however, avoid the fundamental question: does it make sense at all to 
use market norms to govern our conduct regarding a particular good?22  
 
 This is essentially a moral question, but both the market23 and technology24 
lack a moral basis, so they turn every question into an analysis of costs and 
benefits—the greatest welfare or utility. 25  Market imperialism and technology 
empty public life of moral argument, and any attempts at moral thinking tend to 
devolve into utilitarian analyses of the costs and benefits of probable scenarios.26 
The scholar who seems to have thought about this issue most deeply, Professor 
Margaret Jane Radin of the University of Michigan Law School, believes that the 
characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis, when it is put forward as the sole 
discourse of human life, is “morally wrong.”27 In fact, freedom and autonomy 
require that certain goods be outside market relations. Michael Walzer of the 
Institute for Advanced Study has made the most extensive list of dealings outside 
market relations.28 They include the purchase and sale of human beings; political 
power and influence; criminal justice; freedom of speech, press, religion, and 
assembly; marriage and procreation rights; etc.29 He also includes simony, bribery, 
 
22 ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 219. Professor Anderson has suggested that the proper limits of 
the market can be partly defined by asking two questions: (1) do market norms do a better job of 
embodying the ways we properly value a particular good than norms of other spheres; and (2) do 
market norms, when they govern the circulation of a particular good, undermine important ideals 
such as freedom, autonomy, and equality, or important interests legitimately protected by the 
state? Id. at 143-44. 
23 See FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 117-18,143, 157 (1976); see also CHARLES 
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 109 (1978) (noting that market thinking fails to see the need for a 
moral foundation for choice).  
24 NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY 79 (1973) (“the 
Technopoly story is without a moral center”). 
25 For a discussion of the economics of a cost-benefit analysis, see e.g., Will Kenton, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cost-
benefitanalysis.asp#:~:text=A%20cost%2Dbenefit%20analysis%20(CBA,decision%20to%20purs
ue%20a%20project.  
26 SANDEL, supra note 20, at 5, 6, 14; see SHEILA JASANOFF, THE ETHICS OF INVENTION: 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE HUMAN FUTURE 253 (2016). 
27 Radin, supra note 21, at 1851. In a similar vein, Stanford University Philosophy Professor 
Debra Satz believes that some markets are “noxious,” and that their use should be blocked and, 
further, that they can “even undermine the conditions for a democratic society.” DEBRA SATZ, 
WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 94-96, 208 
(2011). Columbia University Law Professor Bernard Harcourt in describing systems analysis has 
said, “[a]nd all that was necessary—that is, necessary to avoid talking about morality, was a lot of 
information and good statistical analyses.” BERNARD D. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND 
DISOBEDIENCE AND THE DIGITAL AGE 155 (2015). 
28 See WALZER, supra note 16. 
29 Id. at 100-03. 




and prostitution.30 Even this extensive list may not be complete. It does not seem 
to include judges selling their decisions to the highest bidder or the enforcement of 
unconscionable contracts. To acknowledge that the market has limits is to recognize 
that it has a proper role in analyzing human life. The challenge is to reap the 
advantages of the market while confining its analysis to those areas suited to it.31  
 
 Market imperialism has not only expanded market thinking to all areas of 
human experience, it has also necessarily resulted in precluding discussion of moral 
issues. The British historian Tony Judt has explained that since the 1970s, 
“[i]ntellectuals don’t ask if something is right or wrong, but whether it is efficient 
or inefficient. They don’t ask if a measure is good or bad, but whether or not it 
improves productivity.”32 The insightful internet critic Evgeny Morozov reached a 
similar conclusion about the last few decades. He believes that one of the greatest 
misconceptions of this period has been “the idea that technology ought not to 
intrude on questions of morality . . . [m]orality here, technology there: the two shall 
never overlap.”33 The veneration of technology has also precluded the discussion 
of moral issues because it presumes that technical innovation has only positive 
effects.34  
 
 But this preclusion of moral analysis ultimately undermines the moral 
legitimacy of the market economy. It is generally recognized that a market 
economy, even in its purest form, requires some restrictions on self-interest to 
prevent theft, fraud, and contracts contrary to the public interest, as well as the 
 
30 Id. at 9. 
31 ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 166-67. 
32 TONY JUDT & TIMOTHY SNYDER, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 361 (2012). Some have 
questioned whether new technology is now increasing productivity: “[t]he more tech we get, the 
less productive we are.” WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 90; see also MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 196 (2d ed. 1998) (implying that a disregard of 
moral issues is attributable to liberal democracy. “Political liberalism insists on bracketing our 
comprehensive moral and religious ideals for political purposes ….”); see also MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 323 (1996). 
“A political agenda lacking substantive moral discourse is one symptom of the public philosophy 
of the procedural republic.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN 
POLITICS 28 (2005). 
33 EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
SOLUTIONISM 323 (2013). 
34 Id. at 167. As Siva Vaidhynathan, Professor of Media Studies at the University of Virginia, has 
observed, “[i]nnovation lacks a normative claim of significant betterment . . . . The ultimate goal 
of innovation seems to be more innovation.” SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW 
FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 205 (2018). Nicholas Carr has 
suggested that a utopian view of technology also encourages people to “switch off their critical 
faculties and give Silicon Valley . . . free reign to remaking culture to fit their commercial 
interests.” ROUGH TYPE (Sept. 12, 2017). http://www.roughtype.com/.  
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corruption of legislators and judges. Truth, trust, restraint, and obligation are social 
virtues grounded in religious belief that play a central role in a market economy. 
Such an economy requires morality to assure that the law is obeyed and those 
aspects of life not covered by the law are governed by some rules. By trying to fill 
the vacuum left by the decline of religion and the preclusion of morality, market 
values weaken moral sanctions and sabotage their own legitimacy.35  
 
 Given that some activities are off limits to the market, might they include 
the behavioral-advertising business model for internet services? We can attempt to 
answer this question by using our common-sense moral intuitions and by allowing 
our moral judgments to be guided as much as possible by the reasons that can be 
given for opposing views.36 Although the digital behavioral-advertising business 
model is in many respects unprecedented, analogies to familiar practices can be 
helpful in evaluating it. Appeals to both moral common sense and analogy are 
invoked below. 
 
III.  ADVERTISING  
 
 A.  THEN AND NOW 
 
 In 1922, Herbert Hoover remarked about radio that “[i]t is inconceivable we 
should allow so great a possibility for service, for news, for entertainment, for 
education, and for vital commercial purposes to be drowned in advertising 
chatter.”37 Later, at the dawn of the television age, the respected columnist Walter 
Lippman observed that “while television is supposed to be ‘free,’ it has in fact 
become the creature, the servant, and indeed the prostitute, of merchandizing.”38 In 
1958, Vance Packard’s book The Hidden Persuaders referred to advertising firms 
as “one of the most advanced laboratories in psychology” and quoted an adman’s 
statement that psychology held great promise for understanding people and 
“ultimately for controlling their behavior.”39 In the 1980s, some philosophers wrote 
that persuasive advertising was immoral because it manipulated people and reduced 
autonomy.40 Advertising, nevertheless, was adopted as the primary revenue stream 
 
35 R. C. O. Mathews, Book Review, 87 THE ECON J. 576-77 (1977) (reviewing FRED HIRSCH, 
SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976)); HIRSCH , supra note 23, at 141, 143: see also, AMARTYA 
SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 22-25 (1987). 
36 JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 11-12 (4th ed. 1986). 
37 TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS 86 (2016). 
38 Id. at 150. 
39 Robert L. Arrington, Advertising and Behavior Control, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 4 (1982) 
40 See, e.g., Paul C. Santelli, The Informative and Persuasive Functions of Advertising: A Moral 
Appraisal, 2 J. BUS. ETHICS 27-33 (1983); Roger Crisp, Persuasive Advertising, Autonomy, and 
 




for radio and television and later became the revenue model for internet services.41 
Before the rise of Google, Silicon Valley viewed advertising with some disgust—
it was considered a core sin of the old media, especially television.42 The idealists 
were adamant that information should not be monetized online.43  
 
 But, of course, ubiquitous radio and television services depended on 
advertising. And this common use of advertising on radio and television suggested 
that advertising on an internet service should be acceptable too. But the analogy of 
internet services to free radio and television is misleading. There is a fundamental 
difference between internet and other services: the nature and amount of personal 
data disclosed by the user. Computers and digitization have profoundly changed 
the personal data available to advertisers.44 The data collected through internet 
platforms have four distinguishing characteristics: the data is essentially permanent, 
is easily transferable, is all-pervasive, and is gigantic. Market imperialism suggests 
that these characteristics make the data a commodity and, indeed, a very marketable 
one.   
 
 In considering the amounts of information on users, a better analogy than 
radio and television might be mail and telephone service. As distinguished from 
radio and television, consumers have used the mail service and telephone to 
exchange large amounts of personal information. In this respect, they are similar to 
Facebook’s services. But they are different in that customers have always paid a 
fee for mail and telephone service and the service providers have always been 
prohibited from using the personal information contained in the messages for 
commercial purposes.45 Why has no one seriously suggested free mail or telephone 
 
the Creation of Desire, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 413-18 (1987); Tom L. Beauchamp, Manipulative 
Advertising, 3 BUS. & PRO. ETHICS 1-22 (1984). 
41 LANIER, supra note 8, at 97. 
42 JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 82 (2010).  
43 JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 207 (2013). 
44 Jeroen van de Hoven et al., Privacy and Information Technology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. (revised October 30, 2019) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/#PerDat (discussing 
the history and advances of digital privacy and the implications of technology). 
45 As to mail, Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 626 
(1977) that “throughout our history Congress has respected the individual’s interest in private 
communication. The notion that private letters could be opened and inspected without notice to the 
sender or the addressee is abhorrent to the tradition of privacy and freedom to communicate 
protected by the Bill of Rights.” See also ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (asserting that 
letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage are fully guarded from examination and 
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight). As for the telephone, eavesdropping for 
commercial or private purposes has been legally prohibited starting with state statutes enacted as 
early as 1862. The Crime Control Act of 1968 authorized electronic surveillance, but only subject 
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service in exchange for the collection and use of the information contained in the 
letters or the calls? An economist’s answer—and partially an accurate one 
historically—would be that, before the computer, it was too costly to gather and 
aggregate the information. But even today the answer is surely that most people 
would feel uncomfortable with such an arrangement and, if they thought about it, 
would consider it immoral. Perhaps the conclusion should be the same for internet 
services.46  The case seems even stronger and the privacy and autonomy concerns 
much greater for internet services because the providers collect vastly more 
personal information.  
 
 These analogies point out two moral issues not applicable to advertising on 
radio or television: privacy and autonomy. Essentially, the word “privacy” denotes 
a “cluster” of problems.47 The specific privacy problem referred to here is the right 
to control over information about oneself provided by oneself. This issue arises 
because the user discloses personal information and then loses control over it. The 
service provider sees the relationship solely in market terms and collects, 
aggregates, and processes data in ways that violate the user’s expectation of 
privacy. This creates a moral problem of depriving the user of privacy.  
 
 Privacy is closely linked to the second moral issue, autonomy. In fact, 
privacy can be seen as a precondition for autonomy. The problem of autonomy 
occurs at a later stage, as the service provider’s business develops after privacy has 
been weakened. The service provider goes public (Google in 200448, Facebook in 
201249) and needs to satisfy the demands of its shareholders and Wall Street for 
larger profits. To support greater revenues in an advertising-based business model, 
the service provider needs more users and more engagement to gather more data to 
better target the advertisements.50 Monetizing users’ private data to the greatest 
extent becomes the goal.51 With enormous amounts of data obtained both from the 
user’s activity on the site and outside sources, the service provider is able to 
 
to strict judicial control. Electronic Eavesdropping, ENCYC. BRITTANICA ONLINE. See also Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (asserting that the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
applies to an individual in a telephone booth). 
46 The legal answer to this question is that the user has consented to the collection and use of the 
personal information.  
47 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 172 (2008). 
48 Jay Ritter, Google’s IPO, 10 Years Later, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayritter/2014/08/07/googles-ipo-10-years-later/#ad157ff2e6ca.  
49 Justin Walton, When Did Facebook Go Public, INVESTOPEDIA (June 9, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/111015/when-did-facebook-go-public.asp.  
50 See generally Suketu Gandhi, Bharath Thota, Renata Kuchembuck & Joshua Swartz, 
Demystifying Data Monetization, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/demystifying-data-monetization/.  
51 See id.  




manipulate the user and deprive the user of autonomy, shunting him or her in 
directions that benefit it, not the user.52 This manipulation and loss of privacy and 
autonomy are immoral. This is why advertising has been called the Internet’s 
“original sin.”53  
 
 A full recounting of the history of Google and Facebook would reveal many 
failures to fulfill commitments to users and to government authorities.54 This article 
treats, however, only those moral failings that are the direct result of the 
advertising-based business model and therefore does not cover many events in the 
history of the two internet giants. It generally avoids discussion of privacy abuses 
by the founders in the daily conduct of the business (e.g., Cambridge Analytica 
scandal55) even if these actions were perhaps incentivized by the business model. 
The focus of analysis is on the business model, not the individuals, even though the 
founders held extreme corporate powers as noted below. 
 
 B.  THE ADVERTISING-BASED BUSINESS MODEL 
 
 The successful advertising-based business model was first developed by 
Google and then adopted by Facebook. To consider the moral and legal issues in 
this business model, we need to understand the history of these two companies. In 
large part that is the history of the founders. The unusual multiple-class share 
structure of these two companies gives the founders voting control over the 
company’s management.56 The founders also served for many years in the most 
important management roles.57 Therefore, to an almost unprecedented extent in 
 
52 Natasha Singer, Just Don’t Call It Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2018, at SR 4. 
53 HARTZOG, supra note 9, at 78. 
54 See infra pages 136-141; FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 144-45 (2015); Gabriel J. X. Dance, 
Miguel LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, Facebook Offered Users Privacy Wall, Then Let Tech 
Giants Around It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A1; 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Plus Shutting Down After User Data Was Exposed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2018, at B3; Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Is Said to Consider Hefty Fines for 
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2019, at B1. 
55 Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout so Far, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-
scandal-fallout.html.  
56 SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN 
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 101-02 (2019). 
57Until recently, Sergey Brin was President of Alphabet, Inc, the holding company of Google, and 
Larry Page was CEO (the chief operating decision maker) of Alphabet. Letter from Josh Paul, Dir. 
of Acct., to SEC Staff (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000048/filename1.htm [https://p
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major corporations, the views and conduct of the founders and owners of these two 
companies influence the actions of the companies and, specifically, its business 
model. In effect, Larry Page and Sergei Brin have been Google and Mark 
Zuckerberg is Facebook. To an unusual degree, these individuals, not Wall Street 
investors, are responsible for the corporate ethics of the two companies. 58 
Facebook’s use of the advertising-based business model has attracted more 
attention and Mark Zuckerberg is now at the center of a discussion about the moral 
character of Silicon Valley and its leaders.59 The discussion below emphasizes 
Facebook, although it starts with Google, the pioneer in developing the advertising-
based business model. It suggests that we can understand how we arrived at our 
current predicament only by understanding the history of the two companies. 
 
IV.  THE HISTORY OF GOOGLE 
 
 A.  BEFORE ADVERTISING 
 
 Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two fellow Ph.D. students in the computer 
sciences department at Stanford, incorporated Google in 1998 with a goal of 
promoting an internet search engine.60 From the beginning, the company’s mission 
was “[o]rganize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and 
useful.”61 This was a grand, pretentious, but seemingly noble cause—and perhaps 
all young men exhibit some degree of grandiosity. But Elias Aboujaoude, Director 
of the Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Clinic at Stanford Medical School, has 
described “grandiosity” as “an exaggerated belief in one’s importance and 
 
erma.cc/P6U2-BY8B]. In December 2019, Brin and Page gave up their management positions. 
Jack Nicas & Daisuke Wakabayashi, End of Era for Google as Founders Step Aside, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2019, at B1; Mark Zuckerberg is Chairman and CEO of Facebook. Facebook, 
Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 13, 2018).  
58 See ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK CATASTROPHE 101 (2019) 
(“When called to account for this [exploiting human weaknesses to make money], tech companies 
blame pressure from shareholders. Given that the founders of both Facebook and Google have 
total control of their companies, that excuse falls short”).  
59 Evan Osnos, Ghost in the Machine, NEW YORKER, Sept. 17, 2018, at 35. Facebook seems to 
have met more public criticism because it has been more forthcoming. To a certain degree, Google 
has been able to let Facebook take the criticism that applies to the business model both companies 
employ. 
60 See Samuel Gibbs, Google has ‘outgrown’ it’s 14-year old mission statement, says Larry Page, 




61 How Search Works, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/mission (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NM88-APDW].  




abilities...[that] seems to be in the Internet’s DNA.”62 It is a characteristic and 
stubborn trait of the “e-personality,” the unwitting creation of extensive online 
interactions.63 The e-personality may explain the business philosophy of Silicon 
Valley start-ups pioneered by PayPal: “raise a boatload of money, expand quickly, 
and present lawmakers with a fait accompli. Here is the future, deal with it.”64 
 
 Even before the incorporation of Google, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were 
struggling with the moral issues of the internet search business. In a 1998 paper, 
“The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine,” they noted an 
ethical problem they called “Advertising and Mixed Motives.” They observed that 
“[c]urrently, the predominant business model for commercial search engines is 
advertising. The goals of the advertising business model do not always correspond 
to providing quality search to users.”65 They saw an irreconcilable conflict between 
the integrity of a search engine’s search function and the business of search.66 They 
concluded, in effect, that advertising caused so many conflicts of interest between 
the integrity of search and the lure of profits that only a transparent and academic 
search engine could preserve the integrity of search.67 An objective search engine 
would have to be located in a non-profit environment like a university. They did 
not seriously consider other possible business models, such as paid subscriptions. 
They believed that the company would make money, in part, from licensing fees 
and selling search services to corporations.68 The search engine was an end in itself 
and too important to be corrupted by financial interests.69 
 
 
62 ELIAS ABOUJAOUDE, VIRTUALLY YOU: THE DANGEROUS POWERS OF THE E-PERSONALITY 48 
(2011).  
63 Id. at 20. The other traits are narcissism, darkness, regression and impulsivity. Id. at 43. 
This grandiosity seems related to Ayn Rand’s famous quote “[w]ho will stop me?” 
described as Google’s “founding principle” by Director Emeritus of the Annenberg School 
for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California, Jonathan Taplin. 
He has described the principle as meaning: “Google will do whatever it wants without asking 
permission and the results will be so awesome that no one will complain.” He points to 
Gmail, Google Street View, and the effort to digitize the world’s books as examples. 
TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 97-99. In a similar vein, writer Franklin Foer asserts that “Google is 
never plagued by second-guessing.” FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE 
EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 42 (2017). 
64 TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 167 (2017). 
65 Larry Page & Sergey Brin, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 
STAN. INFOLAB PUB. SERVER, http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/1/1998-8.pdf (last visited Sept. 
6, 2020).  
66 See id.  
67 Id.  
68 KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 61 (2009); STEVEN LEVY, 
IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 95 (2011). 
69 RICHARD L. BRANDT, INSIDE LARRY AND SERGEY’S BRAIN 40 (2005). 
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 An incident from 1999 demonstrates the founders’ attitude toward 
advertising at that time. Sergey Brin told Susan Wojcicki, an employee in the 
marketing department, “I have a good idea . . . [w]hy don’t we take the marketing 
budget and use it to inoculate Chechen refugees against cholera. It will help our 
brand awareness and we’ll get more new people to use Google.”70 If that didn’t 
work, he had a backup plan: “[w]hat if we gave out free Google-branded condoms 
to high-school students?”71 Two years later, Eric Schmidt was hired to provide 
“adult supervision” to the young founders.72 
 
 At a 2001 internal meeting to consider Google’s evolving position in the 
marketplace, the attendees spent the first fifteen minutes describing what Google 
was not and what it would not do.73 Larry Page urged that Google should be “a 
force for good,” which excluded marketing tricks like sweepstakes, coupons, and 
contests that took advantage of people’s cognitive biases.74 He declared that it was 
evil to prey on people’s stupidity.75 Google would not deceive people by selling 
placement in search results.76 
 
 B.  AFTER ADVERTISING  
 
 The aftereffects of the 2000 collapse of the dotcom bubble77 threatened the 
existence of the young company and changed the founders’ views. Advertising 
seemed unavoidable; it was the prevailing business model for commercial search 
engines.78 The two founders did not know how ads would function, but they had 
one condition: the ads had to be useful to users and not slow down the site.79 They 
looked at the possibility of paid listings in search results, but rejected that as 
crossing an invisible ethical line. 80  Instead, Google began to experiment with 
 
70 DOUGLAS EDWARDS, I’M FEELING LUCKY: THE CONFESSIONS OF GOOGLE EMPLOYEE NUMBER 
59, 48-49 (2011). 
71 Id. 
72 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Katie Benner, & Claire Cain Miller, Eric Schmidt to Step Down as 
Alphabet’s Executive Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/technology/eric- schmidt-google-alphabet.html.  
73 EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 290. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 190-91. 
77 See e.g., Adam Hayes, Dotcom Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dotcom-
bubble.asp#:~:text=During%20the%20dotcom%20bubble%2C%20the,equities%20entering%20a
%20bear%20market (summarizing the Dotcom Bubble collapse).  
78 See id.  
79 BRANDT, supra note 69, at 95. 
80 EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 310. 




advertisements, but would not allow banner or pop-up ads that were ubiquitous on 
the web.81  
 
 The rationalization for ads went beyond utility for users and income 
generation. For Larry Page, at least, there was the experience of Nikola Tesla, the 
inventor whose lack of business sense left him in poverty despite his brilliant 
inventions.82 Tesla’s experience was a lesson for Page. “I didn’t want to just invent 
things,” he said, “I also wanted to make the world better . . . .”83 But he needed the 
resources that Tesla did not have to do that. As one commentator put it, “[t]o realize 
their dreams, Page and Brin had to build a huge company.”84 Advertising would 
give them the necessary resources and scale to fulfill their grandiose goal of 
organizing the world’s information and making it available to all.85 
 
 But even if ads were necessary both for survival and for scale, were they 
still reprehensible? Early in its history Google’s moral vision was summarized in a 
phrase invented by the engineer Paul Buchheit at an in-house meeting in July, 2001 
to discuss Google’s corporate values. He suggested something that would make 
people uncomfortable but also be interesting: “[d]on’t be evil.”86 The founders 
adopted it as their hope and mantra for the company.87 What did the phrase mean? 
One interpretation was that it was an elaboration of the earlier phrase “[d]on’t go 
commercial.”88 This interpretation fit with the 1998 article noted above regarding 
the conflict of interest between search results and advertising. 89  Another 
interpretation calls the phrase an exemplification of a sense of moral purity.90 The 
trenchant internet critic Nicholas Carr has suggested that the mantra means that the 
company can make money without doing evil.91 However naïve, presumptuous, or 
inaccurate Google’s motto was, it could nevertheless rationalize the use of 
advertising to make money: if the company wasn’t being evil, then advertising was 
necessarily not evil.  
 
 
81 See id. at 286-87.  
82 See e.g., Gilbert King, The Rise and Fall of Nikola Tesla and His Tower, SMITHSONIAN MAG. 
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-rise-and-fall-of-nikola-tesla-and-his-
tower-11074324/.  
83 LEVY, supra note 68, at 13. 
84 Id. at 6. 
85 See supra note 61.  
86 See EDWARDS, supra note 70 at 276. 
87 See id. at 272-76. 
88 BRANDT, supra note 69, at 39. 
89 See Page & Brin, supra note 65. 
90 LEVY, supra note 68, at 6. 
91 CARR, supra note 15, at 283. Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has said that “evil was 
baked into the business plan” of Google. RANA FOROOHAR, DON’T BE EVIL 32 (2019). 
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 The founders began to see keyword-targeted text ads as an important part 
of the information package given to the user as part of a search result.92 This new 
system was called “paid-search,” but it did not provide for the direct payment to 
Google to improve the search results.93 Advertisers simply bid in an auction on 
search words—large numbers of them—to win the right to have their ads appear 
alongside the search results that were generated by the use of those words for the 
search.94 The ads did not affect the search itself, but they displayed next to search 
results.95 Every time a user clicked on an ad, the advertiser paid a fee to Google.96 
The ads were so well targeted that, according to a test, users did not realize they 
were ads and actually liked them.97 Ads would not just be necessary, they would be 
helpful. They could improve the user’s search experience. This “paid search” 
advertising business broke new ground in advertising history.98 For advertisers, it 
meant that for the first time they could connect to enormous numbers of consumers 
as individuals as they were making shopping decisions online.99 Most important, it 
was also very profitable. Google’s income from advertising went from zero in 2002 
to over $2 billion in two years.100 The company would not just survive but flourish 
beyond the founders’ dreams.  
 
 The “paid search” ads that Google ran were successful because they assured 
advertisers that the environment surrounding the ad was appropriate—the content 
on the web page where Google sent it.101 At the beginning, these ads were not 
directed to specific individuals. But as Google grew and acquired more behavioral 
data about its users, the “surplus” (more data than needed to serve its users) became 
a zero-sum asset that was diverted from improving service to targeting individual 
users. 102  This personalization of advertising has been described by Shoshanna 
 
92 DAVID VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 99 (2005). 
93 See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING 
YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 66-67 (2011). 
94 Id. at 66.  
95 Douglas Edwards has said that these ads were displayed “directly in line with regular results” 
and were “a form of paid placement, the exact practice Google had railed against so vehemently 
when it profited others.” EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 308. But the key distinction is that the ads 
were not influencing the content of the search results; the ads were simply placed next to the 
search results.  
96 TUROW, supra note 93, at 67. 
97 NOAM COHEN, THE KNOW-IT-ALLS: THE RISE OF SILICON VALLEY AS A POLITICAL 
POWERHOUSE AND SOCIAL WRECKING BALL 131 (2017). 
98 TUROW, supra note 93, at 65. 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 118. 
102 ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 81. Jaron Lanier has described the change as an inevitable result of 
the advance of the internet, the devices and the algorithms. LANIER, supra note 8, at 97.   




Zuboff, Professor Emerita at Harvard Business School, as “surveillance 
capitalism.”103  
 
 This new form of capitalism is characterized by two phenomena, the 
“extraction imperative” and the “prediction imperative.” Extraction refers to the 
gathering of a user’s data.104 Prediction refers to the use of that data to predict and 
manipulate the user’s behavior.105 Google was the first company to integrate an 
array of tools, such as cookies, proprietary analytics, and algorithmic software 
capabilities into a new system that centered on the unilateral expropriation of 
behavioral data.106 In contrast to industrial capitalism, which requires “economies 
of scale in production in order to achieve high throughput combined with low unit 
cost . . . [,]” surveillance capitalism necessitates “economies of scale in the 
extraction of behavioral surplus.”107  Under surveillance capitalism, competitive 
pressures compel an ever-expanding need for raw material—personal data.108 This 
explains Google’s drive to expand its supply chain of data surplus to other activities 
than mere search through such free services as Gmail, Google Maps, Google 
Calendar, Google News, and Google Shipping. Actual extraction entails a 
dispossession cycle consisting of a carefully designed sequence of incursion, 
habituation, adaptation, and redirection.109The prediction imperative necessarily 
involves manipulation because “the way to predict behavior is to intervene at its 
source and shape it.”110 This new type of advertising was called “online behavioral 
 
103 The description of “surveillance capitalism” is taken from ZUBOFF, supra note 56. The term 
“surveillance capitalism” may be derived from the term “surveillance society.” See Kirstie Ball 
and David Murakami Wood infra, note 237. Al Gore has gone even further and suggested that we 
now have a “stalker economy.” Alisha Foster, Al Gore at Southland: We Now Have a Stalker 
Economy, USA TODAY (June 10, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/10/al-
gore-tech-southland-conference/10299753/. Other authors who have used the capitalism metaphor 
are NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, THE COSTS OF CONNECTION: HOW DATA IS 
COLONIZING HUMAN LIFE AND APPROPRIATING IT FOR CAPITALISM 3 (2019). 
104 See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 87. 
105 See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 200-03. 
106 Id. at 87. Nicholas Carr has described this system as “vampiric.” “Their [Google’s and 
Facebook’s] overriding goal is to know us, to transfer into their data bases our informational 
lifeblood. Their thirst is unquenchable. To survive, they must suck in ever more intimate details of 
our lives and desires.” CARR, supra note 15, at 51. 
107 ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 87. 
108 See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 81. 
109 Id. at 138-55. 
110 Id. at 202. Franklin Foer says that Facebook’s “whole effort is to make human beings 
predictable—to anticipate their behavior, which makes them easier to 
manipulate.” FOER, supra note 63, at 77. 
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advertising” because it altered people’s behavior 111  and it was an advertiser’s 
dream come true. The advertisers could not only persuade users to buy, they could 
manipulate them to purchase.   
 
 This surveillance capitalism model of online behavioral advertising 
deprives users of autonomy and is immoral. But users’ loss of autonomy was not 
the only moral issue raised by this business model; it also compromised search 
integrity in three ways. 
 
 First, as Larry Page and Sergey Brin said in their 1998 talk, “a search engine 
could add a small factor to search results from ‘friendly’ companies, and subtract a 
factor from results from competitors. This type of bias is very difficult to detect but 
could still have a significant effect on the market.”112 “Difficult to detect” is an 
understatement. While there has been no indication that Google currently adjusts 
the search algorithm to favor a third party, it is impossible to show that Google does 
this or to prove that it does not. We will never know whether the integrity of the 
search is affected because, for competitive reasons and to prevent the “gaming” of 
search results, Google will never explain—if it even can—how its search 
algorithms work.113 This is a moral hazard. 
 
111 TUROW, supra note 93, at 176. Others have used different words to describe this 
phenomenon. Professors Paul M. Schwartz and Donald J. Solove refer to it as “behavioral 
marketing.” See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1854 (2011). 
Professor Robert H. Lustig refers to this advertising as “neuromarketing.” See ROBERT H. 
LUSTIG, THE HACKING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE CORPORATE 
TAKEOVER OF OUR BODIES AND BRAINS, 190 (2017). Siva Vaidhyanathan calls it “contextual 
advertising.” See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE 
SHOULD WORRY) 27 (2011). The Federal Trade Commission has defined the term “behavioral 
advertising” as “the tracking of a consumer’s activities online – including the searches the 
consumer has conducted, the Web pages visited, and the content viewed – in order to deliver 
advertising targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.” FED. TRADE COMM’M, ONLINE 
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF–
REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/online-behavioral-
advertising-moving- discussion-forward-possible-self-regulatory- 
principles/p859900stmt.pdf. Some have criticized the term “behavioral advertising” as a 
euphemism for “microtargeted manipulation.” BENKLER, FARIS, & ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 
269.  
112 Page & Brin, supra note 65. 
113 See How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2020) 
(providing an explanation generally on how search algorithms work); see also Kirsten Grind, Sam 
Schechner, Robert McMillan & John West, How Google Interferes With Its Search Algorithms 
 





 Second, it is clear that this business model’s demand for data has 
compromised the search results. A 2015 study at the Harvard Business School 
found that Google began to develop its content as it expanded its product 
offerings.114 For example, Google reviews compete with TripAdvisor and Google 
shopping competes with Amazon. But Google continues to act as a search service 
as well. It has a clear conflict of interest in these situations. But Google has invented 
a feature called “universal search,” by which it “intentionally excludes content 
competitors and only shows Google’s content.”115 The founders seem to think that 
allowing a third-party advertiser to influence search results is wrong, but it is 
acceptable for the search company to do so. The problem is that in either case, the 
advertiser gains and the trusting user who believes in the integrity of the search 
engine loses. One would struggle to call Google’s practice ethical. This is a betrayal 
of the founders’ concern for search integrity. 
 
 Third, search engine integrity also is at stake in another aspect of 
surveillance capitalism—personalization (tailoring online content to what will 
interest the individual user).116  In 2005, Google began to personalize searches 
because it boosted revenue from advertising. 117 But personalization compromises 
 
and Changes Your Results; The internet giant uses blacklists, algorithm tweaks and an army of 
contractors to shape what you see, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-interferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-your-
results-11573823753. 
114 Michael Luca, Timothy Wu, Sebastian Couvidat, Daniel Frank, & William Seltzer, Does 
Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working 
Paper No. 16-035, 2015), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23492375.  
115 Id.; see also PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 66-69, 160-65.  
116 Commentators have been critical of personalization. Nicholas Carr has written, 
“[p]ersonalization’s evil twin is manipulation.” CARR, supra note 15, at 258. University of 
Maryland Law Professor Frank Pasquale has said, “Personalization means vulnerability as well 
as power.” PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 79.  
Eli Pariser, chief executive of Upworthy, has written, “But there’s always a bargain in 
personalization: In exchange for convenience, you hand over some privacy and control to the 
machine.” ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 213 
(2011). University of Michigan Professor John Cheney-Lippold believes that “personalization” 
(the assumption that you as a user are distinctive enough to receive content based on you as a 
person with a history and with individual interests) generally “does not exist.” Instead, he believes 
that we are communicated to through “profilization” that allows our data to be categorized. JOHN 
CHENEY-LIPPOLD, WE ARE DATA: ALGORITHMS AND THE MAKING OF OUR DIGITAL SELVES 87 
(2017). 
117 Thomas W. Simpson, Evaluating Google As an Epistemic Tool, 43 METAPHILOSOPHY 426, 437 
(2012). For more details on the gradual process of personalization, see Chris Jay Hoofnagle, 
Beyond Google and Evil: How Policy Makers, Journalists and Consumers Should Talk Differently 
About Google and Privacy, 14 FIRST MONDAY (2009), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/a 
rticle/view/2326/2156#32. 
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the integrity of the search results. There are a number of factors in assessing the 
functioning of a search engine, such as precision, recall, and objectivity. 118 
Personalization does not affect any of these except objectivity, but objectivity is 
critical for the informational task that a search engine performs. 119  And 
personalization diminishes objectivity in a search engine by reinforcing 
confirmation bias. 120  This means that people are more likely to: (1) justify 
disbelieving evidence that contradicts their preexisting beliefs, (2) not subject 
evidence that supports their preexisting beliefs to the same level of scrutiny, (3) and 
take as confirmatory evidence that is consistent with their preexisting beliefs.121 
Personalization reduces the chances that the search engine will inform the user of 
contrary opinions, or “unknown unknowns.”122 But objectivity in search results is 
a public good required by a democratic society.123 Democracy requires a degree of 
objectivity that allows the public a sufficient understanding of the issues. If the 
search engine reinforces confirmation bias, then it will reinforce political 
polarization. Through personalization, Google’s advertising-based business model 
thus not only reduces the objectivity of Google’s search engine, it also weakens 
democracy. As in the case of the contradiction between search and advertising 
mentioned in the 1998 paper, 124 we will never know how much personalization 
lessens objectivity in Google searches. Personalization of search is a moral 
challenge and a moral hazard. 
 
 Search engine integrity is not the only way in which Google has weakened 
democracy. It seems clear that its search algorithm could decide an election. In a 
2015 article, Robert Epstein, Senior Research Psychologist at the American 
Institute for Behavioral Research and Technology, recounted “How Google Could 
Rig the 2016 Election: Google has the Ability to Drive Millions of Votes to a 
Candidate with No One the Wiser.” His research suggested that “Google, Inc., has 
amassed far more power to control elections—indeed, to control a wide variety of 
opinions and beliefs—than any company in history has ever had. Google’s search 
algorithm can easily shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by 20 percent 
 
118 Simpson, supra note 117, at 437. 
119 Id. at 431-33. 
120 Id. at 438. 
121 Id.  
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or more...with virtually no one knowing they are being manipulated.”125 As one 
example, he noted that:  
 
According to Google Trends, at this writing [August, 
2015] Donald Trump is currently trouncing all other 
candidates in search activity in 47 of 50 states. Could 
this activity push him higher in search rankings, and 
could higher rankings in turn bring him more 
support? Most definitely—depending, that is, on 
how Google employees choose to adjust numeric 
weightings in the search algorithm. Google 
acknowledges adjusting the algorithm 600 times a 
year, but the process is secret, so what effect Mr. 
Trump’s success will have on how he shows up in 
Google searches is presumably out of his hands.126 
 
Out of the public’s hands, and the public will never know how much the search 
algorithm benefitted Donald Trump. It seems morally wrong to give an unknowable 
search algorithm and its masters such power. 
 
 Behavioral advertising transforms the moral issue from one of privacy to 
one of autonomy.127 “Autonomy” refers to governing “oneself, to be directed by 
considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed 
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s 
authentic self.”128 Autonomy is distinguished from “freedom,” which concerns the 
ability to act without external or internal constraints, because it concerns the 
independence and authenticity of the desires (values, emotions, etc.) that move one 
 
125 Robert Epstein, How Google Could Rig the 2016 Election: Google has the Ability to Drive 
Millions of Votes to a Candidate with No One the Wiser, POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2015), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016-election-
121548. 
126 Id.  
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firms collect and use the personal data of customers, of internet users.” Singer, supra note 52. 
128 John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
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to act in the first place.129 Autonomy seems to be an “irrefutable value”130 and it 
requires significant constraints on the application of market principles. 131  Our 
common moral intuitions and the basic principles of Kantian philosophy tell us that 
a person should never act so as to treat another person merely as a means to an end, 
but treat the other as an end in himself or herself.132 But the behavioral-advertising 
business model undermines the individual user’s right to make decisions free from 
manipulation or exploitation.133 Through addiction, surveillance, and manipulation 
it undermines the user’s autonomy.134 The behavioral-advertising business model 
of surveillance capital is morally wrong.  
 
 Google started as an academic enterprise that valued above all else the 
integrity of its search engine, despised advertising, and believed that advertisements 
would irremediably compromise search results.135 But adopting the business model 
of surveillance capitalism made it what it had despised—an advertising company. 
Ultimately, the moral issue was not only about the integrity of search, but also the 
integrity of the users—the compromising of their autonomy. This morally deficient 
business model also weakened democracy. Unfortunately, this model was adopted 
and further developed for social media by Facebook. 
 
V.  THE HISTORY OF FACEBOOK 
 
 A.  BEFORE ADVERTISING 
 
 Facebook has been a phenomenally successful innovation—no human 
enterprise, technology, utility, or service has ever spread so widely and so 
 
129 Id. Some might argue that plentiful choices offered online would strengthen autonomy, but the 
abundance of choices overwhelms users, distracts them from critically reviewing the options not 
given and imposes a duty to control one’s personal information. As a result, “choice becomes an 
illusion of empowerment or a burden.” HARTZOG, supra note 9, at 57.  
130 Christman, supra note 128.  
131 ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 142. 
132 Thomas E. Hill Jr., Autonomy of Moral Agents, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 112 (Lawrence C. 
Becker and Charlotte B. Becker eds., 2001). 
133 Matt Zwolinski & Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Dec. 20, 
2001), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/. The unfairness underlying the exploitation 
here would seem to be not only procedural but also substantive.  
134 Sarah Buss & Andrea Westlund, Personal Autonomy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/. There does not appear to be a non-arbitrary level to distinguish the 
degree of, or the presence or absence of, autonomy. See Christman, supra note 128. But, 
Professors Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund have found widespread agreement that addiction 
itself alone is a paradigm threat to autonomy.  
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quickly.136 This is a tribute to Mark Zuckerberg’s grandiosity.137 From almost the 
beginning, his motto was “Dominate!” and soon became “to make the world more 
open and connected.”138  These slogans reflected Mark Zuckerberg’s grandiosity 
and his reckless haste, two traits to which Steven Levy who has written the inside 
history of the company, attributes virtually all Facebook’s recent problems.139  
 
 Mark Zuckerberg was known as a computer whiz at Harvard and, in his 
sophomore year, established his hacker’s cred. In the fall of 2003, he created 
“Facemash,” the predecessor to Facebook, using photos he had hacked from the 
digital versions of “facebooks” for each of Harvard’s undergraduate “houses” 
(dormitories).140  He did this, of course, without asking permission.141 One writer 
has described the moral issue by hypothesizing how Mark Zuckerberg rationalized 
his conduct: in a sense, it was stealing because he didn’t have the legal right to the 
photos and because the university certainly didn’t put them there for someone to 
hack and download. 142  But then, if information was hackable, didn’t a well-
intentioned hacker have the right to hack it? Who had the rightful authority to 
decide that he wasn’t allowed access to something he could access so easily? 
Wasn’t he really doing them a favor, teaching them a lesson? Even though the 
administrators wouldn’t see it that way, wasn’t he really doing a good deed by 
showing them the flaws in their system?143 Another writer has speculated on the 
relevance to Mark Zuckerberg of the moral issue in this hacking, “the fact that he 
was doing something slightly illicit gave Mark little pause . . . . It’s not that he set 
out to break the rules; he just didn’t pay much attention to them.”144 This ethically 
challenged hacker ethos valuing brilliant, but heedless, disruption survived and 
flourished at Facebook.145  
 
 
136 John Lancaster, You Are the Product, 39 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3-10 (Aug. 2017). 
137 Roger McNamee, an early investor and advisor to Mark Zuckerberg, said: “[w]hat I did not 
grasp was that Zuck’s ambition had no limit.” MCNAMEE, supra note 58, at 64.  
138 Id. at 241. 
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Beginnings, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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141 Id.  
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 But the hacking was only the first of the moral issues. Facemash was a 
Harvard version of the website HotorNot.com and placed photos of two students 
next to each other, asking the user to choose the “hotter” person. 146  Students 
condemned it as “hurtful and demeaning” and the staff of The Crimson, the Harvard 
college newspaper, criticized it as “cater[ing] to the worst side of Harvard 
students.”147 Mark Zuckerberg was called before Harvard’s Administrative Board 
for violations of the college’s code of conduct in connection with security, 
copyright, and privacy issues.148  
 
 He closed down Facemash and expressed particular concern about privacy, 
telling The Crimson that “issues about violating people’s privacy don’t seem to be 
surmountable...I’m not willing to risk insulting anyone.”149 But a comment in a 
messaging exchange, when he was appearing before the Administrative Board for 
the Facemash fiasco, yields a different insight on his judgement and ethics: 
  
 [redacted friend’s name]: But what are the grounds for kicking you out of 
 school? 
   
 Zuckerberg: Unethical behavior. 
 
 [redacted friend’s name]: Wouldn’t that be dependent on the court case? 
 
 Zuckerberg: Haha man come on. You can be unethical and still be legal 
that’s  the way I live my life haha.150 
 
 But early the next year, Zuckerberg created “TheFacebook,” another social 
media site that retained Facemash’s emphasis on connecting people with “a dash of 
 
146 See hotornot.com; Horton, supra note 140; Katharine A. Kaplan, Facemash Creator Survives 
Ad Board, HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 19, 
2003), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/11/19/facemash-creator-survives-ad-board-the/.  
147 The Crimson Staff, None M*A*S*H Online ‘facemash’ site, while mildly amusing, catered to 
the worst side of Harvard students, HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 6, 2003), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/11/6/mash-for-the-most-monastic-undergraduates/. 
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PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/mark-zuckerbergs-secret-ims-from-college-2014-2 
(revealing confidential AOL Instant Messenger exchanges which were disclosed in the discovery 
process for the ConnectU litigation referred to in footnote 154 infra). Some may object to using 
Mark Zuckerberg’s private messages to judge his character; others might find it cosmic justice.   




vanity and more than a little voyeurism.”151 It resolved some of the moral issues 
with Facemash. One change came from a suggestion in The Crimson: instead of 
hacking the pictures from the houses’ websites, the users of TheFacebook would 
provide the photos themselves, thus avoiding one privacy issue.152 But in an email 
exchange at the time about TheFacebook, Mark Zuckerberg offered another 
perspective: that the users of the site were stupid dupes.153 
 
 The private comments by Mark Zuckerberg contrast with the public 
comments he made about users’ privacy when he shut down Facemash. Perhaps the 
public comments were insincere. On the other hand, maybe his email comments to 
a friend were just a bit of sophomoric bravado. But they seemed to show contempt 
for the privacy of schoolmates who had trusted him. 
 
 The launching of TheFacebook created two other moral issues: (1) whether 
Mark had stolen the idea for TheFacebook; and (2) whether he had sabotaged a 
competing platform. In December, 2002, a year before Facemash, fellow Harvard 
students, the brothers Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss and Divya Narendra, began 
to develop a business plan for a new type of website that would allow students of a 
college to create a network specific to that institution and allow students to meet, 
exchange information, discuss employment prospects and serve as an online dating 
service.154  
 
151Amelia E. Lester, Show Your Best Face, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 17, 2004),  
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2004/2/17/show-your-best-face-lets-talk/; WU, supra note 
37, at 295-96; MEZRICH, supra note 142, at 94 (suggesting that Facebook’s success was linked to 
its usefulness for “hooking up and that the thing that drove the social network was the same thing 
that drove life at college—sex); see also Kevin Roose, Juul’s Convenient Smoke Screen, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), (“Facebook, an outgrowth of a Harvard student’s juvenile attempt to 
quantify the attractiveness of his classmates, now claims to have been motivated by a virtuous 
impulse to connect the world”) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/technology/juul-cigarettes-
marketing.html.   
152 See Lester, supra note 151 (discussing the pictures that Harvard students were now able to 
upload to thefacebook.com).  
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 “Zuckerberg: Yeah so if you ever need info about anyone at Harvard   
Zuckerberg: Just ask.   
Zuckerberg: I have over 4,000 emails, pictures, addresses, ...   
[Redacted friend’s name]: What? How’d you manage that one?   
Zuckerberg: People just submitted it.   
Zuckerberg: I don’t know why.   
Zuckerberg: They ‘trust me’   
Zuckerberg: Dumb fucks.”).  
154 Complaint at 3, ConnectU v. Mark Zuckerberg, Edwardo Saverin, Dustin Moskowitz, Andrew 
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These three students had developed a prototype for the website (called 
“Harvard Connection”) but needed additional help to finalize it.155 In the fall of 
2003, they asked Mark Zuckerberg for help. He worked on the project for a time, 
but without a written contract.156 Even though the “Harvard Connection” website 
was close to being completed, before they were able to launch, Mark Zuckerberg 
launched his own new site, TheFacebook.157  
 
 The Winklevosses and Narendra were taken aback. As Tyler Winklevoss 
said, “[Mark Zuckerberg] said he was working for us; he led us on; he took unfair 
advantage of us . . . [h]e’s just not a fully formed individual, from an ethical 
standpoint.”158 The Harvard Connection, the site created by the two brothers and 
Narendra, finally launched in late spring 2004,159 but TheFacebook had already 
seized the initiative and dominated the field. The Harvard Connection (renamed 
ConnectU) never achieved the success it seemed to promise. After discussions with 
Mark Zuckerberg failed to settle the dispute, ConnectU sued him in September, 
2004, alleging “breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of 
fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, intentional interference with prospective 
business advantage, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and fraud arising 
out of [Mark Zuckerberg’s]...unauthorized use of [ConnectU’s] source code and 
confidential business plans, and usurpation of business opportunity.”160  
 
 In fact, both sites were variations of existing websites: Friendster, MySpace, 
and Club Nexus. Mark Zuckerberg admitted that, “there aren’t very many new ideas 
floating around... The facebook [sic] isn’t even a very novel idea. It’s taken from 
all these others.”161 Indeed, the original inspiration for Facebook seems to have 
come from Kris Tillery’s “Exeter Facebook”—a digital version of the photo address 
book at the Phillips Exeter Academy that appeared while Zuckerberg was a student 
there, and which he was aware of. 162 But TheFacebook did have a novel feature; 
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he described it as bringing social connection to a “different level”—it was bringing 
the connections down to a specific domain, that is, limiting it to the Harvard 
community.163 But a website designer, Victor A. Gao, a fellow student who worked 
first on the Harvard Connection and then later until November 2003 on 
TheFacebook, said that that novel feature was pioneered by Narendra and was 
Narendra’s idea.164  
 
 The Crimson Staff’s conclusion was that neither ConnectU nor 
TheFacebook was very original, but Mark Zuckerberg had the know-how and put 
in the effort to make his site successful and nobody else could take credit for that.165 
But the propitious timing of TheFacebook’s launch was not merely the result of 
good faith hard work. Confidential emails that were disclosed at the trial, and never 
denied by Mark Zuckerberg,166 suggest that he deliberately delayed his work on the 
Harvard Connection until TheFacebook launched.167 
 
 The complex litigation was finally settled in 2008.168 The Winklevosses and 
Narendra reportedly received $65 million in cash and stock in Facebook.169 The 
settlement may reflect that Mark Zuckerberg was innocent, but wanted to get rid of 
a nuisance suit—the amounts, however, suggest that the claims against him had 
some merit.170  
 
 The “don’t ask permission” attitude, the self-proclaimed “unethical” way of 
life, the contempt for users, and the sabotaging of a competitor suggest ethically 
questionable behavior in Facebook’s origins. In Mark Zuckerberg’s defense, one 
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can observe that the prefrontal cortex, the seat of the executive function and 
judgment in the human brain, is not fully developed until the age of 25.171 As a 
sophomore born in May, 1984, he was only 19 when he launched TheFacebook and 
his lapses might be excused as biologically conditioned youthful exuberance. But 
the question remains whether his moral lapses were a stage in his maturing or 
whether they represent a fixed character trait.172 In either case, his adoption of the 
behavioral-advertising business model ensured that the company would be morally 
challenged. 
 
 B.  AFTER ADVERTISING  
 
  1.  Formation, 2004-2012: The Issue of Privacy 
 
 Facebook’s relationship with advertising can be divided into two periods. 
The first period, from the origins to 2012, exemplified the extraction imperative of 
surveillance capitalism: a formative time in which Facebook accumulated gigantic 
amounts of data, but did not know how to exploit them effectively in advertising. 
During this period, the moral issue was privacy. The second period, from 2012 to 
the present, exhibited the predictive imperative: a period of consolidation of the 
advertising model. By this time, Facebook had learned how to use the mountains 
of personal data to craft personalized advertisements to users; it had adopted 
behavioral advertising. At this time the moral issue was not merely control of an 
individual’s personal information (privacy), but control of the individual himself or 
herself (autonomy).  
 
 The origins of Facebook would suggest that Mark Zuckerberg was not 
greatly concerned about privacy and never thought of autonomy as an issue. As a 
hacker, he was undoubtedly influenced by Silicon Valley’s disdain for advertising. 
In early 2004, his business partner and fellow student Eduardo Saverin began to 
push him to think of advertising, but it was a tough sell. Mark Zuckerberg wanted 
to keep Facebook as a fun site and not make any money off it.173 Later, Washington 
Post CEO Caroline Little, after a meeting with him about investing in Facebook, 
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opined that “Mark was kind of against ads, as far as we could tell . . . .”174 A sales 
rep who worked for Facebook’s first advertising firm said, “Mark never wanted 
ads.”175  Zuckerberg himself remarked “I don’t hate all advertising. I just hate 
advertising that stinks.”176 The most perspicacious observer of Facebook, the writer 
David Kirkpatrick, has written that Zuckerberg was “ambivalent,” “blasé,” and had 
“contempt for advertising.”177 When Eduardo arranged for them to visit potential 
advertisers in New York, Mark slept through about half of the meetings.178  
 
 Mark Zuckerberg was forced to adopt a utilitarian view of advertising. He 
accepted it only in order to cover the costs of operation, not to make a profit.179 The 
first advertisements, starting in April 2004, were for moving services, T-shirts, and 
other products attractive to college students. 180  They were few, cute, and 
harmless,181 were all the standard-size banner ads and did not include any annoying 
pop-up ads.182 For a time, he even placed small captions above the display ads 
reading “[w]e don’t like these either but they pay the bills.”183 Like Larry Page and 
Sergey Brin, he was uninterested in advertising that interrupted the user’s 
experience or distracted the user’s attention; he wanted advertising that would be 
useful for the user.184 In 2006, Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer, Owen Van 
Natta, whose primary task was generating revenue, remarked that “[w]e almost 
shouldn’t be making money off of [advertising], if it isn’t adding value [to the user’s 
experience].”185 Facebook maintained a profound corporate ambivalence towards 
advertising. 
 
 But in 2008, Mark Zuckerberg hired Sheryl Sandberg from Google to 
improve Facebook’s advertising strategy.186 Google’s strategy was to help people 
find what they had already decided to buy; Facebook’s would be to help them 
decide what it was they wanted to buy. Google’s advertising was “fulfill demand,” 
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while Facebook’s would be “generate demand.”187 Sheryl Sandberg remarked that, 
“There has been this myth that everyone’s waiting for our [Facebook’s] revenue 
model. But we have the revenue model. The revenue model is advertising. This is 
the business we’re in, and it’s working.”188 Essentially, she introduced to Facebook 
the Google behavioral-advertising business model. 189  Facebook became an 
advertising firm, gathering enormous amounts of information about what all users 
of its site do and then selling the ability to reach them anonymously with advertising 
based on the profiles that the Facebook users had created for themselves.190 By 
2010, Facebook was the best social media site for mining data and finding 
customers.191 
 
 Sheryl Sandberg’s introduction of behavioral advertising did not initially 
change Mark Zuckerberg’s utilitarian view, nor did it overcome his complaints 
about advertising. The complaints were twofold. First, that advertising was 
disruptive; it interfered with the user’s experience when accessing the site. 192 
Second, that advertising was offensive; it was too commercial.193 His insistence on 
preventing advertising from interfering with the user’s experience on the site 
suggests that his opposition was primarily due to the disruptive effect.  
 
 But neither he, nor Sheryl Sandberg, nor her import of surveillance 
capitalism addressed the morality of the advertising-based online business model. 
The bartering of one’s personal information in exchange for use of Facebook’s 
platform is a Faustian bargain: free service for your data.194 In the early days of 
Silicon Valley, the advertising-based business model was considered one of the 
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worst “devils” that needed to be destroyed.195 A leading internet legal scholar, 
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School, has referred to the attention merchants 
(including Facebook and Google) as “those Faustian geniuses who thought they 
had beaten the Devil.”196  Other commentators have noted Facebook’s “devil’s 
bargain of advertising” and referred to its contract with users as a relationship with 
“a Faustian element.”197  
  
 The “free” use of the platform is a key aspect of this Faustian bargain. 
“Free” is, of course, a misnomer. “Free” is not an accurate economic explanation, 
but a deceptive con game or a “bait and switch” ploy.198 Experience tells us that 
everyone loves to get “something for nothing.”199 And framing transactions as 
“free” makes it very difficult for users to evaluate the fairness of information 
practices given that they often carry a hidden charge.200 Psychologists tell us that 
people do not act rationally when they are told something is “free.” 201  They 
overestimate the value of free and lose their normal sense of cost vs. benefit.202 As 
a result, people end up trading their personal data for less than they should.203 One 
perceptive historian, Yuval Noah Harari, has analogized the situation in the 
following damning terms: “[a]t present people are happy to give away their most 
valuable asset—their personal data—in exchange for free email services and funny 
cat videos. It’s a bit like the African and Native American tribes who unwittingly 
sold entire countries to European imperialists in exchange for colorful beads and 
cheap trinkets.”204  
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  2.  Consolidation, 2012-present: The Issue of Autonomy 
 
 As noted above, advertising on radio and television is different from that on 
the internet. Although all three media use advertising, radio and television employ 
inefficient across-the-board, hit-or-miss ads. The innovation that made Facebook 
advertising phenomenally successful was its targeting. 205  While advertising 
represents itself as uncovering what consumers already desire, rather than 
informing them what they should want,206 in fact, the goal of any advertising is to 
get people to buy—to create demand. Thus, targeted advertising is more effective 
because it is more manipulative. 207  But despite Sheryl Sandberg’s focus on 
advertising until 2012, when Facebook made its initial public offering, its ads were 
not smart. Antonio Garcia Martinez, a product manager at Facebook, describing 
Facebook’s poor monetization of ads, said that Facebook’s monetization of ads was 
laughable compared to Google’s, although the usage was ungodly.208  
 
 But in 2012, in preparation for its initial public offering and to show 
investors its market value, Facebook created an intelligent targeted advertising 
powerhouse. 209  The key was its “microtargeting,” ads that were targeted or 
“personalized” to the type of individual user.210 Facebook adeptly used the huge 
trove of personal data provided by a user to target ads to that specific type of user. 
It enjoyed three advantages in developing targeted ads: it had more users than 
anyone else (over one billion); it knew more about its users than anyone else; and 
it had unique access to the users through their friends.211  
 
 And the larger the amount of personal information that a service has, the 
greater the power to manipulate. Given the mountains of data Facebook had, its 
power to manipulate was very significant. In fact, one cogent critic of current digital 
practices, computer philosopher and Microsoft employee Jaron Lanier, has 
suggested that “advertising” is a misnomer; the proper name is “behavior 
modification” because Facebook users are bombarded with continuously adjusted 
stimuli without interruption as long as they are on the site and the options open to 
them are directly micromanaged moment to moment.212 Technology mediated cues 
developed by B.J. Fogg, the inventor of “captology” (Computers As Persuasive 
 
205 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
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206ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 219. 
207 Cohen, supra note 205, at 1407. 
208 GARCIA MARTINEZ, supra note 2, at 275. 
209 MOORE, supra note 11, at 120. 
210 See id.  
211 Id. 
212 LANIER, supra note 8, at 6; LANIER, supra note 43, at 173-74. 




Technology),213 seem to be more effective than the physical cues used by the 
pioneer of behavioral modification B. F. Skinner. 214  As with Google, this 
behavioral modification was an advertiser’s dream come true—not just enticing to 
buy, but causing a purchase. It was the nightmare foretold by advertising’s critics 
in the twentieth century. These new behavioral advertisers were truly able to reduce 
the users’ autonomy.  
 
 Behavior modification depletes autonomy through three processes: 
addiction, surveillance, and manipulation. Addiction and surveillance facilitate 
manipulation. 
 
   a.  Addiction 
 
 As early as summer 2004, Mark Zuckerberg and his colleagues, observing 
how students used TheFacebook, described it as “the trance.”215 As Sean Parker, 
Facebook’s first President, said, “[using TheFacebook] was hypnotic. You’d just 
keep clicking and clicking and clicking from profile to profile, viewing the data.”216 
Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook and Google, has noted that 
Facebook “consciously addict[s]” its users in order to make their products and 
advertising more valuable. 217  One chronicler of Facebook’s history has 
characterized the website as “addictive” from the very beginning. 218  Antonio 
Garcia Martinez, a Facebook product manager, has written, “[u]p there with heroin, 
 
213 See generally B. J. Foggs, Stanford Persuasive Technology Lab, STAN. UNIV., 
http://captology.stanford.edu/about/about-bj-fogg.html (discussing the various resources that the 
lab developed for the ethical creation of persuasive technologies); see also DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, 
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(2016).  
214 WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 43; CLIFF KUANG WITH ROBERT FABRICANT, USER 
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PLAY 255 (2019) (noting that Cliff Kuang, a product designer, has called Facebook a “Skinner 
box”). 
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carbohydrates, or a weekly paycheck: that is how addictive and rewarding 
Facebook was.”219  
 
 Until recently, few psychologists had concluded that social media sites, 
including Facebook, were “addictive,” because addiction is generally associated 
with substances, not behavior.220 Adam Alter, Associate Professor at NYU’s Stern 
School of Business, notes that substance addiction and behavioral addiction 
activate the same brain areas and arise from the same aspects of human nature: the 
need for social engagement and social support, mental stimulation, and a sense of 
effectiveness.221 He defines “addiction” as “something you enjoy doing in the short 
term that undermines your well-being in the long term—but that you do 
compulsively anyway.”222 In 2013, the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) added 
the official diagnosis “behavioral addiction” to the list.223  David Greenfield, a 
clinical psychologist and founder of the Center for Internet and Technology 
Addiction, asserts that Zuckerberg knew from the beginning that the site was 
“addictive” and was designed to have social validation loops and intermittent 
reinforcement to push people to use it over and over again.224  
 
 The product designer Nir Eyal, the author of “Hooked: How to Build Habit-
Forming Products,” has laid out the “hook model” to addiction in four sequential 
steps used by internet service providers: trigger (the spark plug, such as a Web site 
link); action (behavior in anticipation of a reward); variable reward (unpredictable 
feedback loops create intrigue); and investment (the input of time, data, effort social 
capital or money by the user into the service).225 One example of this design would 
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be the “like” button on Facebook which changed tracking friends’ lives from a 
passive activity to a deeply interactive one with the type of unpredictable feedback 
that contributes to addiction.226 It has even been proposed that Facebook might have 
its own version of addiction—“Facebook Addiction Disorder.”227  
 
 The British neuroscientist Susan Greenfield has stated that Facebook 
“likes” are “designed from the ground up to be addictive.”228 She described the 
neurochemistry of the process as follows:  
 
(1) fast-paced screen interaction is exciting and 
arousing; (2) as a consequence of this arousal, 
dopamine is released; (3) dopamine underlies 
systems for reward and addiction, and also inhibits 
the prefrontal cortex [the site of the brain’s executive 
function]; (4) an underactive prefrontal cortex 
characterizes the brain-states of schizophrenics, the 
obese, compulsive gamblers and children, there the 
here-and-now trumps any consequences; (5) the 
screen will have more appeal as it offers strong 
sensory stimulation.229  
 
The result on Facebook is addiction “to short-term, dopamine-driven feedback 
loops.”230 This is perfectly suited to Facebook’s business model, which is online 
behavioral advertising. Advertising is driven by engagement, and the best way to 
engage is to keep delivering small dopamine hits.  
 
 Robert H. Lustig, Professor of Pediatrics at U. of C. San Francisco, has 
noted that markets, even if unpredictable and volatile, usually work, but he adds, 
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“[e]xcept when it comes to addictive substances.”231 If Facebook and Google are 
addictive, then it would be inappropriate to allow operation on market principles 
without restriction.  
 
 Google and Facebook’s services operate through dopamine-feedback loops 
and on market principles and are addictive--“the twenty-first century version of 
Marx’s ‘opiate of the people.’” 232 And addiction is a “paradigm threat to personal 
autonomy.”233  
  
   b.  Surveillance  
 
 Obtaining the data necessary for the behavioral-advertising business model 
requires surveillance, or watching and tracking.234 Mammals dislike surveillance, 
which is considered a threat because it indicates they are prey to predators.235 But 
surveillance is widespread because people like freedom, enjoy convenience, and do 
not perceive the surveillance.236 Great Britain’s Information Commission Office’s 
2006 report described Western democracies as “surveillance societies”237; cyber 
security expert Bruce Schneier has called surveillance the “business model of the 
Internet”238; and Shoshanna Zuboff, as noted above, has described the current 
 
231 LUSTIG, supra note 111, at 199. University of Maryland Law Professor Julie Cohen has 
observed “[w]e accept without question that new drugs should be evaluated for their effects on 
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American economy as an example of “surveillance capitalism.”239 And Facebook 
is at the center of this economy, having the most pervasive surveillance system in 
the world240 and being the biggest surveillance-based enterprise in the history of 
mankind.241 According to WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, Facebook is also 
“the greatest spying machine the world has ever seen.”242 Facebook’s surveillance 
involves not only the collection of Facebook users’ information disclosed on 
Facebook but also information from other sources, including those from people 
who are not even on Facebook. It enables surveillance not only by commercial and 
political entities but also by Facebook users and government.243 As the Edward 
Snowden revelations of 2013 showed, American intelligence services had access to 
the data acquired by Facebook and Google, demonstrating that state and 
commercial surveillance is inextricably linked.244  
 
 Information is power, and more information is more power. 245  Some 
information grants some control, and extensive information grants extensive 
control. As a source of information, surveillance facilitates control.246 Facebook 
possesses unparalleled databases on users and has unparalleled power and control 
over them. One critic has observed that the chief danger from Facebook’s 
surveillance system is in its concentration of power in Facebook.247 Given the 
extensive reach of the federal criminal law, it seems likely that Facebook possesses 
information on many individuals sufficient to support an indictment, if not 
conviction, based on some obscure provision of the law.248 As noted above, the 
government seems to have access to Facebook’s data, making every Facebook user 
potentially subject to a careful review of their data for potential evidence of criminal 
offenses. Some may confidently assert that this has never happened, but there is no 
assurance that we would ever know if it has happened or that it will not happen in 
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the future. In sum, pervasive surveillance generates information that enables the 
manipulation of the users of Google’s and Facebook’s services. 
 
   c.  Manipulation 
 
 Addiction and surveillance allow manipulation—treating another person 
not as a fellow rational agent who can be reasoned with, but as a device to be 
operated. Manipulation violates another person’s autonomy.249  
 
 Manipulation by Facebook refers specifically to utilizing the cognitive 
biases of users to influence their perceptions and their behavior.250 Addiction and 
surveillance entail manipulation particularly when something is new and poorly 
understood. The overwhelming majority of internet users have no formal training 
in it and lack a knowledge of how Facebook and other firms are manipulating 
them.251 As University of Chicago Law Professor, Eric Posner, has said of the 
advertising-based business model, “[a]ll this is so new that ordinary people haven’t 
figured out how manipulated they are by these companies.”252 Roger McNamee has 
warned, “Facebook exploits its users’ fear and anger to such a degree that many are 
vulnerable to manipulation by those who exploit its algorithms and architecture to 
. . . harm the powerless.”253 When Facebook introduced its video tab, Watch, in 
August, 2017, the chief executive of the agency 360i said, “[o]ne of the things that 
Facebook has done here . . . is that they let the ad model lead the consumer behavior 
versus the other way around.” 254  One tech investor surmised that the thought 
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process of the Silicon Valley founders could be characterized as “[w]e have to 
understand people better in order to manipulate them better.”255  
 
 This manipulation is enabled by the data collected through addiction and 
surveillance. This data, even in its initial form is not “raw,” but reflects certain 
assumptions. 256  It is formatted through algorithms which contain further 
assumptions.257 These formats of information then open and foreclose opportunities 
for the users.258 Formatting is political work—the exercise of power. The resulting 
information allows control, not in the sense of a direct, perceived suppression of 
the user’s autonomous will, but through framing the user’s world through the direct 
and constant micromanagement of the options in front of the person. And this 
framing takes place beyond the user’s gaze and without the user’s comprehension; 
the user remains largely unaware of it. Stuart Russell, Professor of Engineering at 
the University of California, Berkeley, noted that Facebook’s content-selection 
algorithms are designed to maximize the probability that the user clicks on 
presented items, but the end result is not simply to present items that the user likes 
to click on; it is to change the user’s preferences so that they become more 
predictable.259 He says, “Once surveillance capabilities are in place, the next step 
is to modify your behavior to suit those who are deploying this technology.”260 
 
 Professor Russell, in treating content selection algorithms on Facebook, has 
described in the abstract what is different in this process from traditional 
advertising: 
 
First, because AI systems can track an individual’s online 
reading habits, preferences, and likely state of knowledge, 
they can tailor specific messages to maximize impact on that 
individual while minimizing the risk that the information 
will be disbelieved. Second, the AI system knows whether 
the  individual reads the message, how long they spend 
reading it, and whether they follow additional links within 
the message. It then uses these signals as immediate 
feedback on the success or failure of its attempt to influence 
 
255 John Thornhill, Opinion, Silicon Valley is slowly learning how to speak human, FIN. TIMES 
(May 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c5e59d7e-5747-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8. 
256 See CHENEY-LIPPOLD, supra note 116, at vii., 155, 179-80.  
257 See id. at 55. 
258 See id. at 54.  
259 RUSSELL, supra note 248, at 104. 
260 Id.  
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12 
38 
 
each individual; in this way, it quickly learns to become 
more effective in its work.261  
 
 Dutch Professors Mireille Hildebrandt and Bert-Jaap Koops give a specific 
example of manipulation:  
 
For example, if I am contemplating becoming vegetarian, 
profiling software may infer this from my online behaviour. 
It may for instance infer that there is an 83  per cent 
chance that I will stop eating meat within the coming month 
and sell this  information to a retailer or industry that has 
an interest in me remaining a carnivore. Whoever bought this 
information may send me free samples of the type of meat I 
am inferred to prefer and may for instance place 
‘advertorials’ on websites that I visit containing scientific 
evidence of the specific benefits of the consumption of beef. 
The profiling software may have calculated that such 
measure will reduce the chance that I stop eating by 23 per 
cent, thus making such investment worthwhile. Meanwhile I 
am unaware of all this activity.262  
 
This manipulation is the inevitable result of the behavioral-advertising business 
model and the combination of addiction, surveillance, and manipulation is essential 
to this model.  
 
   d.  Loss of Autonomy 
 
Philosophers have questioned the nature of autonomy. Clearly, no one can 
conduct herself free from the influence that does not derive directly from her own 
authority. As Philosophy Professors Sarah Buss and Andrea Westlund have 
observed, “[e]verything we do is a response to past and present circumstances over 
which we have no control.”263 The critical question for philosophers then is: what 
distinguishes autonomy-undermining influences on a person’s decision, intention, 
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or will from those motivating forces that merely play a role in the self-governing 
process? Philosophers have been unable to reach a consensus on the answer to this 
question which is also the question of the precise nature of the threats to personal 
autonomy.264  
 
 One way of responding to this question in the current digital context of 
Facebook and Google, is the concept of the “autonomy trap” as conceived by 
Director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, Professor Paul M. 
Schwartz. The “autonomy trap” refers to the fact that self-determination in the 
digital age is not self-determined, that is, self-determination itself is shaped by the 
processing of personal data. 265 The most concrete description of the implications 
of the “autonomy trap” has been given by Vice Dean of the University of Haifa, 
Law Faculty, Tal Zarsky. He describes the vicious cycle of the autonomy trap as 
follows: 
 
(a) Individuals inform the information providers which types 
of knowledge and information they are interested in and 
provide (both implicitly and explicitly) personal information 
such as their traits and interests; 
 
(b) The content providers supply individuals with specific 
information ‘tailored’ to the needs of every person, 
according to each provider’s specific strategy, and chosen on 
the basis of the personal information previously collected; 
 
(c) The individuals require additional information. This time, 
however, the  request is affected by the information 
previously provided; 
 
(d) Again, the information providers supply information, in 
accordance with their policies and discretion; 
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The central feature of the “autonomy trap” is manipulation. Professors Buss 
and Westlund are correct that we respond to circumstances over which we have no 
control. We take the natural environment as given and would not consider it as 
limiting our autonomy. The key question is how the circumstances arise. Are they 
the result of the objective conditions of the general environment or are they directed 
at someone by someone else? This distinction is important for autonomy. We can 
see this when we consider slavery. Why is it that we find slavery is so morally 
egregious? “It is not just because the slave is not able to govern himself, it is 
because he is governed by someone else. The master has imposed his will on the 
slave in a way that the slave would not endorse.” 267  When circumstances are 
intentionally arranged to influence the individual in a way that is beneficial to the 
influencer and detrimental to the individual, this is manipulation that depletes 
autonomy. The key is that the conditions are not natural or random, they are 
intentional.268  
 
 As we come to spend more and more time online, our online behavior not 
only influences our off-line behavior, it constitutes all our behavior.269 As more and 
more of our commercial and personal relationships are migrating online, our 
choices for storing and exchanging information and for entertaining, informing, and 
expressing ourselves do so as well.270 We are adopting a “digital form of life” and 
becoming “digital human beings.”271 Nicholas Carr has observed that the essence 
of computer systems is not emancipation, but control and the acts of control become 
harder to detect and those wielding control more difficult to discern.272 More and 
more our online experiences are shaped to fit the commercial interests of Google 
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and Facebook and we pay for the convenience with an erosion of our autonomy.273 
This is what the “autonomy trap” entails.  
 
 But as noted above, this manipulation is an affront to a person as a rational 
and moral being. It is a failure to respect the person’s rational moral agency that is 
critical to personhood. It is to treat the person as something less than a person and 
is therefore wrong.274 
 
 C.  THE BEHAVIORAL-ADVERTISING BUSINESS MODEL AND ITS  
  IMPLICATIONS 
  
  1.  The Economics of the Behavioral-Advertising Business  
   Model 
 
 The immorality of the behavioral-advertising business model is the result in 
large part of its economics.275 Economic incentives define critical aspects of the 
model. Surprisingly, online advertisements are not worth very much. One estimate 
in 2015 suggested that the average Facebook user spends a total of 20 hours on the 
platform per month and Facebook earns in profit only about 20 cents a month per 
user. 276 These paltry sums drive the business model and have three consequences: 
(1) only a platform with hundreds of millions of users can make substantial profits; 
(2) the platform must keep the users engaged so they can be advertised to; and (3) 
the platform must gather personal data from the users in order to target the 
advertisements and manipulate the users. But this business model conflicts with the 
desires of the users. Approximately two thirds of Americans do not want 
advertisements that target them based on tracking and analysis of personal data.277 
The users simply want to connect with other people, but the platforms must 
manipulate them to survive and make a profit. Many people believe that their 
Facebook feed shows everything that their friends post, but that is not so. The 
 
273 Id. at 241. See also WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at xiii (“...increasingly the choices 
we make are subtly (and not so subtly) manipulated by the makers of our technology in ways 
intended to promote the makers’ profit over our individual and collective well-being”). As 
Douglas Rushkoff, Professor of Media Studies at Queens College, has noted, “Whoever controls 
the menu controls the choices.” DOUGLASS RUSHKOFF, TEAM HUMAN 64 (2019). 
274 See Noggle, supra note 268, at 52. 
275 Zeynep Tufekci, What ‘Free’ Really Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2015, at A25. The profit figure 
is from Ethan Zuckerman, who helped found Tripod.com, an early ad-financed site with user-
generated content. 
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algorithm decides what the user sees and it seeks, above all, to increase engagement 
and advertising revenue.278   
 
 The economic imperatives of the business model have led to immoral 
behavior in various forms as described below. One particularly egregious form is 
the exploitation of children—it not only adults who are subject to surveillance, data 
collection, and manipulation. U.K. Baroness Kidron, a member of the House of 
Lords, visiting Silicon Valley to listen to companies’ objections to proposed rules 
to protect children online, said of her discussions: “[t]he main thing they are asking 
me is: [a]re you really expecting companies to give up profits by restricting the data 
they collect on children?’” she said, referring to various online services she had met 
with this year. ‘Of course I am! Of course, everyone should.’”279  
 
  2.  The Morality of the Behavioral-Advertising Business  
   Model 
 
 Despite the general reluctance to surface moral issues inside280 and outside 
Facebook, several commentators have questioned the morality of Facebook’s 
business model. Chris Hughes, a roommate of Zuckerberg and former spokesman 
for Facebook, has said, “I hate selling ads. . . . It makes me feel seedy.”281 Professor 
Zittrain has suggested that aspects of the behavioral-advertising business model are 
incompatible with ethically serving users, as polluted streams are incompatible with 
ethically mining coal.282 Reporter Eduardo Porter of the New York Times has noted 
that “the raw business models of the colossi of the data economy are creepy in and 
of themselves.”283 After disclosures that the company’s priority on growth led to 
 
278 See Matthew Lynley, This is How an Ad Gets Placed in Your Facebook Newsfeed, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mattlynley/this-is-how-an-ad-gets-
placed-in-your-facebook-news-feed.  
279 Singer, supra note 227, at B6; Kashmir Hill & Aaron Krolik, Photos of Your Kids Are 
Powering Surveillance A.I., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2019, at BU 1; see Editorial, Defend Privacy 
Protections for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2019, at A26 (noting the efforts by the technology 
industry to weaken protections for children); see also Jack Nicas, Sex Trafficking via Facebook 
Sets Off a Lawyer’s Novel Legal Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2019, at B1.  
280 Roger McNamee has said, “[i]f there was [at Facebook] any soul searching about the morality 
of intense surveillance and the manipulation of user attention, or about protecting users against 
unintended consequences, I have been able to find no evidence of it.” MCNAMEE, supra note 58, 
at 77-78. 
281 FOER, supra note 63, at 136. 
282 Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Can Still Fix This Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2018, at SR3. New 
Yorker reporter Andrew Marantz has suggested that Facebook’s failure to censor hate speech is 
“immoral.” See Andrew Marantz, Free Speech Is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2019, at SR6. 
283 Eduardo Porter, Before Fixing Our Data-Driven Ecosystem, A Crucial Question: How Much Is 
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ignoring signs of disrupting elections, Rishad Tobaccowala, chief growth officer 
for the Publicis Groupe, one of the world’s biggest ad companies said, “[n]ow we 
know Facebook will do whatever it takes to make money. They have absolutely no 
morals.”284 But perhaps most damning were the comments by Tim Cook, CEO of 
Apple, in a speech to the Electronic Privacy Information Center in Washington, D. 
C., in which he said “I’m speaking to you from Silicon Valley, where some of the 
most prominent and successful companies have built their businesses by lulling 
customers into complacency about their personal information. They’re gobbling up 
everything they can learn about you and trying to monetize it. We think that’s 
wrong.”285 
 
 In late 2018, editorials in two of the world’s most respected newspapers, 
The New York Times and The Financial Times, severely criticized Facebook’s 
business model. On November 17, 2018, in an editorial titled “Facebook Cannot 
Be Trusted,” The New York Times said, “Facebook’s business model, which . . . 
capitalizes on personal information to influence the behavior of its users and then 
sells that influence to advertisers for a profit . . . is an ecosystem ripe for 
manipulation.” 286 On December 2, in an editorial titled “Facebook must recognize 
it is more than a platform,” The Financial Times said, “[a]nother company might at 
this point question whether its business model is ethically sound. Facebook instead 
remains largely in a state of denial . . . . Broad changes to its business model are 
required . . . . It is untenable for the doyen of social media to continue placing profits 
above privacy, and above democracy.”287 
 
  3.  Disregard for Moral Issues 
 
 Addiction, surveillance, and manipulation occur only after a person joins 
Facebook. It raises the question of why people ignore the moral issues and join 
Facebook in the first place. Perhaps the best explanation, but an abstract one, comes 
from the neuroscientist Professor Mathew D. Lieberman who said, “[c]reating ways 
to keep us connected is . . . the central problem of mammalian evolution.”288 People 
use Facebook because it has found a new way of keeping people connected. More 
specifically, three aspects make the service attractive: (1) it is free; (2) “network 
effects” (the value of a network grows as more people use it); and (3) “lock-in” 
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(difficulty of abandoning the network). These three factors seem to be more 
important than individual choice. If all your friends are on Facebook, how can you 
not join? Perhaps it’s also affected by what Professor Aboujaoude calls “reverse 
parenting”—parents emulating their children in the virtual world rather than the 
other way around.289 Roger McNamee has suggested a consumer rationale: “[a]s 
consumers, we crave convenience. We crave connection. We crave free.”290 But 
perhaps the enduring motive is not quite so crass. A study at the University of 
Connecticut found that although users generally signed up for Facebook to 
communicate with friends and relatives, fairly quickly they use it to fight 
boredom.291 
 
 The user often doesn’t know the ramifications of using the site and doesn’t 
understand the underlying economic goal of social networking—monetizing 
personal information.292 The monetization of the user’s information, the key to the 
devil’s bargain of Facebook use, is by stealth; it is completely “frictionless”—
immediate, effortless, silent, invisible, unnoticed, and automatic.293 An empirical 
explanation comes from the scholar who has done the most relevant research on the 
topic, Professor Joseph Turow of the Annenberg School for Communication at the 
University of Pennsylvania. He has concluded that those who join Facebook are not 
participating in a rational exchange, they are giving up their personal information 
out of a lack of legal literacy, out of futility, and out of resignation.294 As Professor 
Turkle has observed, “[a]s long as Facebook and Google are seen as necessities, if 
they demand information, young people know they will supply it. They don’t know 
what else to do.”295  
 
 One might ask why is Facebook so popular an employer in the tech industry 
if the business model is defective. Glassdoor, a site allowing employees to 
anonymously rank their employers, gave Facebook the No. 1 place in 2017.296 
Good salaries (starting at about $140,000 per year), generous benefits (Philz Coffee 
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on campus), and the allure of a famous company may explain the attraction.297 As 
Olivia Brown, head of Stanford’s Computer Science and Social Good Club said, 
“everyone cares about ethics in tech before they get a contract.”298 Recently, morale 
has suffered as employees have begun to question the company’s business model. 
In April 2018, Westin Lohne, a product designer at Facebook who left said, 
“[m]orally, it was extremely difficult to continue working there.”299 At a gathering 
of young engineers at Berkeley in November 2018, many said they would avoid 
taking jobs at Facebook. 300  One engineering student invited to a Facebook 
recruiting event said, “I’ve heard a lot of employees there don’t even use it . . . I 
just don’t believe in the product because like, Facebook, the baseline of everything 
they do is desire to show people more ads.”301 Some students who were taking jobs 
there are doing so more quietly and advising friends they have carved out more 
ethical work at the company or would work from within to change it.302  The 
Financial Times lauded Facebook’s employees saying, “some tech company 
employees have highlighted how these companies’ noble goals can clash with the 
daily reality of tricking people into clicking on advertisements . . . Bold tech 
employees are speaking out and holding their bosses to account for their fine words. 
They should be applauded for doing so.” 303 In 2018, Facebook’s ranking in the 
Glassdoor survey noted above declined from No. 1 to No. 7.304 
 
 More employees perceiving the moral deficiencies in the business model 
presents a threat to the companies. Maciej Ceglowski, the founder of the social 
bookmarking service Pinboard, has said that “[t]ech workers are the only point of 
leverage on these big companies.”305 Jaron Lanier has noted that “[t]he one thing 
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that will kill [the internet giants] totally is if the good engineers start leaving. Then 
the companies will die.”306  
 
 When people talk about their Facebook use (at least to me), they do not 
explicitly talk about ethics or morality, but they express reservations. Respondents 
to my questions about Facebook use generally say something like, “[w]e are not on 
social media or Facebook,” “I am on Facebook, but I have not posted anything in 
months,” “I was on Facebook for a while, but I quit some time ago.” Perhaps the 
most revealing statement was “I told my daughter ‘Don’t use it [Facebook]. It is 
not kosher.’” In the summer of 2018, a New York Times tech reporter, Daisuke 
Wakabayashi, found that “[f]or the first time, I noted people were making excuses 
as to why they were even on Facebook anymore as though it was an embarrassing 
vice.”307 In 2018, after the Cambridge Analytica revelations, Elon Musk, the CEO 
of Tesla, deleted his companies’ Facebook pages,308 and reporter Walt Mossberg 
of the Wall Street Journal, one of the most prominent tech columnists, deactivated 
his Facebook account saying, “I am doing this—after being on Facebook for nearly 
12 years—because my own values and the policies and actions of Facebook have 
diverged to the point where I’m no longer comfortable here.” 309  Another 
dissatisfied user summed up her experience on Facebook saying “[Facebook] took 
me right back to high school.”310 
 
 Why don’t more quit?311 Because it keeps you from falling out of touch with 
people you don’t see very often. Many do not quit because their friendships, their 
jobs, their spare time, their very sense of self is closely associated with Facebook. 
If they gave up Facebook, they would be severing part of their life or exiling 
themselves from society. 312 For others the reason is probably FOMO—the fear of 
missing out. 313 One of the most humiliating questions in the English language is, 
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“Oh! You mean, you haven’t heard?” Some do not quit because of the group 
support they find on the platform.314 One morally conflicted Facebook user, the 
mother of a special-needs child, suggested gathering members of a support group 
on Facebook and jumping ship together because “not that we need Facebook. We 
just need one another.” 315 It appears that few people quit for moral reasons. A 
moral philosopher, S. Matthew Liao, Professor at NYU, whose focus was not the 
moral nature of the business model, asked “Do You Have a Moral Duty to Leave 
Facebook?” He decided that the answer for him was to await new information to 
see whether Facebook has crossed a moral red line. 316 Billions will continue to use 
Facebook regardless of a study of Facebook usage by researchers at NYU and 
Stanford that found that deactivating Facebook had a “positive . . . effect” on  mood 
and life satisfaction.317  
 
 Some have asserted that they are not very concerned about the behavioral-
advertising business model because they feel that their privacy and autonomy have 
not been affected; they do not feel manipulated.318 There is no perfect answer to 
such assertions. But one might ask that individual: (1) “Have you ever looked at 
the data that Google and Facebook have collected on you?”319 (2) The manipulation 
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is inherent in the system, so the burden of proof should reverse.320 “Can you show 
that you haven’t been manipulated?” (3) “You think your autonomy hasn’t been 
compromised? Just wait...” But by then it will be too late.321 
 
  4.  Exploitation of Human Weakness  
 
 Some might say that the moral question of this behavioral-advertising 
business model is the user’s lack of self-control. Columbia University Sociology 
Professor Duncan Watts asserted that Facebook’s popularity was due to voyeurism 
and exhibitionism and had nothing to do with networking.322 One could argue that 
individuals should exercise self-discipline and exhibit moral courage and resist peer 
pressure to join Facebook even when all their friends are on it. But as Professor H. 
Lustig of the University of California, San Francisco, has said, “addiction and 
depression are not choices that people make willingly. Our environment has been 
engineered to make sure our choices are anything but free.”323 More and more, we 
don’t simply condemn opioid addiction as a lack of self-control. We should not do 
so for addiction caused by behavioral advertising. 
 
 But the larger question is whether as a society we want to allow the intrusion 
of market values and the profit incentive to allow such manipulation of other human 
beings in their personal relationships, their commercial activities, and their civic 
duties. MIT Professor, Sherry Turkle, has observed, “technology is seductive when 
what is offers meets our human vulnerabilities. And as it turns out, we are very 
vulnerable indeed.” 324  Psychologists have described in detail many human 
vulnerabilities, such as the availability heuristic, the affect heuristic, WYSIATI, 
confirmation bias, the priming effect, the anchoring effect, hindsight bias, loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, the planning fallacy,325 inattentional blindness,326 
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“ego depletion”327 and many other heuristic biases arising from our proclivity to 
“think fast” rather than “think slow.”328 Many of these would apply to users of 
Google and Facebook. Privacy is especially sensitive to heuristic biases.329 Tristan 
Harris, a former design ethicist at Google and co-director of Time Well Spent, has 
noted that the user’s willpower is engaged in an unequal battle; it is competing with 
1,000 people on the other side of the screen whose job it is to break down the self-
regulation that a user has.330 He describes ways they have devised to keep users on 
the site, such as controlling the menu to control the choices; stoking the fear of 
missing something important; using social approval and social reciprocity; instant 
interruptions; inconvenient choices; and auto play (Facebook deliberately auto 
plays the next video after a countdown).331 Professor Turkle sums up the discussion 
with the conclusion of a precocious sixteen-year-old girl: “[t]echnology is bad 
because people are not as strong as its pull.”332 
 
  5.  Users as Lab Animals 
 
 The depletion of autonomy through addiction, surveillance, and 
manipulation and the perversion of personhood are incompatible with human 
dignity. An entity that tracks and collects the private information of its constituents 
or users has deprived them of their inherent dignity as autonomous individuals and 
treated them as objects to be understood and controlled.333 Several critics have 
analogized Facebook users to lab animals: “[i]nternet designers are not treating us 
like humans, they’re treating us like lab rats…”; “[w]e have become data-producing 
farm animals . . . We are the cows. Facebook clicks on us . . . ”; “[w]e’re being 
hypnotized little by little by technicians we can’t see, for purposes we don’t know. 
We are all lab animals now . . . ”; and “[the behavioral-advertising business model] 
has turned most of the human race into part-time lab rats.”334 Specific acts of 
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manipulation have been reported in which Facebook without the knowledge or 
consent of its users has turned them into psychological study subjects and freely 
and secretly experimented on them.335 Roger McNamee, commenting on remarks 
by Sheryl Sandberg, has noted that, “[i]f Sheryl’s comments are any indication, 
running experiments on users without prior consent is a standard practice at 
Facebook.”336  
 
  6.  Unhappiness 
 
 Facebook also seems to sabotage users’ inalienable right to the pursuit of 
happiness—it generates more unhappiness than happiness. Professor Lustig has 
asserted that “[w]e are our biochemistry, whether we like it or not. And our 
biochemistry can be manipulated.” 337  He has written that “reward is not 
contentment, and pleasure is not happiness; reward is dopamine and contentment is 
serotonin; chronic excess reward interferes with contentment.” 338  A two-week 
time-analysis study suggests that the more people use Facebook, the less subjective 
well-being they experience. 339  This can explain why many users initially feel 
excited by their Facebook use, but after a while experience unhappiness. In 2013, 
psychologists at the University of Michigan and Leuven studied two components 
of subjective well-being: how young people feel moment-to-moment and how 
satisfied they are with their lives.340 The results showed that Facebook use predicted 
negative shifts on both components over time.341 The psychologists concluded that, 
“[o]n the surface, Facebook provides an invaluable resource for fulfilling the basic 
human need for social connection. Rather than enhancing well-being, however, 
 
likelihood that a Facebook user has been a guinea pig in one of Facebook’s experiments is at 100 
percent). 
335 See Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know about Facebook’s Secret, Mood Manipulation 
Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-
secret-mood-manipulation-experiment/373648/; see also SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 203. 
336 McNamee refers to the 2014 Facebook study “Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale 
Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks.” MCNAMEE, supra note 51, at 88–89. 
337 LUSTIG, supra note 85, at 121. 
338 Id. at 221-2. 
339 Id. at 233. 
340 Ethan Kross et al., Facebook Use Predicts Declines in Subjective Well-Being in Young Adults, 
PLOS/ONE (Aug. 14, 
2013), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0069841.  
341 Id.  




these findings suggest that Facebook may undermine it.”342 Deactivating Facebook 
can have a positive effect on a user’s mood and life satisfaction.  
 
  7.  Critical Silence 
 
 It seems clear that the business model of Facebook is morally flawed. But 
the primary guardians of morality in America, the churches, have not condemned 
it. Perhaps they were led astray by a service that was free and convenient. Maybe 
they see the greater convenience of the Facebook platform over a Church webpage 
for connecting with members as sufficient justification for any moral qualms. Or 
perhaps it is because the pastors are following, not leading, their flocks. The 
churches are faced with a fait accompli—many of their members—particularly 
younger members—use Facebook, so in an environment of declining church 
membership, 343 they may have adopted a utilitarian stance that does not risk losing 
touch with their current and future members. Protestant churches and the Catholic 
church have websites and are on Facebook, but the Pope apparently is not, although 
he is reportedly on Twitter.344 Granted, the churches have protested some uses of 
Facebook,345 but their Facebook pages and their suggestions that parishioners can 
contact them through these pages lend the moral support of the churches to the 
business model. This absence of criticism and active support of the business model 
would seem to diminish the moral authority of the churches.346 Perhaps they do not 
recognize the ethical issues in the advertising-based business model. Even if they 
decide they must participate, they could at least notify members that the church’s 
participation is not an endorsement of the business model. It seems odd that Tim 
Cook can criticize the Facebook business model, but church leaders do not.  
 
 
342 Id.; see also Manjoo, supra note 230; Jean M. Twenge, World Happiness Report 2019: 
Chapter 5: The Sad State of Happiness in the United States and the Role of Digital Media, WORLD 
HAPPINESS REPORT (March 20, 2019), https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2019/ (relating the use of 
digital media, including social media, to a rise in unhappiness among Americans since 2012). 
Former Surgeon General Vivek Murthy told CBS News in 2017 that “for too many people 
technology has led to substituting online connections for offline in-person connections, and 
ultimately I think it has been harmful.” See WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 118. 
343 See e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Church Membership Down Sharply in Past Two Decades, 
GALLUP (Apr. 18, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/248837/church-membership-down-sharply-
past-two-decades.aspx.  
344 Lina Sharkey, The reason why the Pope has a Twitter and not a Facebook account, 
INDEPENDENT (May 23, 2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/the-reason-why-the-
pope-has-a-twitter-and-not-a-facebook-account-9426746.html. 
345 See Chris Gayomali, A Catholic Parish Calls Facebook the ‘Opposite of Christian Culture,’ 
TIME (Apr. 11, 2011), http://techland.time.com/author/chrisgayomali2/page/3/?order=ASC. 
346 The same concerns apply to schools, colleges, and other not-for-profit institutions. 
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 Schools, universities, and other educational institutions have put links to 
Facebook on their webpages and in communications with alumni. This common 
practice poses moral questions. First, one would think that as not-for-profit entities 
they would not be making recommendations for profit-making enterprises. 
Educational institutions are not typically in the business of promoting the goods or 
services of third parties. 347  Nor do universities in other contexts provide free 
advertising or promote other profit-making enterprises. Universities do not suggest 
that students and alumni use an Apple, rather than Dell, computer to contact the 
university on the internet. Why should they do so for Facebook? Second, Facebook 
is not a public utility.348 It is a private enterprise that makes money by monetizing 
the personal information of its users. As a publicly listed company, it has very 
strong incentives to exploit this information in the future in any possible way349—
ones that we cannot even imagine today. These incentives are a recipe for an 
immoral business model. Third, the free advertising by schools and universities put 
the integrity of these institutions at stake. Why is a profit-making company with an 
immoral business model given the advantage of free publicity? Of course, the 
superficial answer is that Facebook is popular with students. The better answer is 
that the institutions have lost their moral compass. 
 
 Another reason why there has not been a more forceful reaction against 
surveillance capitalism and its behavioral-advertising business model is market 
imperialism. Market imperialism discourages attention to morality and for many in 
the tech industry moral critiques are uncool.350 But perhaps it is also because we, 
like the founders of Google and Facebook, did not understand advertising.351 More 
specifically, this business model was unprecedented. It was poorly understood; 
people did not grasp how it worked or how the companies made money.352 The 
technology implementing the model was dazzling, intimidating, and complex. In 
 
347 This analysis would likely differ when considering private educational institutions that are for-
profit.  
348 This is true even though users may treat it that way and Mark Zuckerberg has so declared. But 
if it is truly a public utility, then it should be heavily regulated as are other public utilities. For 
“utility” comments, see KIRKPATRICK, supra note 144, at 144; see also LANIER, supra note 43, at 
250. On a similar note, Nicholas Carr has suggested that, “[t]he PC age is giving way to a new era: 
the utility age.” CARR, supra note 270, at 61. 
349 A major factor in business decisions for publicly listed companies is based on what 
shareholders will want: money.  
350 CARR, supra note 15, at 10. 
351 Sherry Turkle has warned that, “We’re accustomed to media manipulation—advertising has 
always tried to do this. But unprecedented kinds of information about us...allows for 
unprecedented interventions and intrusions. What is at stake is a sense of a self in control of itself. 
And a citizenry that can think for itself.” SHERRY TURKLE, RECLAIMING CONVERSATION 314 
(2015). 
352 See id. 




comparison with the physical world, the online environment made it harder to 
detect the acts of manipulation and control. 353  The legal environment was 
unprepared and caught off guard when Google and Facebook arrogated to 
themselves the right to “move fast and break things” or charge ahead, pushing 
technology into new areas without seeking permission.354 The companies believed 
that new technology was both good 355  and inevitable 356  and we consented, 
switching off our critical faculties.357 The two companies expended huge resources 
to take advantage of basic human desires for information and connection and 
exploited human weaknesses, such as heuristic biases and addiction. Perhaps we 
have not reacted more forcefully because, as Shoshanna Zuboff suggests, 
surveillance capitalism has left us feeling helpless, resigned, and numb.358  
 
 Nor should we disregard fear or intimidation. Anyone familiar with social 
media understands the power of troll swarms, bot armies, and denial of service 
(DoS) attacks. Criticism of Google and Facebook could lead to rapid and vicious 
attacks by those who value these services. Wael Ghonim, a former Google 
executive who organized the Arab Spring protests against the Egyptian dictator 
Hosni Mubarak through social media, remarked that “. . . it is much harder to 
actually stand up against the mainstream on Twitter than stand up against a 
 
353 CARR, supra note 270, at 199. 
354 For example, Antonio Garcia Martinez has written, “there were almost no legal precedents 
covering any [of] this newfangled data-privacy stuff...Facebook and every major ads player...were 
making it up as they went along.” GARCIA MARTINEZ, supra note 2, at 326. Nicholas Carr has 
noted that “Technological revolutions tend to race ahead of institutional responses, creating all 
sorts of social and legal quandaries.” CARR, supra note 270, at 61. 
355 Mary Aiken, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Geary Institute for Public Policy at University 
College Dublin, reminds us that “what is new is not always good—and technology does not 
always mean progress.” MARY AIKEN, THE CYBER EFFECT 303–04 (2016); 
see ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 225 (asserting the “[i]nevitability rhetoric is a cunning fraud 
designed to render us helpless and passive in the face of implacable forces...”). 
356 SHERRY TURKLE, THE SECOND SELF: COMPUTERS AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 4 (2005) (“[I]f we 
hope to construct the richest lives possible with this [computer] technology, we must not...see its 
current direction as inevitable or determined.”). Daniel Kahneman believes the story of Google 
demonstrates the inevitability illusion. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 325, at 200–01; see also 
COHEN, supra note 231, at 241 (asserting “the fact that emerging patterns of information flow 
serve powerful economic and political interest, and thus might have been predicted by anyone 
paying attention to the distribution of incentives, does not make the patterns natural or just”). 
357 Nicholas Carr, The Internet as Innocent Fraud, ROUGH TYPE (Sept. 12, 2017),  
http://www.roughtype.com/?p=8113.  
358 ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 94–95. But see Shoshanna Zuboff, You Are Now Remotely 
Controlled, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillance-
capitalism.html (“Anything made by humans can be unmade by humans. Surveillance capitalism 
is young…democracy is old…”). 
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dictator.”359 If Facebook and Google felt threatened and wanted to mobilize, or just 
inspire, a crowd to attack their critics, what critic would stand a chance of a fair 
hearing? We should also not ignore the possibility of silent intimidation caused by 
the fear, or possible fear, of such an attack. What Wael Ghonim tells us is that the 
affordances of social media can be exploited for evil that is worse than the evil the 
protesters used social media to oppose.360 That the cure of Twitter is worse than the 
disease of the oppressive Egyptian government because it is even more difficult to 
oppose.361 It seems likely that fear of intimidation by a cyber mob has inhibited 
criticism of Google and Facebook. 
 
  8.  Frictionless Sharing 
 
 For some, Mark Zuckerberg’s lofty goal for Facebook (“to give people the 
power to share and make the world more open and connected”)362 excuses the 
immorality of the business model. More commonly, the veneration of technology 
assumes that innovation has only positive effects.363 Invention is seen as good in 
itself with ethical oversight limited to greed prevention.364 In a similar way, Mark 
Zuckerberg has believed from the beginning that connecting people through new 
technology and frictionless sharing was naturally good.365 But, this belief has been 
called a “thinly veiled cover for the true goal of . . . increasing the amount of data 
available for ad targeting.”366 Whether the effects of a new technology connecting 
people are good or bad depends on the circumstances. Consider the old technology 
of the car horn and then a new technology that would allow people frictionless, 
direct connections: a tiny, but very loud, megaphone mounted on top of every car, 
 
359 ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS 79 (2017). For intimidation, see also Sarah 
Jeong, How an Online Mob Created a Playbook for a Culture War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/15/opinion/what-is-gamergate.html; 
RICHARD SEYMOUR, THE TWITTERING MACHINE 37 (2019) (referencing a trolling slogan “none of 
us is as cruel as all of us”); JAMES WILLIAMS, STAND OUT OF OUR LIGHT: FREEDOM AND 
RESISTANCE IN THE ATTENTION ECONOMY 76 (2018) (stating “[the] mob rule is hard-coded into 
the design of the attention economy”). 
360 See TUFEKCI, supra note 359, at 79. 
361 Id. 
362 MCNAMEE, supra note 58, at 241. 
363 MOROZOV , supra note 33, at 167; see also, Janan Ganesh, Against the cult of innovation, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fa1f922e-2631-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134. 
364JASANOFF, supra note 26, at 251. 
365 Andrew Bosworth, Facebook Vice President, has said, “[t]he ugly truth is that we believe in 
connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to connect more people more often is ‘de 
facto’ good.” Sheera Frenkel & Nellie Bowles, Facebook Employees in Uproar Over Executive’s 
Leaked Memo, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/technology/facebook-leaked-memo.html. 
366 Kevin Roose, Is Tech Too Easy To Use?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/technology/tech-friction-frictionless.html. 




allowing the driver to express his or her opinion about the drivers of the surrounding 
vehicles. Mark Zuckerberg should consider this megaphone a great improvement 
over the old car horn; it would be a wonderful way to have people share and connect 
more expressively. But most drivers recognize that it would result in an epidemic 
of road rage—drivers cursing at other drivers who were changing lanes without 
signaling, driving too slowly, etc. This example teaches us that new technology and 
connecting people are not necessarily good; it depends on the architecture or 
structure of the technology and the way it facilitates positive or negative human 
traits. If a technology brings out the worst in human nature, limits on connection 
can, in fact, be good.367  
 
 This example seems to illustrate one of the implications of the famous 
comment that “the medium is the message” by University of Toronto Professor 
Marshall McLuhan:368 the architecture or structure of a technology, by limiting and 
focusing our perspectives, largely determines its effects.  
 
 
367 MOROZOV, supra note 33, at 346 (“Limits and constraints...can be productive—even if the 
entire conceit of the ‘the Internet’ suggests otherwise”); LANIER, supra note 42, at 107 
(“[C]onstraints compensate for the flaws of human nature”). Friction may also play a positive role. 
The friction of face-to-face meetings is why comments in that context are rarely as rude or 
provocative as those issued through frictionless digital media. Further, as more people spend more 
time online, darkness, regression and impulsivity, characteristics of the e-personality, would 
probably exacerbate the problems with this new frictionless device. See ABOUJAOUDE, supra note 
62. Julie Cohen has observed that human flourishing in the networked information society requires 
an effort to reverse, or at least cabin, the tendencies toward seamless continuity within 
infrastructures for information exchange. See COHEN, supra note 231, at 241; see also 
NICHOLAS CARR, THE GLASS CAGE: AUTOMATION AND US 182 (2014) (“Removing the friction 
from social attachments doesn’t strengthen them; it weakens them”); ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 
164 (“Higher, shared, and personal ways of valuing goods require social constraints on use.”); 
Zeynep Tufekci, Engineering the Public, 19 FIRST MONDAY (June 30, 
2014), https://firstmonday.org/article/view/4901/4097 (“computational politics removes a 
‘beneficial inefficiency’...that aided the public sphere”). 
368MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 7 (1964) (“[T]he medium is the message. This 
is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium...result from the new 
scale that is introduced into our affairs...by any new technology”). Another example of the 
negative effects of a new technology on communication would be the computer programs that 
allow robocalls. These programs connect people with others (advertisers) frictionlessly but are 
perceived by the receivers of the calls as annoyances rather than positive experiences. Previously, 
such calls were not economically viable; it cost too much to have human operators make each 
call. But automation lowered the cost and spawned an entire industry. Unfortunately, another 
technical innovation, caller ID service, does not resolve the problem because the receiver’s phone 
still rings. See Wade Roush, Goodbye Phone Calls, Hello, Loneliness: Can you really “reach out 
and touch someone” via text?, SCI. AM. (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/goodbye-phone-calls-hello-loneliness/. 
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 Finally, this example also suggests the following question for Facebook and 
for Google: does the architecture of a new technology call forth the positive or the 
negative in human nature?369 If more negative than positive, what is the moral basis 
for using the technology?  
 
 For Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook the answer is that the company, despite 
its failings, is still overwhelmingly a force for good in the world.370 This belief rests 
on the assumptions that connectivity is ipso facto good, that connectivity is the 
preeminent good, that Facebook’s mission is to connect people and, therefore, 
Facebook plays a positive role regardless of any shortcomings. Others who do not 
accept these assumptions differ as to Facebook’s effects. Roger McNamee tells us 
that “[t]he time has come to accept that in its current mode of operation, Facebook’s 
flaws outweigh its considerable benefits.”371  
 
  9.  Data Exhaust  
 
 The behavioral-advertising business model requires vast amounts of 
personal information. This personal information collected by Google and Facebook 
has been described as “data exhaust.”372  This term suggests analogies. One is 
“dumpster diving.” Google’s and Facebook’s collection of data has similarities to 
dumpster diving. While dumpster diving is not generally prohibited, there are 
municipalities that do prohibit it under a theory of trespass.373 The U. S. Supreme 
Court held in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), that the Fourth 
 
369 See TURKLE, supra note 295, at 19 (“So, of every technology we must ask, does it serve our 
human purposes?”); MOROZOV, supra note 33, at 124 (“We must not fixate on what this new 
arsenal of digital technologies allows us to do without first inquiring what is worth doing”); 
RICHARD WATSON, FUTURE MINDS 222 (2013) (“[P]erhaps a question we should be asking 
ourselves more frequently in the future is not whether we can invent something but whether we 
should”). One suggestion is that we promote technologies that correct the problems created by the 
last technologies. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 34, at 26.  
370 LEVY, supra note 139, at 16. 
371 MCNAMEE, supra note 51, at 247. 
372 See VIKTOR MAYOR-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 113 (2013); Adam 
Baron, Turning Trash into Treasure: Data Exhaust and A New Wave of Quant Data, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/answerson/five-lessons-learned-data-
exhaust/ (“Data exhaust is literally the modern day…equivalent of the old adage “one man’s trash 
is another man’s treasure.””); see also NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, supra note 103, at 9 
(stating that if data is seen as the “exhaust” of life processes, then “[d]ata is assumed to just be 
there for the taking”). 
373 Ashlee Kieler, Dumpster Diving for Beauty Products: Is It Legal and 
Safe? CONSUMER REPORTS (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/dumpster-diving-for-beauty-products-is-it-legal-
and-safe/.  




Amendment did not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure by government 
authorities of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home because 
there was no socially accepted objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
garbage.374 But Justice Brennan in dissent expressed a commonsense revulsion at 
the police’s conduct in that case: 
 
Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover 
a meddler—whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a 
detective—scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to 
discover some detail of our personal lives.... When a 
tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger's trash and published his findings, 
Kissinger was ‘really revolted’ by the intrusion and 
his wife suffered ‘grave anguish.’375 
 
 Should the collection of our digital exhaust generate the same sense of 
disdain and repulsion as dumpster diving? One answer is that we are sharing our 
digital exhaust, but not abandoning it. Another answer is that the collectors of our 
digital exhaust obtain consent and this acquits them. But, as explained below, that 
answer is defective. 376  Should our digital exhaust be outside the reach of the 
market?  
 
 Consider two analogies that take the concept of “exhaust” a step further. 
Science has recently made it possible to gather a person’s DNA and personal 
microbiome. 377  Assume in the future that these acquire a market value and 
companies strive to collect them. The janitors of public and private buildings will 
vacuum up the strands of hair containing DNA that people leave in rooms and 
corridors. The entrance to the building will predictably have a notice stating that 
entrance is free, but anyone entering consents to the collection of his or her DNA.378 
In the toilets of these buildings, devices will be put in the drainage pipes to catch 
human stool so that personal microbiomes can be collected. Again, on the door of 
every bathroom stall a notice will inform the visitor that he or she consents to the 
 
374 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
375 Id. at 51-52. 
376 See infra at p. 142-43. 
377 DNA Fingerprinting, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/DNA-
fingerprinting; Kara Rogers, Human Microbiome, https://www.britannica.com/science/human-
microbiome.  
378 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 642 (1989) (Marshall, J. 
dissenting), it was expressed that privacy interest exist in a person’s bodily fluids and excretions. 
Whether a notice of consent is sufficient to overcome this privacy interest remains a theoretical 
question. 
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collection of stool and the personal microbiome in exchange for free use of the 
facility. Would people find this acceptable? Likely, not. But this is essentially what 
Google and Facebook are doing already. If you have already given up your mind, 
it seems reasonable to render your body as well. But are these appropriate 
applications of market thinking?379  
 
  10.  Threat to Democratic Practice  
 
 Behavioral advertising, through addiction, surveillance, and manipulation 
and the perversion of personhood, threatens democratic practice. It does so in two 
ways.  
 
First, the behavioral-advertising business model threatens democratic 
elections by its policy of favoring demonstrably false and misleading political 
campaign advertisements. In 2019, after the Trump campaign put up on Facebook 
a false advertisement about Joe Biden, the Biden campaign demanded that 
Facebook take it down and Facebook refused.380 Later, when Elizabeth Warren, 
another Democratic candidate, intentionally posted an ad with false information 
about Mark Zuckerberg to challenge the company, it refused to take it down.381 
Facebook responded that it “believes political speech should be protected.”382 But 
it is not that Facebook believes in free speech, it is that Facebook’s algorithms favor 
disinformation that is inflammatory and provocative. This is the information that 
gets shared most often and most widely and this engagement generates more 
advertising revenue for Facebook.383  
 
As in the case of the car megaphone, it is not that the technology is bad in 
and of itself, it is that the architecture of the technology and the surrounding 
circumstances determine whether the technology has positive or negative results. 
In the United States, the virality of misinformation caused by Facebook’s 
 
379 Would we want to see Facebook and Google combine our personal data, DNA, and 
microbiome and upload the combination together with our brains to achieve Singularity? Ray 
Kurzweil, a Google employee, discusses this situation. See RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS 
NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 198-200 (2005). 
380 Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, Defiant Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Police Political Speech, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/zuckerberg-facebook-
free-speech.html. 
381 Cecilia Kang & Thomas Kaplan, Warren Dares Facebook with Intentionally False Political 
Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/12/technology/elizabeth-
warren-facebook-ad.html. 
382 Id.  
383 See Aja Romano, The Scariest Part of Facebook’s Fake News Problem: Fake News Is More 
Viral Than Real News, VOX (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/11/16/13626318/viral-
fake-news-on-facebook.  




algorithms damages democratic election campaigns. In underdeveloped countries 
like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and India where civil institutions are weak, the virality 
of misinformation has led to mass violence and killing as mentioned below.384 
 
 Second, the data and algorithms of behavioral advertising have enabled 
attacks on American democracy by influencing elections. In the 2010 congressional 
elections, Facebook created an “I voted” icon and the bandwagon effect increased 
voting turnout by 0.39 %, enough to change the results of a close election.385 In his 
discussion of this, Professor Zittrain, a co-founder of the Berkman Klein Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, speculated at what might happen if 
Mark Zuckerberg decided to send a message encouraging voting only to those 
voters favoring the candidate he favored, and asked whether we should have a 
problem with that.386 More recently, in the 2016 presidential race, just before the 
election the Trump campaign paid for a voter-suppression effort on the platform 
precisely targeted at potential Democratic voters.387  Theresa Hong, the Trump 
campaign’s digital-content director, said, “[w]ithout Facebook we wouldn’t have 
won.”388 As for the 2020 presidential election, Texas Congressional Representative 
Lamar Smith has said that, “Google could well elect the next president.”389  
 
 The influence is not necessarily by Facebook as an entity; its users can 
exercise influence. Data Scientist Cathy O’Neill wrote prophetically before the 
2016 election that “Facebook’s algorithms can affect how millions of people feel, 
and those people won’t know that it’s happening. What would occur if they played 
with people’s emotions on Election Day?”390 It is not clear whether Facebook did 
 
384 See discussion infra on pp. 157-160. 
385 Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. FORUM 335, 335-36 (2014).  
386 Id. at 336. 
387 See Dan Sabbagh, Trump 2016 Campaign Targeted 3.5m Black Americans to Deter Them 
From Voting, GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/sep/28/trump-2016-campaign-targeted-35m-black-americans-to-deter-them-from-
voting.  
388 April Glaser, The Cambridge-Analytica Scandal Is What Facebook-Powered Election Cheating 
Looks Like, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/03/the-cambridge-
analytica-scandal-is-what-facebook-powered-election-cheating-looks-like.html. 
389 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Cecilia Kang, Google’s Pichai Faces Privacy and Bias Questions in 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/technology/google-
pichai-house-committee-hearing.html?searchResultPosition=7; see also Kevin Roose, Buckle Up 
for Another Facebook Election, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/technology/facebook-election.html. 
390 O’NEILL, supra note 320, at 184; see Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How 
Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html (describing 
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so, but it is clear that Russian agents did so through Facebook, engaging with 
American voters to affect the results of the 2016 presidential election. 391  The 
Mueller Report and a report produced for the Senate Intelligence Committee based 
on data from Facebook and other companies disclosed that the Internet Research 
Agency, a Russian organization owned by an oligarch close to President Putin, had 
used false Facebook accounts to send messages to potential American voters, 
particularly African-Americans, to discourage them from voting or to otherwise 
influence their voting behavior to the advantage of Donald Trump.392 The White 
House has issued an official statement that characterized the foreign interference in 
United States elections as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security...of the United States.”393  
 
 Historian Yuval Noah Harari, looking towards the future, offers a warning 
that Facebook’s global connectivity may doom democracy. He assumes that 
referendums and elections are always about human feelings, not about human 
rationality.394 He then posits that this reliance on them “might prove to be the 
Achilles’ heel of liberal democracy. For once somebody (whether in Beijing or San 
Francisco) gains the technological ability to hack and manipulate the human heart, 
democratic politics will imitate into an emotional puppet show.”395  
 
 The behavioral-advertising business model is morally deficient. Its design 
preferences inflammatory and provocative expression and promotes virality. It has 
 
how Facebook lets third parties target its users); see also Keith Collins & Larry Buchanan, How 




391 THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MUELLER REPORT 14-32 (2019); Scott Shane 
& Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social 
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-
2016-influence-campaign.html. For an example of manipulation by a Google user, see 
Patrick Berlinquette, I Used Google Ads for Social Engineering. It Worked., N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/opinion/google-ads.html. 
392 THE WASHINGTON POST, THE MUELLER REPORT 14-32 (2019); Scott Shane 
& Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence Operation Targeted African-Americans on Social 
Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-
2016-influence-campaign.html.  
393 Notice Continuing the National Emergency With Respect To Foreign Interference In or 
Undermining Public Confidence In U.S. Elections, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 
2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/notice-continuing-national-emergency-
respect-foreign-interference-undermining-public-confidence-u-s-elections/. 
394 HARARI, supra note 204, at 46. 
395 Id.  




enabled the undermining of our system of democratic elections and endangered the 
national security of our country. 
 
  11.  Threat to Rule of Law 
  
 The behavioral-advertising business model, through addiction, surveillance, 
and manipulation, also threatens our legal system and the rule of law. In 2018, it 
was reported that Sheryl Sandberg, in a potential “dirty tricks” attempt, hired a 
public relations firm to dig up negative information on George Soros because of his 
call for regulation of tech companies.396 It seems unlikely that any user can now 
trust that Facebook management would not make use of data from the user, the 
user’s spouse, or close relatives to blackmail a legislator about a piece of legislation 
of interest to Facebook or blackmail a judge or the close relatives of a judge in an 
important legal case. Of course, if this ever did happen, the chances are remote that 
we could ever learn of it. Especially if the response from Facebook to any 
accusation was that its actions were the result of its algorithm and any analysis of 
the algorithm would be a violation of its intellectual property rights. Or even if 
access were granted to the algorithm, artificial intelligence may well have rendered 
it unintelligible to humans. 397  The parties on the other side of legislation or 
litigation have no way to assure that this will not happen. Facebook’s history and 
recent revelations show that the company is morally challenged and has subjected 
the rule of law to an unacceptable risk. One would think that the American Bar 
Association would have raised some concerns. But it has placed a Facebook icon 
on its webpage, encouraging lawyers to connect with it through Facebook. 398 
Perhaps lawyers representing Facebook are a bit too influential in the relevant ABA 
Sections. 
 
 Sheryl Sandberg’s potential “dirty trick” brings to mind Fordham Law 
School Professor Zephyr Teachout’s comment that those with too much power, like 
 
396 Rana Foroohar, A Year in a word: Techlash, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e; see also Sheera Frenkel et 
al., Delay, Deny, Deflect: How Facebook Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-
racism.html.  
397 See SAMUEL ARBESMAN, OVERCOMPLICATED: 
TECHNOLOGY AT THE LIMITS OF COMPREHENSION 80 (2017) (“[T]he vast majority of computer 
programs will never be thoroughly comprehended by any human being”). 
398 The bottom of the American Bar Association website contains an icon linking the reader to its 
Facebook page. See americanbar.org.  
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Google, cannot help but be evil.399 It is not wrong for a company to aspire to grow 
to a large size nor wrong for it to try to protect its interests. Surveillance capitalism 
incentivizes companies to seek more raw material data and that requires Facebook 
and Google to grow. Size gives power and the temptation to protect a company’s 
interests by exercising its power in ways that are morally–and often legally—
improper. Google’s size makes it harder to avoid “being evil.”400 
 
 The behavioral-advertising business model is morally repugnant. It has not 
only threatened democratic practice, but also our legal system and the rule of law. 





399 Zephyr Teachout, Google is coming after critics in academia and journalism. It’s time to stop 
them, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/30/zephyr-teachout-google-is-
coming-after-critics-in-academia-and-journalism-its-time-to-stop-them/ (providing an example of 
Google’s role in pressuring the not-for-profit New America to fire its Open Markets team after the 
team dared to speak up about Google in the mildest way); see also LEVY, supra note 68, at 6 
(stating that Google is evil in another way despite its rhetoric of moral purity and “Don’t Be Evil,” 
because it seems to have a blind eye for the consequences of its own technology on privacy and 
property rights); Nancy Scola, Why Liberals and Big Tech Companies Broke Up, POLITICO (Mar. 
17, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/17/democrats-candidates-2020-tech-silicon-
valley-1229345 (stating Elizabeth Warren singled out Facebook for taking down her campaign ads 
and calling for its breakup). 
400 This is true regardless of whether Mark Zuckerberg and the Google founders are “good” or 
“nice” people. See Paul Lewis, Our Minds Can Be Hijacked: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a 
Smartphone Dystopia, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-silicon-
valley-dystopia (citing Roger McNamee, “The people who run Facebook and Google are good 
people…”); see also Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 
2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-
zuckerberg.html (“Mark [Zuckerberg] is a good, kind person”); Edward Luce, The Zuckerberg 
Delusion, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/580f18d6-c951-11e7-aa33-
c63fdc9b8c6c (“Mr. Zuckerberg suffers from two delusions common to America’s new economy 
elites. They think they are nice people—indeed, most of them are. Mr. Zuckerberg seems to be, 
too”); Nellie Bowles, Tech Embraces Its Doomsayer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/business/yuval-noah-harari-silicon-valley.html (quoting 
Yuval Noah Harari, “I’ve met a number of these high-tech giants, and generally they’re good 
people...They’re not Attila the Hun. In the lottery of human leaders, you could get far worse”); 
LEVY, supra note 139, at 51 (stating Mark Zuckerberg’s sister described him as a “very ethical and 
fair individual”). But see LEVY, supra note 139, at 11 and 59 (noting a report issued in a 
U.K. parliamentary study called Facebook “digital gangsters,” New Zealand’s Privacy 
Commissioner John Edwards said that Facebook’s leaders were “morally bankrupt pathological 
liars,” and Aaron Greenspan, a Harvard student and builder of small digital products, said of Mark 
Zuckerberg, “I didn’t trust him from the moment I met him”). 




PART TWO: LEGALITY 
 
I.  CONTRACT LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL-ADVERTISING BUSINESS MODEL 
 
 The behavioral-advertising business model poses a special problem for the 
legal system because it is unprecedented. It is unprecedented in the sense that it 
(and the contracts implementing it) depend on a technology (the internet) that is 
unique in its combination of characteristics: the technology has been distributed 
more widely, more quickly and has had deeper effects than any other technology in 
human history. This technology, business model, and the attendant contracts were 
never seen before and therefore, unfortunately, not foreseen. The unprecedented 
nature of this technology and business model explains why we have so far failed 
the challenge set for us more than 40 years ago by Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, 
who wrote that, “[t]he major technological problem ahead will be the test of our 
ability to foresee the effects of social and technological change and to construct 
alternative courses in accordance with different valuations of ends, at different 
costs.”401  
 In our defense we can say that technological revolutions tend to race ahead 
of institutional responses, creating a panoply of social and legal quandaries.402 We 
can understand that a legal system based on precedent finds it difficult to deal with 
the unprecedented. But we can also recognize that history repeats itself, although 
often in a cunning disguise that prevents us from detecting the resemblance until it 
is too late.403 Once we have seen the resemblance, then, as University of Chicago 
Law Professors Saul Levmore and Martha Nussbaum have suggested, “[o]ld 
solutions are sometimes appropriate for new problems.”404 Thus, the concept of 
inalienable rights that was the philosophical justification for American 
independence and an important element of the California Constitution can help us 
deal with this unprecedented business model and its contracts. 
 
 A.  INALIENABLE RIGHTS 
 
 The unprecedented nature of this business model has meant that, for the 
most part, the response of the legal system to surveillance capitalism and the 
 
401 DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 284 (1973) (emphasis added).  
402 CARR, supra note 270, at 184. 
403 Paraphrasing a quote from esteemed Chicago Sun-Times columnist Sydney J. Harris, “History 
repeats itself, but in such cunning disguise that we never detect the resemblance until the damage 
is done.” See SYDNEY J. HARRIS, CLEARING THE GROUND: IF HE’S NOT GUILTY, WHY IS HE IN 
COURT? 24 (1986). 
404 Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 5 (2010).  
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behavioral-advertising business model has been feeble and misdirected.405 Legal 
scholars, government officials, and private practitioners have mostly viewed the 
current practices of Google and Facebook through the legal lenses of privacy and 
monopoly.406 Efforts at privacy legislation and monopoly regulation have achieved 
some modest success,407 but the advertising-based business model has not been 
seriously affected. Even the European Community’s most aggressive effort yet, the 
General Data Protection Regulations, is primarily directed at privacy.408 Monopoly 
 
405 MARK BARTHOLOMEW, ADCREEP (2017) (“At a time when a panoply of new marketing 
techniques is changing human behavior and eroding consumer agency, the legal system has stood 
still”). Perhaps this feeble response is partly a result of Google’s influence over academia and the 
private sector. Shoshanna Zuboff has noted that a list of Google Policy Fellows for 2014 lists 
individuals from non-profit organizations that one would assume are leading the fight against 
Google: The Center for Democracy and Technology, The Electronic Frontier foundation, the 
National Consumers League, The Future of Privacy Forum and others. See ZUBOFF, supra note 56, 
at 126. See also CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW 
AND POLICY 361 (2016) (stating his belief that George Mason University Law School “has been 
used as a kind of academic front for Google’s activities”). 
406 ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 193 (“The primary frameworks through which our societies have 
sought to assert control over surveillance capitalism’s audacity are those of ‘privacy rights’ and 
‘monopoly’”). Id. at 54 (“These developments [of surveillance capitalism] are all the more 
dangerous because they cannot be reduced to known harms—monopoly, privacy—and therefore 
do not easily yield to known forms of combat. The new harms we face entail challenges to the 
sanctity of the individual, and chief among these challenges I count elemental rights that bear on 
individual sovereignty...”). For the monopoly perspective, see Tim Wu, What Years of Emails and 
Texts Reveal About Your Friendly Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/opinion/amazon-facebook-congressional-hearings.html; see 
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057-63 (2000) 
(suggesting a role for contracts and a concept of legislative rules specifying certain contracts that 
would carry implied promises of confidentiality). 
407 See generally Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/ et seq. (2008); see also 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-
law.html.  
408 The General Data Protection Regulation in CHARLENE BROWNLEE & BLAZE D. WALESKI, 
PRIVACY LAW (2019) § 5.02[3][d]; see also Art. 4 GDPR Definitions, GENERAL DATA 
PROTECTION REGULATION https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020). The 
GDPR’s emphasis on privacy means that it emphasizes “consent.” See Art. 4 GDPR Definitions, 
GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdpr-info.eu/art-4-gdpr/ (last visited 
Sep. 13, 2020); see also Art. 6 GDPR Lawfulness of Processing, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdpr-info.eu/art-6-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020); Art. 7 GDPR 
Conditions for Consent, GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR), https://gdpr-
info.eu/art-7-gdpr/ (last visited Sep. 13, 2020). Privacy is a cluster of problems, so it can be 
waived in part. But autonomy is unitary and cannot be waived; it is inalienable so consent is 
irrelevant. Emma Martins, Data Protection Commissioner, Office of the Data Protection 
Authority, Guernsey, CI, sees the GDPR as “a good starting point,” but has stated that the way our 
 




and privacy are not the main problem; the business model is. The new harms that 
threaten us are more than issues of privacy and monopoly; they undermine our 
autonomy and our democracy. Legal protection of privacy and restrictions on 
monopoly alone can never safeguard these existential interests because they do not 
address the basic problem of the immoral business model. 
 
   Inalienabilty is the legal system’s way of saying that something is beyond 
the reach of the market.409  Legally, it can be established by a Constitution or 
legislation, but it is important to recognize that courts have the power to interpret 
what is or is not inalienable.410 And inalienable rights have occupied a central role 
in American moral and legal culture.411  Most Americans are familiar with the 
stirring words of the Declaration of Independence: “[w]e hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit 
of Happiness . . . .”412  The presence of the words “unalienable rights” in the 
Declaration of Independence indicates their fundamental role in justifying the 
existence of the United States as a country. These rights were not some anomaly or 
minor exception to a world of market thinking, no generous concession granted by 
market analysis. Nor do they constitute an instance of market failure. They were 
the most basic and most important aspects of the social and political lives of 
citizens. These words were not included in the United States Constitution.413 
Therefore, their direct legal effect on surveillance capitalism is questionable as a 
matter of federal law. But, the constitutions of a number of states do include similar 
language.414  
 
The Constitution of the State of California proclaims in Section 1 that “[a]ll 
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these 
 
personal data are used “goes well beyond notions of data privacy,” and “goes to the heart of what 
it is to be an autonomous free citizen.” Emma Martins, Conversation about our data must involve 
us all, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2020, at 14. The distinction between privacy and 
autonomy holds even though the European conception of privacy differs from the American in its 
emphasis on dignity. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004). 
409 Inalienability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
410 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 161 (1996). 
411 Radin, supra note 21, at 1849. 
412 The Declaration of Independence, NAT. ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-
docs/declaration (last reviewed Mar. 16, 2020) (emphasis added); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2482 (1966) gives “inalienable” as a synonym of “unalienable.” 
413 See U.S. CONST.  
414 See generally, Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah Agugo, Individual Rights Under State 
Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply 
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008).  
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are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” 415 
California’s Constitution is relevant because the relationship between Google or 
Facebook and its users is governed by California law.416 The digital Terms of 
Service for both companies refer to California law and to California jurisdiction 
over all disputes in courts in California.417 That relationship is therefore subject to 
the declaration of inalienable rights set forth in the California Constitution.  
 
 The invocation of California’s Constitution here is not intended to assert 
that suing the companies for violations of Section 1 would be the most appropriate 
strategy. 418 Rather, the language of the Constitution is cited here primarily as an 
affirmation that, as a matter of public policy, California does not accept the idea of 
universal commodification; it recognizes that certain activities are not subject to 
market forces. In fact, it asserts that the most important rights that people have are 
necessarily not marketable, which are characterized as “inalienable.” “Inalienable,” 
of course, has various meanings. It can mean that the right may not be sold; that it 
may not be transferred; that it may not be bequeathed; that it may not be lost at 
all.419 In the context of contract law it means that a person cannot give up the right 
by contract; that consent to do so is void.420 
 
 Statements in the political sphere, such as the California Constitution (“[a]ll 
people...have inalienable rights”), often express what David Ellerman, Visiting 
 
415 Cal. Const., § (emphasis added); Staughton Lynd has argued that “inalienable” in the 
Declaration of Independence is ambiguous. It could refer either to either rights seen as property, in 
which case they could be disposed of with consent, or as rights of conscience that by their nature 
could not be transferred. He concluded, however, that, “The statesmanship of the American 
Revolution...tended to reserve absolute inalienability for the life of the mind.” STAUGHTON LYND, 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM 54 (1968). 
416 See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D]; 
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3-
ATBQ].  
417See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D]; 
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3-
ATBQ].  
418 A suit alleging that the behavioral-advertising contracts violate the inalienable right of “liberty” 
or “privacy” in Article 1 could be attempted, and deserves further study. University of California 
Berkeley law Professor Chris Jay Hoofnagle has noted that waivers of the extensive privacy rights 
in the Constitution are unenforceable, citing Cal. Civ. Code §1798.84. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 
405, at 172. 
419 Radin, supra note 21, at 1850.  
420 See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 179 
(1986).  




Scholar at the University of California, Riverside, calls the “inalienist” tradition. In 
this tradition, the question of alienability, not consent or contract, is the heart of the 
liberal vision of both government and slavery.421 In liberal thought there are two 
traditions. One is an “alienist” tradition, which believes that basic rights can be 
alienated.422 This tradition sees basic rights as essentially property rights that can 
be alienated with full, free, and informed consent.423 Capitalism is in the alienist 
tradition.424 Under this view, a contract of self-enslavement would be permitted.425  
 
Second, the “inalienest” tradition believes that basic rights are personal and 
cannot be alienated even with full, free, and informed consent.426 A contract that 
purported to alienate these rights would be null and void.427 Political democracy is 
in this inalienist tradition.428 The inalienist tradition is the democratic tradition of 
liberal thought.429 It would not permit a contract of self-enslavement.430 Statements 
in the political sphere, as noted above, express the inalienist tradition, while those 
in the economic sphere follow the alienist tradition. Market thinking leans toward 
the alienist tradition.  
 
 The modern origins of inalienable rights can be seen in the concept of 
freedom of conscience which came from the formal separation of spiritual from 
temporal power and liberation of the human mind among fifth-century clergy.431 
Martin Luther later developed this idea further and it became a fundamental concept 
of the Reformation. He wrote:  
 
How one believes or disbelieves is a matter for 
everyone’s own conscience, and since this takes 
nothing away from secular government, the latter 
should be content to attend to its own affairs and let 
everyone believe this or that as they are able and 
willing, and constrain no one by force.”432  
 
421 DAVID P. ELLERMAN, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN ECONOMICS 72 (1992). 
422 Id. at 73.  
423 Id.  
424 Id.  
425 See id.  
426 Id. at 72.  
427 Id.  
428 Id. at 72-73. 
429 See id. at 73. 
430 See id.  
431 LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN LIBERALISM 133-
34 (2014).  
432 MARTIN LUTHER, THE ANNOTATED LUTHER 111 (Hans J. Hillerbrand et al. eds.,1989) 
(emphasis added). 




 But it was two Scotsmen, George Wallace, a jurist, and Francis Hutcheson, 
a teacher of Adam Smith, who directly influenced the drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence. Wallace wrote that:  
 
Men and their liberty are not in commercio; they are 
not either saleable or purchaseable . . . For these 
reasons, every one of those unfortunate men, who 
are pretended to be slaves, has a right to be declared 
free, for he never lost his liberty; he could not lose 
it; his prince had no power to dispose of him.433  
 
Hutcheson's views were very influential. Thomas Jefferson’s division of rights into 
alienable and inalienable came from Hutcheson. 434  Hutcheson first made the 
distinction between alienable and inalienable rights in An Inquiry into the Original 
of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), but he developed it more fully in his 
influential A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), writing: 
 
Our rights are either alienable, or unalienable. The 
former are known by these two characters jointly, 
that the translation of them to others can be made 
effectually, and that some interest of society, or 
individuals consistently with it, may frequently 
require such translations. Thus our right to our goods 
and labours is naturally alienable. But where either 
the translation cannot be made with any effect, or 
where no good in human life requires it, the right is 
unalienable, and cannot be justly claimed by any 
other but the person originally possessing it.435  
 
Hutcheson then continues:  
 
Thus no man can really change his sentiments, 
judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of 
another; nor can it tend to any good to make him 
 
433 GEORGE WALLACE, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 95 (1760).  
434 GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 213 
(1978). 
435 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 261 (2000). 




profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of 
private judgment is therefore unalienable.436  
 
 The culmination of the concept of inalienability came with John Stuart Mill 
in his argument against self-enslavement by contract. In On Liberty, he wrote of 
the person who sells himself into slavery: 
 
[H]e abdicates his liberty, he foregoes any future use 
of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats in 
his own case, the very purpose which is the 
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself . . 
. The principle of freedom cannot require that he 
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be 
allowed to alienate his freedom.437 
 
 The idea of inalienability went from the understanding that one’s 
conscience was free to the principle that freedom itself prevents the alienation of 
freedom. Thus, one’s freedom cannot be voluntarily disposed of. No form of 
consent, however free, full, and informed, will make such an alienation possible. 
This argument provides the basis for the reference to “inalienable rights” in the 
Declaration of Independence and in the California Constitution. German 
philosopher Ernst Casirer summarized this argument as saying that by self-
enslavement, a man “would give up that very character which constitutes his nature 
and essence: he would lose his humanity.”438 More concretely, he would lose his 
autonomy. 
  
 The other tradition, the alienist tradition, has its history and supporters, but 
they are decidedly a minority. For example, few philosophers in the United States 
have taken the position that self-slavery is permissible; that a contract binding one 
to slavery should be enforceable. Harvard Professor Robert Nozick, one of the few, 
has asked “whether a free system will allow [an individual] to sell himself into 
slavery. I believe it would.” 439  Another philosopher, Donald VanDeVeer, has 
suggested that “the wisdom, prudence, or moral acceptability of [self-slavery] 
remains an open question,” but he has admitted that “[t]o the extent that a person’s 
 
436 Id. at 261-62. In the same way, we can say that people cannot use their autonomy to deprive 
themselves of future autonomy because that would contradict the justification for allowing them 
autonomy in the first place. 
437 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 74-75 (1988).  
438 ERNST CASIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 175 (1963).  
439 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (1974); see also J. Philmore, The 
Libertarian Case for Slavery: A Note on Nozick, 14 PHIL. FORUM 45-58 (1982). 
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surrender of autonomy is more thorough and permanent . . . and to the extent that 
autonomy is regarded as a good or an ideal to which one should aspire, such acts 
will be morally suspect.” 440  Others have suggested that the inalienability rule 
against slavery would not be justified if the rule were inefficient.441 As Professor 
Radin has remarked, “[a]nyone who has no qualms about this argument bears 
witness to a (literally) demoralizing triumph of market methodology.”442  
 
 This alienist tradition has not been accepted by the legal system. The 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits both slavery and involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for a crime.443 It also authorizes Congress to enforce this prohibition 
by appropriate legislation. One piece of legislation, the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, 
abolished peonage and rendered null and void “all acts, laws, resolutions...of 
any...State [establishing, maintaining, or enforcing] voluntary or involuntary 
service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation or 
otherwise...”444 The key term here is “voluntary.” This statute clearly repudiates the 
idea that prohibited servitude must be involuntary. It accepts the notion that if a 
person were to voluntarily contract himself or herself into a type of servitude, 
peonage, such an act would be prohibited because it is so evil in its nature that the 
legal system will not allow even the victim’s full, free, and informed consent to 
permit it.  
 
 B.  ILLEGAL CONTRACTS: THE PRECEDENT OF THE PEONAGE   
  CONTRACT 
 
 Peonage is a type of bondage. It was a nineteenth and twentieth century 
throwback to the earlier forms of bondage in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Bondage was characteristic of America in the seventeenth, eighteenth, 
and nineteenth centuries. There were four types of bondage: indentured servitude, 
 
440 DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 133 (1986).  
441 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972). Lawrence Alexander has 
suggested that “it is perhaps time to re-examine the regime of legal unenforceability of personal 
service contracts and its supporting arguments.” Lawrence Alexander, Voluntary Enslavement in 
Coons & Weber supra note 249, at 245-46. Judge Richard Posner suggested that it is “puzzling” 
from an economic standpoint that a person cannot sell himself into slavery. RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 187 (2d ed. 1977). Margaret Jane Radin has asserted that “the 
cases economists find mysterious are mysterious just because economists generally treat property 
as fungible, and those cases treat it as personal.” Margaret Jane Radin, Personhood and Property, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1004, 1015 (1982). 
442 RADIN, supra note 410, at 24. 
443 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
444 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012). 




redemption, apprenticeship, and slavery.445 Indentured servants were recruited in 
England, often through deceit and manipulation, to enter into indenture contracts 
for passage to America with an obligation to repay for the voyage by working in 
America for a term of years.446 Indentured servitude was a major institution of 
colonial America.447 It is estimated that after 1630, between one half and two thirds 
of white immigrants to the American colonies came under indenture,448 and more 
than half of those who went to the colonies south of New England were servants in 
bondage.449  
 
Redemption was indentured servitude of those who came as partially paid-
up passengers.450 Upon arrival, they entered into contracts of indenture in order to 
pay the remainder of the passage price and did so by working for a term, generally 
four years.451  
 
Apprentices were often young boys and girls who were bound to a master 
for a period of years.452 The master provided food, clothing, lodging, and training 
in the master’s trade in exchange for obedience and work by the apprentice.453 
Bonded servants, whether indentured or redemptionist, were their masters’ chattel, 
but, unlike slaves, they had the right of franchise. 454  
 
The first African slaves were brought to America in the seventeenth century, 
where slavery became widespread in the South, particularly after the demise of 
indentured servitude in the eighteenth century. 455  Over time, as free workers 
became more plentiful and less expensive, masters began to pay wages to 
employees rather than purchasing the time of a servant or slave.456  
 
 
445 See generally, Indentured Servants in the U.S., PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/indentured-servants-in-the-
us/#:~:text=Servants%20typically%20worked%20four%20to,protected%20some%20of%20their
%20rights (explaining the difference between indentured servitude and slavery);  
446 Id.  
447 Id.  
448 DAVID W. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 3-4 (1982). 
449 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, AMERICA AT 1750 34 (1972). 
450 Id. at 50-51. 
451 Id.  
452 Mark Snyder, The Education of Indentured Servants in Colonial America, 33 (1/2) J. TECH 
STUDIES 67-69 (2007). 
453 Id.  
454 Hofstadter, supra note 449, at 51. 
455 See GALENSON, supra note 448, at 127, 179. 
456 SHARON SALINGER, TO SERVE WELL AND FAITHFULLY: INDENTURED SERVANTS IN 
PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1800 54 (1987). 
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Taking into account these four forms of bondage, it seems likely that the 
majority of the colonial and early republic population in America was subject to 
some form of bondage. With the exception of slavery, the other three forms of 
bondage constituted contractual bondage. Economic forces caused the decline of 
indentured servitude (including redemption) 457  and apprenticeship, and the 
Emancipation Declaration ended slavery. But in the nineteenth century a new form 
of contractual bondage arose—peonage.  
 
 The peonage system of bondage referred to in the Anti-Peonage Act seems 
to have originated in Spain and became widespread in Mexico under Spanish 
rule.458 In New Mexico, the peons constituted a large class of persons who had very 
little or no property and worked mainly as servants or domestics.459 They were not 
born into servitude, but rather signed contracts to become peons because the master 
advanced them money.460 They were indebted to their master and labored to pay 
off the debt. Until they had paid off the debt, they were not free to leave the service 
of their master. If they did leave before the debt was paid off, the master or local 
officials could seize the peon and return him or her to service for the master.461 A 
new master could pay off a peon’s debt to their original master, and then the peon 
would be indebted and bound to the new master.462 If the peon did not pay off the 
debt or work, he or she could also be let out to the highest bidder under a new 
peonage contract.463  
 
The peon still retained rights. Certain local officials, called alcaldes, had the 
duty to authenticate the books of accounts between masters and peons.464  The 
master was prohibited from using the whip against the peon, and a peon could sue 
a master for excessive punishment.465 Peons did not lose political and civil rights; 
they were allowed to vote.466  
 
 
457 Professor Galenson found that “[t]he history of the final demise of indentured servitude in the 
United States remains obscure.” GALENSON, supra note 448, at 179. 
458 This description is taken from Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194-207 (N.M. 1857). For a 
full treatment of peonage, see PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH 
1902-69 (1972). 
459 Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (1905), 
460 Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194-207 (N.M. 1857). 
461 Id. 
462 Id. 
463 Id.  
464 Id.  
465 Id. 
466 Id.; Peonage Cases, 136 F. at 707. 




 While peonage was native to New Mexico, the term was later used to refer 
to similar relationships in other parts of the country. Judicial opinions in courts in 
the East and South clarified and expanded this definition of peonage.467 In the 
Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1905), peonage was defined as “the 
holding of any person to service or labor for the purpose of paying or liquidating 
an indebtedness due from the laborer or employee to the employer, when such 
employee desires to leave or quit the employment before the debt is paid off.”468 
This definition seems to limit the condition of peonage to only those cases where 
the employee wanted to quit before paying off the debt. But Justice Hughes in 
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), succinctly described the essence of it as 
“compulsory service in payment of a debt.”469 This definition and the case law 
support the notion that peonage can exist even before the employee desires to quit.  
 
 Outside New Mexico, peonage came to include fieldwork (picking sweet 
potatoes, cucumbers, tobacco, and other crops) on plantations or migrant labor 
farms; housekeeping in motels and hotels; serving as barmaids, hostesses, and 
prostitutes in a saloon and dancehall; tending to chickens in a chicken farm; and 
laboring in the forest as lumberjacks. Often, the original debt was for transportation 
of the worker from another place within the state, out of state, or even from abroad 
(Mexico or the Philippines). The employer, however, often provided food and 
housing on credit to the workers at prices that would never allow them to pay off 
the debts.  
 
 
467 This description and the discussion in the text below are based on the following peonage-
related cases: Matter of Clark, 1 Black. 122 (1821); Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. M. 190 (N.M. 
1857); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala.) (1903); 
United States v. McClellan, 127 Fed. Rep. 971 (S.D. Ga.) (1904); In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 
Rep. 686 (N.D. Fla. 1905); Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (E.D. Ark. 1905); Clyatt v. United States, 
197 U.S. 207 (1905); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); United States v. Cole, 153 Fed. 
Rep. 801 (W.D. Tex. 1907); United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. Rep. 974 (D.S.C. 1909); Freeman 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 539 (1910); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); United States v. Broughton, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bernal v. 
United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Pollock v. 
Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944); Pierce v. United 
States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2nd Cir. 1964); 
United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562 (4th 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mussry, 726 F. 
2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988); United States v. 
Farrell, 563 F. 3d 364 (8th Cir. 2008).  
468 Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (Dist. Ct. E. D. Ark. 1905). 
469 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911). The Assistant Attorney-General, Charles W. 
Russell, defined peonage as “causing compulsory service to be rendered by one man to another on 
the pretext of having him work out the amount of debt, real or claimed.” CHARLES W. RUSSELL, 
REPORT ON PEONAGE 3 (1908). 
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A report on peonage in the early twentieth century found that no general 
system of peonage existed in the United States, but sporadic cases existed in every 
state except Oklahoma and Connecticut.470 The most complete system of peonage 
existed in the lumber camps in Maine.471 In Maine, Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, 
criminal fraud statutes that criminalized taking money with no intention of 
performing the services, were used to enforce contracts of peonage.472 If the laborer 
left before the debt was paid off, he or she was deemed prima facie to have intended 
to take the initial advance fraudulently without any intention of repaying it.473 
Peonage was authorized and enforced by the state not only in these states by suits 
from employers, but also in all states by the self-help of employers who seized 
runaway peons and forcibly brought them back.474 
   
 Peonage raises a challenging question: what exactly is it that makes it 
wrong?475 Is it the loss of freedom? Is it the power imbalance? Is it the physical 
mistreatment? Is it the commodification? Undoubtedly, what made it wrong was a 
combination of these factors. Without presuming to arrive at a conclusive answer, 
we can say that the discussion of peonage in these cases provides us with a general 
framework for responding to this question. This general framework divides the evil 
of peonage into two general categories: physical abuse and loss of autonomy. 
Perhaps our humanitarian instincts lead us first to look at the physical side. When 
we think of slavery, we think of arduous field labor under a hot sun. Peonage took 
that form in some cases, but it could be domestic work and not extreme physical 
labor. In some cases, peons were beaten and brutalized, but, as noted above, in New 
Mexico the masters were prohibited from using the whip on them. In some cases, 
the peons were even guarded night and day and lacked freedom of movement.476  
 
 Peonage deprived the peon of something internal—a sense of autonomy. 
The answer to another question confirms this suggestion: assuming that slaves were 
treated better than their free counterparts, would slavery be acceptable? None but 
the most extreme utilitarian would answer “yes.” The reason we reject a positive 
response is that our natural moral instincts tell us that the loss of autonomy is the 
key evil of slavery.477 As noted slavery historian Yale Professor David Brion Davis 
 
470 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18-19 (1944). 
471 Id. at 19. 
472 See id. at 18-24.  
473 Id.  
474 For further discussion on different peonage laws in the United States, please refer to list of 
cases supra note 467.  
475 Radin, supra note 21, at 14. 
476 See Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N. M. 190 (N.M. 1857). 
477 J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, A Framework for Assessing the Moral Status of ‘Manipulation,’ in 
Coons & Weber, supra note 249, at 126.  




wrote: “Slavery is the perfect antithesis of individual autonomy or self-
sovereignty.”478 But perhaps the most eloquent expressions of this idea were by two 
former slaves. Mum Bett, the first slave in Massachusetts to sue in 1781 for her 
freedom under the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,479 said, “[i]f one minute’s 
freedom had been offered to me, and I had been told I must die at the end of that 
minute, I would have taken it.” Additionally, the Reverend E. P. Holmes, a former 
slave, testified before a congressional committee in 1883: 
 
Most anyone ought to know that a man is better off 
free than a slave, even if he did not have anything. I 
would rather be free and have my liberty. I fared just 
as well as any white child could have fared when I 
was a slave, and yet I would not give up my 
freedom.480  
 
 The same logic holds for peonage. This is why the judges in the peonage 
cases refer to the concept of voluntariness. The statute, as noted, prohibits both 
“voluntary or involuntary servitude,” so logically the voluntary nature of the 
peonage contract should not have influenced whether it was prohibited or not. As 
stated in the Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707 (1905), “[i]t is wholly immaterial whether 
the contract whereby the laborer is to work out an indebtedness due from him to 
the employer is entered into voluntarily or not. The laws of the United States declare 
all such contracts null and void, and they cannot be enforced.”481  
 
 The judges, like John Stuart Mill, were not comfortable with the notion that 
one could contract to subject oneself to what could become involuntary service.482 
But they grappled with the question of voluntariness.483 The opinion in the similarly 
named Peonage Cases, 123 F.671 (M.D. Ala. 1903), analyzed voluntariness from 
the perspective of time. “[i]f the [peonage] agreement . . . can ever be said to be 
voluntary, it certainly becomes involuntary the moment the person desires to 
withdraw, and then is coerced to remain and perform service against his will.”484 
 
478 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, 
264 (1975). 
479 See Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS. GOV. (last visited Oct. 3, 
2020), https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolition-of-slavery#-
the-mum-bett-case-.  
480 ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY 7 (1983). 
481 Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1905).  
482 Id. at 709. 
483 See id. at 707-09. 
484 Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 680 (M.D. Ala. 1903).  
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Justice Brewer in Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), distinguished 
voluntary from involuntary peonage on the basis of origin: 
 
Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or 
involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in 
the mode of origin, but none in the character of the 
servitude. The one exists where the debtor 
voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his 
creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some 
provision of law [such as, the fraud statutes noted 
above]. But peonage, however created, is 
compulsory service, involuntary servitude.485  
 
The effort to deal with the issue of voluntariness shows that even though the statute 
prohibited a peonage contract and resulted in making one null and void, judges still 
justified their decisions to convict for peonage by referring to the involuntary nature 
of the ongoing relationship if not the commencement of it. 
 
 This is not to say that the judges ignored the arduous physical conditions 
peons endured. One judge even went so far as to say that, compared with a life of 
peonage, “the slavery of ante bellum days was a paradis [sic].”486 Another judge 
referred to “those brutalities and outrages which have so greatly shocked the public 
conscience in some of the peonage cases.”487 But these statements are outliers. In 
any particular case, the specific physical conditions of either slavery or peonage 
could be worse, but generally it seems that peons fared better than slaves. The evil 
of peonage was not in the physical treatment, but in the loss of autonomy. 
 
 In recent decades, peonage has largely been classified as involuntary 
servitude or human trafficking. In 1984, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in United 
States v. Mussry, 726 F. 2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), expanded the scope of the Anti-
Peonage Act. It noted that the most common method of forcing another into 
involuntary servitude was the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force, but, 
that “[c]onduct other than the use, or threatened use, of law or physical force may . 
. . violate the [Thirteenth] amendment and its enforcing statutes.”488 A Supreme 
Court decision a few years later, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), 
 
485 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). 
486 United States v. McClellan, 127 F. 971, 977 (S.D. Ga. 1904). 
487 United States v. Clement, 171 F. 974, 976 (1909) (D.S.C. Carolina). This seems to be an earlier 
instance of the term “shock the conscience” than Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) cited 
by FRIED & FRIED, infra Cover Page at 70 as the origin of the term. 
488 United States v. Mussry, 726 F. 2d at 1453. 




held that a conspiracy to violate rights secured by the 13th Amendment must involve 
“the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion[,]” and therefore these rights 
cannot be violated voluntarily.489  
 
 Later, the emergence of human trafficking as the predominant form of 
involuntary servitude led to legislation, particularly, the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”) which changed the discussion from 
“involuntary servitude” to “human trafficking.”490 This Act, in part a reaction to the 
Kozminski decision, changed the relevant jurisprudence in order to recognize 
nonphysical coercion as an element in human trafficking, and, specifically, that 
coercion could be established both indirectly and purely psychologically.491 The 
problem of initial consent and later coercion in the relationship, as noted in the 
earlier cases, continues. Loyola Marymount University School of Law Professor 
Kathleen Kim has suggested that “[i]n actuality, many human trafficking cases 
appear to fall somewhere between consent and coercion. Those who are willing are 
easier to coerce.” 492  The result is that the laws concerning human trafficking 
struggle to delineate the parameters of coercion and legal scholars have not yet 
provided guidance on this issue.493 
 
 For our purposes, the VTVPA’s significance lies also in its proclamation of 
Congressional intent: that “Congress finds that . . . [t]he right to be free from slavery 
and involuntary servitude is among those inalienable rights [i.e., those referred to 
in the Declaration of Independence].”494 Congress has thus expressed its intent that 
market thinking should not be applied to deprive people of these rights and subject 
them to peonage or involuntary servitude. That is, these political rights should not 
be converted into market commodities.495 
 
489 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988); see also Katherine Kim, The Coercion 
of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 450-71 (2011) (arguing that the discussion is around 
the meaning of “coercion,” not “voluntariness,” and suggesting a “situational coercion ‘framework 
as a better way to define coercion’”).  
490 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 112 Stat. 
1466 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VTVPA]. 
491 See Kim, supra note 489, at 416. 
492 Kim, supra note 489, at 461. She has also expressed this distinction as follows: “. . . trafficking 
victims frequently begin as voluntary economic migrants, whose need and desire for a better life 
motivate their acceptance of risky employment. This initial consent is later vitiated by their 
employer’s coercive actions. Yet, identifying the location of the shift from initial voluntariness to 
subsequent coercion is difficult, particularly where coercion is nonphysical.” Id. at 415. 
493 Id. at 414. 
494 VTVPA, supra note 490, at 1468. 
495 The phrase “convert political rights into market commodities” is from Marc Rotenberg, Fair 
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). 




 We can see that in peonage, as in slavery, the main wrong was in denying 
the person’s autonomy. This was reason enough to outlaw peonage and make any 
contract of peonage null and void. But there was another aspect of peonage, not 
common with slavery, that also made it wrong and justified holding such contracts 
null and void—its threat to democratic government. As noted above, and as stated 
in the 1903 Peonage Cases opinion, “the peon was not a slave. He was a freeman, 
with political as well as civil rights.”496 This led Judge Jacob Trieber to declare that 
peonage was a greater threat to democracy than slavery. His opinion in the 1905 
Peonage Cases states: 
 
Congress recognized that in a government like 
ours—a republic—such a system of peonage was 
more dangerous to the safety of our republican 
institutions than slavery was, for a slave was 
property, and possessed none of the rights of 
citizenship, could not vote, and had no voice in the 
administration of the affairs of the nation. On the 
other hand, the peon, although practically a slave as 
long as he was indebted to his master or employer, 
without the privilege of changing his vocation or 
leaving his master, no matter how small the debt, yet 
possessed all the rights of citizenship, including the 
right of franchise. To permit such a condition was 
deemed dangerous, as in the course of time it might 
happen that a very large number of people, 
compelled by their necessities, perhaps, or through 
ignorance or greed, might thus sell themselves to 
masters, and thereby come absolutely under their 
control, and yet, by reason of the privilege to vote, in 
which they would probably be controlled by their 
masters, have a sufficient voice in the selection of the 
officials to determine the result of an election.497 
 
It can be concluded that a contract for peonage was declared null and void by 
Congress and by the federal courts because the resulting condition of peonage 
deprived the peon of autonomy.498 The contemporary peonage contract, that of 
human trafficking, is null and void because Congress has declared that it violates 
 
496 Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 673 (M.D. Ala. 1903). 
497 Peonage Cases, 136 F. at 707-08. 
498 See VTVPA, supra note 490, at 1468.  




an inalienable right as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. While the 
federal Constitution does not mention inalienable rights, the California Constitution 
does, so one could infer that such a contract should violate the California 
Constitution as well. Another reason for declaring a peonage contract null and void 
was that it posed a threat to our democratic institutions.  
 
The parallel threats to autonomy, inalienable rights, and democracy in the 
Google and Facebook contracts are evident. Of course, there are significant 
differences between peonage contracts and those of the current internet behemoths. 
But couldn’t these current contracts also be considered null and void for the same 
reasons—harm to autonomy, violation of an inalienable right, and threat to 
democracy? As Judge Harrison Lee Winter in his Booker opinion said, “[i]n short, 
the [peonage] statute must be read not only to render criminal the evil congress 
sought to eradicate so long ago, but, as well, its twentieth century counterpart.”499 
His comments could also apply to peonage’s twenty-first century counterpart—the 
online behavioral-advertising internet service contract. 
 
 Many commentators have spoken of the user’s relationship with digital 
technology or social media in terms that reflect a loss of autonomy similar to that 
in slavery or peonage. These statements have no legal effect, but they highlight the 
similarities between the relationship of internet service user and peon. Nicholas 
Carr has described the advertising-based business model as “a modern kind of 
sharecropping system. Like plantation owners in the American South after the Civil 
War, a social network gives each member a little plot of virtual land on which to 
cultivate an online presence through the posting for instance of words and pictures, 
and then the social network collects the economic value of the member’s labor 
through advertising . . .” 500  Additionally, Tim Wu has written, “Facebook’s 
ultimate success lay in this deeply ingenious scheme of attention arbitrage, by 
which it created a virtual attention plantation.”501  
 
 Others have compared internet services to feudalism or serfdom. Bruce 
Schneier stated, “[t]he relationship is more feudal than commercial. The companies 
are analogous to feudal lords, and we are their vassals, peasants, and—on a bad 
day—serfs. We are tenant farmers for these companies, working on their land by 
producing data that they in turn sell for profit.”502 Frank Pasquale has described the 
relationships as “self-incurred tutelage” and “digital feudalism of virtual 
 
499 United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1981). 
500 CARR, supra note 270, at 31.   
501 WU, supra note 37, at 301. 
502 SCHNEIER, supra note 201, at 58.  
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worlds.”503 Jaron Lanier has suggested that “the information economy that we are 
currently building doesn’t really embrace capitalism but rather a new form of 
feudalism.”504 Jacob Silverman has said that, “we’re not just the product, we’re also 
making the product. It’s for this reason that some observers have come to think of 
our relationship to social media as something like feudalism. They call it ‘digital 
serfdom.’”505  
 
 These comparisons raise the question of the correct terminology for the 
users of Google and Facebook services. Jaron Lanier has proposed that we should 
stop calling ourselves “users” because we are not using but being “used.” 506 
Considering the references to sharecroppers and serfs and the similarities of users 
to peons, perhaps we should call the users “digital peons.”507  
 
 This review of the legal system’s experience with peonage tells us that 
certain contracts entered into with full, free, and informed consent have been found 
null and void and without legal effect. The consent of the individual was not 
sufficient to make the contract effective because society had decided that the 
relationship established by the contract was too evil to merit support by the legal 
system. Consent could not legitimize an illegal contract. The key characteristic of 
these contracts was that they deprived the individual of autonomy. As a matter of 
principle, it seems reasonable that other contracts that deprive individuals of 
autonomy would also be found to be null and void and without legal effect.  
 
 As noted above, the California Constitution lends support to an argument 
that such contracts violate that document’s declaration of the inalienable rights to 
“enjoying and defending life and liberty[] . . . and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.” But the California constitution does not specify what 
“liberty,” “happiness,” and “privacy” are in regard to contracts.508 This general 
 
503 PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 163, 196. 
504 LANIER, supra note 43, at 79. 
505 SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 255. 
506 LANIER, supra note 42, at 200. 
507 The term “cyber slaves” would be sibilant, but an overstatement. As would “cyber-self slave.” 
See AIKEN, supra note 355, at 172. Danielle Allen, University Professor at Harvard, has suggested 
“serfdom,”, so “cyber serfdom” would also be a possibility. See Danielle Allen, The Road from 
Serfdom, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2019, at 94-101. See also SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 255. 
508 A few California cases merely note that the right of contract is a part of an individual’s 
“liberty” protected by the California Constitution and that contracts are subject to regulation and 
limitations not prohibited by the California Constitution. See In re Moffett, 62 P. 2d 1190, 1194 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1937); People v. Pond, 284 P. 2d 793, 799 (Cal. 1955); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. V. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 171 P. 2d 21, 25 (Cal. 1946). One court has specified the 
three elements necessary to plead a violation of a privacy right under the Constitution: “(1) a 
 




provision is helpful, but may not provide enough specificity to decide the issue of 




 C.  TYPES OF ILLEGAL509 CONTRACTS 
 
 Current contract doctrine restricts the justifications for declaring a contract 
null and void. In the eighteenth century, however, contracts were often not 
enforced.510 The enforcement of a contract was a matter of discretion by Chancery, 
and only in the nineteenth century did lawyers and judges create the “will” theory 
of contracts that helped adapt the law of contract to a market economy.511 The 
merger of law and equity further subjected a tradition of substantive justice to 
increasingly objective, formal, legal rules “which were stridently justified as having 
nothing to do with morality.” 512  But in the nineteenth century, judges still 
occasionally used a broad interpretation of the public policy principle as a 
“freestanding reason” not to enforce contracts they found corrupt.513 The historical 
development of contract law helps explain why market thinking, advances in 
technology, and the diminished regard for equitable concerns in the law could result 
in the failure to object to moral wrong in the behavioral-advertising business model. 
It also helps explain why Google’s and Facebook’s user contracts have not yet been 
declared illegal.  
 
 While the behavioral-advertising business model may be immoral, that does 
not mean that a contract used to implement it is necessarily illegal. Moral and legal 
 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; 
and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to a serious, egregious invasion of the protected 
privacy interest.” In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, 58 F. Supp. 3d 968, 985 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). For an extensive discussion of the right of “privacy” under the California Constitution, see 
e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). 
509 The terms “illegal” and “unlawful” are synonyms and both are used in California to describe 
contracts that are unenforceable and void under California law. California courts and 
commentators use the term “illegal” to refer to contracts that the California Civil Code and other 
commentators refer to as “unlawful.” See, e.g., McIntosh v. Mills, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66, 73 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004); 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW §452 (11th ed. 2018); Cal. Civ. Code §1667; 2 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 5. “Illegal” is used here because it has a commonly used noun 
form, “illegality,” as compared with the unusual and awkward “unlawfulness.” 
510 See P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 148 (2003). 
511 See Daniel Markovits, Theories of Common Law Contracts, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(Sep. 11, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contracts-theories/.  
512 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 266 (1977). 
513 Zephyr Teachout, The Unenforceable Corrupt Contract: Corruption in the 19th Century 
Contract Law, 35 N.Y. U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 681, 688 (2011).  
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standards differ. In most states, contract law is mainly a product of case law, with 
certain exceptions (for example, sales under the Uniform Commercial Code), But  
California has a Civil Code that sets forth broad principles of contract law. The 
Code itself, however, purports to be simply a codification of common law contract 
law. 514 And California also has a rich body of case law regarding contracts. And 
rules regarding contracts, and rules regarding contracts that injure the public 
welfare are found both in the Code and in the case law. For example, California 
contract law has a number of terms that it uses to analyze contracts inimical to the 
public welfare. The California Civil Code and case law both refer to contracts that 
are “illegal,” “unlawful,” “unconscionable,” “against public policy,” “contrary to 
good morals,” and “contrary to the policy of express law.”  
 
We can analyze the services contract of the behavioral-advertising business 
model in terms of three categories of contracts that are illegal (including unlawful): 
(1) contracts that are unconscionable; (2) contracts against public policy (including 
those contrary to the policy of express law); and, (3) contracts contrary to good 
morals. The cases, of course, do not all follow this neat categorization; there is 
much overlap between these three categories. 
  
  1.  Contracts Contrary to Good Morals515 
 
 The discussion above would suggest that the behavioral advertising service 
contracts of Google and Facebook should satisfy the criterion “contrary to good 
morals.” But, such an assumption would ignore California legislation and court 
decisions that have established precedents for those specific contracts that satisfy 
this criterion. Under California law, the category “contrary to good morals” covers 
different types of contracts. Contracts that have been found to fall into this category 
include those concerning gambling, marriage, marijuana, prostitution, 
pornography, hush money, fiduciary duties, rules of professional conduct, and 
 
514 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, THE CIVIL CODE OF CALIFORNIA 50, 56 (1885); Maurice E. Harrison, 
The First Half-Century of the California Civil Code, 10 CAL. L. REV. 185, 186 (1922). 
515 “Good morals” would seem to be closely related to “good faith.” California’s Commercial 
Code defines “good faith” as meaning “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing.” It also states that “[e]very contract or duty within this code 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.” CAL. COM. CODE § 1201 
(West 2017); CAL. COM. CODE § 1304 (West 2007); see also  
Woods v. Google, Inc., No. 05:11–CV–1263–JF, 2011 WL 3501403, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 10, 2011) (noting Google’s obligation to carry out its responsibilities in good faith). Margaret 
Jane Radin has proposed that good faith and fair dealing are an inalienable right. RADIN, supra 
note 329, at 202. But it appears that a user’s claim that Google and Facebook had violated this 
duty might be difficult to sustain. 




arbitration.516 To understand these restrictions on enforcement of contracts, we can 
review the case law on gambling and marriage. 
 
 Virtually at the inception of statehood, California adopted a conflicted 
policy on gambling. On one hand, it inherited the American common law rule that 
gambling was a misdemeanor and it considered gambling contrary to good 
morals.517 On the other hand, it issued licenses authorizing gambling houses, but 
prohibited the enforcement of contracts involving gambling debts. 518  This 
prohibition had deep roots in Anglo–American jurisprudence, originating in 1710 
in the English Statute of Anne, which declared gambling debts “utterly void, 
frustrate, and of none effect, to all intents and purposes whatsoever. . . .”519 Two 
early cases before the enactment of the California Civil Code in 1872 clearly 
demonstrate the prohibition on the enforcement of gambling debts.  
 
 First, in the California Supreme Court case, Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. 441 
(1851), the court, noting that Blackstone had said that gaming-houses were public 
nuisances, went on to say that “[w]agers, which tend to excite a breach of the peace, 
or are contra bonos mores, or which are against the principles of sound policy, are 
illegal; and no contract arising out of any such illegal transaction, can be enforced. 
These are principles of the common law which has been adopted in this State . . . .” 
520 But this case also raised two other questions. First, did a California statute 
authorizing the granting of a license to keep a gambling-house, confer a right to sue 
for a gaming debt? The answer was in the negative; the license was protection 
solely against a criminal prosecution.521 Second, was all gambling wrong? The 
answer was also in the negative; the innocent playing of cards as a recreation was 
not illegal, but gaming as a business involving significant stakes was illegal unless 
licensed.522  
 
 The other California Supreme Court case prior to the enactment of the 
California Civil Code, Carrier v. Brannan, 3 Cal. 328 (1853), affirmed the rule 
established in Bryant, but emphasized the moral basis for its decision: “It needs no 
authority or arguments to satisfy this court that the practice of gaming is vicious 
and immoral in its nature, and ruinous to the harmony and well-being of society.”523 
 
 
516 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1667 and accompanying comments (1872).  
517 See discussion infra pp. 82-84. 
518 See discussion infra pp. 83-84. 
519 Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
520 Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. 441, 442, 444 (1851). 
521 Id. at 444. 
522 Id. at 442. 
523 Carrier v. Brannon, 3 Cal. 328, 329 (1853). 
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 California case law after the enactment of the California Civil Code reflects 
the disapproval of gambling enshrined in the Code. Section 1667.3 states that “that 
is not lawful which is: . . . 3. otherwise contrary to good morals.” An early case, 
Shain v. Goodwin, 46 F. 564 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1891), involved notes on a debt for 
gambling with dice. The court cited Civil Code section 1667.3 to the effect that a 
contract “contrary to good morals” was not lawful. The decision quoted Irwin v. 
Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884), in which the U.S. Supreme Court said: “[g]enerally, 
in this country all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public 
policy.”524 The California court mentioned the moral basis for the policy, saying, 
“[i]n the United States wagering and gaming contracts seem to have met with no 
countenance from the courts, and consequently in nearly every state they are held 
illegal, as being inconsistent with the interests of the community, and at variance 
with the laws of morality.” The court refused to enforce the contract.525 Later cases 
concerning gambling debts reached the same conclusion. 526  Some of these 
decisions did not specifically mention section 1667.3 or the phrase “good 
morals,”527 but referred to public policy specifically or in general. A number did 
refer to section 1667.3 and said that contracts for the payment of a gambling debt 
were “contra bonos mores” and unenforceable under that section.528  
 
 The court decisions noted several points that highlighted the evil nature of 
gambling. In Pratt v. Padgett, 191 P. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920), the court stated that 
when a contract has for its object the violation of law, a court should sua sponte 
deny any relief to either party. In Hamilton v. Abadjian, 179 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1947), 
the court remarked that even Nevada courts refuse to lend their process to recover 
losses in gambling transactions.529 In Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), the court found that in the absence of a statute authorizing 
 
524 Shain v. Goodwin, 46 F. 564, 565, 567 (Cir. Ct. N.D. Cal. 1891) (quoting Irwin v. Williar, 110 
U.S. 499, 510 (1884); Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419, 421 (Nev. 1872)). 
525 Id. at 568. 
526 See e.g., Foster v. Beau De Zart, 108 P. 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910) (implying that a transaction 
was legal because it was not a gambling contract); Pratt v. Padgett, 191 P. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920); 
Hamilton v. Abadjian, 179 P.2d 804 (Cal. 1947); Lavick v. Nitzberg, 188 P.2d 758 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1948); Jamgotchian v. Sci. Games Corp., 371 F. App'x 812 (9th Cir. 2010).  
527 See Kyablue v. Watkins, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 156, 160 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the 
legality of a contract may depend on public policy concerns for gambling in general, as not all acts 
of gambling are criminal in California).  
528See, e.g., Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 88 P. 708, 709 (Cal. 1907); Braverman v. 
Horn, 198 P.2d 948, 949 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 
820, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re Sir, No. 07-52029-RLE, 2010 WL 2179177, at 
*12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 25, 2010); In re Camarillo, No. 03-45580-N7, 2005 WL 2203163, at 
*8 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 10, 2005).  
529 In 1983, Nevada changed the law to allow enforcement of gambling debts. See NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 463.368 (2019). 




a cheated gambler to sue, the doctrine of in pari delicto barred a tort suit by the 
cheated gambler against the casino. In Lavick v. Nitzberg, 188 P.2d 758 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1948), the court found that even though draw poker did not fall within the 
scope of California Penal Code, section 330 (which imposed a fine for gambling), 
the contract still was illegal under Civil Code section 1667.3. The two judges 
strengthened their decisions to deny enforcement by noting the prohibition of 
gambling in section 330 of the Penal Code.530 
 
 But the most sophisticated analysis of the evil of gambling was in 
Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
This case articulated a distinction that was perhaps implicit in earlier law, but was 
never expressed. The court noted that the state’s public policy on gambling had 
changed.531 The state had passed the California State Lottery Act of 1984,532 and 
pari-mutuel horse racing, draw poker clubs, and charitable bingo clubs had become 
common throughout the state.533 Thus, the state’s public policy on gambling itself, 
but not on the enforcement of gambling contracts, had changed. As the court said, 
“while the public policy against [gambling itself] has been substantially eroded, the 
public policy against [gambling on credit] has not.”534  The court discovered a 
significant distinction between different types of gambling debts. 535  The court 
perceived that the evil in gambling was in gambling on credit, not merely gambling 
itself and it interpreted the applicable precedents as applying to gambling debts that 
were incurred on credit.536 The court additionally noted that the Statute of Anne, in 
fact, had permitted gambling at certain places under certain conditions, but limited 
such gambling to “ready money only.”537  
 
 The court found addiction to be the special reason for treating gambling on 
credit differently from gambling itself; gambling debts are characteristic of 
pathological gambling. 538  The court noted that pathological gambling was 
prevalent in 2-3 percent of the population according to the Diagnostic & Statistical 
 
530 See Kelly v. First Astri Corp., supra note 528 at 812-13, 815; see also Lavick v. Nitzberg, 
supra note 526 at 759.  
531 Metro. Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  
532 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8880 (West 1984). 
533 See LEGIS. ANALYSIS OFF., Gambling in California: An Overview (Jan. 1999), 
https://lao.ca.gov/1998/12998gambling/12998gambling.html#gamblingca.  
534 Metro. Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646, 650-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).  
535 Id. at 652. 
536 Id.  
537 Id. at 651. 
538 Id. at 652. 
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Manual of Mental Disorders.539 In the court’s view, the pathological gambler is 
“out of control” and that is why: 
 
[E]nforcement of gambling debts has always been 
against public policy in California and should remain 
so, regardless of shifting public attitudes about 
gambling itself. If Californians want to play, so be it. 
But the law should not invite them to play themselves 
into debt. The judiciary cannot protect pathological 
gamblers from themselves, but we can refuse to 
participate in their financial ruin.540  
 
In another case, In re Sir, in which enforcement of the gambling debt was refused, 
the debtor was a self-confessed “gambling addict.”541  
 
 California law regarding gambling has deep roots, but is conflicted. 
Originally, gambling was considered by nature “vicious and immoral,” “ruinous to 
the well-being of society,” and “inconsistent with the interests of the 
community.”542 Over time, it lost some of its moral taint, but courts still refuse to 
enforce gambling debts. In addition, they will sua sponte find them unenforceable 
and refuse to allow a tort suit against a gambling house by a gambler for a gambling-
related offense.543 Today, a major concern underlying nonenforcement is addiction 
in the form of gambling on credit, particularly by a pathological gambler. 544 
Addiction of the compulsive gambler contributes to the loss of self-control and 
autonomy. Accordingly, enforcing a gambling contract would be contrary to good 
morals. The contracts of the behavioral-advertising business model could also be 
described as “vicious and immoral,” “inconsistent with the interests of the 
community” and “addictive.” In fact, the internet critic Richard Seymour has said 
that “[t]he model for research into social media addiction is gambling addiction.”545  
  
A second set of cases citing the good morals provision of California Civil 
Code section 1667.3 concerns marriage. In the first case, Heaps v. Toy, 128 P.2d 
813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942), a man entered into an oral agreement with a divorced 
woman that if she did not remarry and would serve as his “companion” for the rest 
 
539 Id. at 651-52. 
540 Id. at 652. 
541 In re Sir, No. 07-52029-RLE, 2010 WL 2179177, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 25, 2010).  
542 Carrier v. Brannon, 3 Cal. 328, at 329; Shain v. Goodwin, 46 F. 564, at 567. 
543 See Bryant v. Mead, 1 Cal. at 444. 
544 See Metro. Creditors, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. 
545 SEYMOUR, supra note 359, at 51. 




of his life, he would support her and her two children for the rest of her life. When 
the man refused to perform the contract, the woman sued.546 The court found two 
reasons to deny enforcement of the contract: legislation and morals.547 At the time, 
California Civil Code section 1676 provided that, “[e]very contract in restraint of 
the marriage of any person, other than a minor, is void.” Since the contract in this 
case provided that the woman gave up the chance to marry, it was found in restraint 
of marriage.548 But, the court also determined that the contract violated section 
1667.3 because the consideration (giving up the chance to marry) was contrary to 
good morals. 549  The assumption behind the decision was that marriage was a 
valuable social institution and needed to be encouraged even if that resulted in 
hardship for a woman. 
 
 Later court decisions evidence a change in views of what is contrary to good 
morals. In the well-known case, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), 
Justice Tobriner established the precedent that courts should generally enforce 
contracts between nonmarital partners despite the contention that such contracts 
violated public policy. California Penal Code § 269a had previously prohibited 
“living in a state of cohabitation and adultery.” The criminalization of this conduct 
demonstrated that it was contrary to good morals, but this provision was deleted 
from the Code before the Marvins’ relationship ended. 550  In any case, the 
enforcement of contracts between nonmarital partners was subject to one condition: 
that the contract not be “expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit 
consideration of sexual services.” 551  The reason for this exception was that a 
contract for the performance of sexual services would be “in essence, an agreement 
for prostitution and unlawful for that reason.”552 Justice Tobriner did not refer to 
section 1667 in his decision, but his reference to the unlawfulness of an agreement 
for prostitution confirms that such an agreement would be contrary to good 
morals.553  
 
This decision thus recognized that views of morality had changed from 
refusing enforcement of agreements between nonmarital partners to enforcing 
them, and made enforcing these agreements the law of California, except where the 
relationship was meretricious.554 
 
546 Heaps v. Toy, 128 P.2d 813, 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942). 
547 See id.  
548 Id. at 814. 
549 Id.  
550 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, n.4, 114 (Cal. 1976).  
551 Id. at 109. 
552 Id. at 116. 
553 See id.  
554 See id. at 110. 




 In Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the 
couple cohabited for 12 years, held themselves out as married, and had three 
children together. After they separated, the woman sued that, according to their 
implied agreement, she had a right to share equally in the property acquired during 
their cohabitation.555 The man defended himself on the ground that the implied 
agreement was unenforceable because the consideration for the implied agreement 
rested on meretricious sexual services. 556  The court ruled that the implied 
agreement should be enforced and found three reasons that the agreement did not 
rest on meretricious services: (1) that the agreement was very general and 
nonspecific; (2) the agreement was based on “many things,” none of which alone 
was crucial; and (3) it would be illogical to deny the enforceability of contracts 
between couples cohabiting when cohabitation was so common. 557  This court 
quoted Marvin to the effect that “[t]o equate the nonmarital relationship of today to 
[prostitution] is to do violence to an accepted and wholly different practice.”558 
 
 In a 2001 case, Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001), the wife alleged an implied contract to share property acquired during 
cohabitation. The court relied on Marvin and Alderson to find that the agreement 
was not based on a meretricious relationship even though it provided that the wife 
would attempt to bear her husband's children.559 The court cited three factors: (1) 
the term “meretricious” referred to prostitution; (2) the agreement contained no 
explicit reference to meretricious sexual services; and (3) § 1667.3 did not apply 
because mores had changed.560  The court quoted Alderson to write that, “[i]n 
today’s society when so many couples are living together without the benefit of 
marriage vows, it would be illogical to deny them the ability to enter into 
enforceable agreements in respect to their property rights.”561  
 
 A subset of marriage cases denied enforcement and concerned divorce. In 
Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), the 
husband and wife signed a marital settlement agreement during their marriage to 
protect and preserve their marriage. The marital settlement agreement contained a 
provision for liquidated damages of $50,000 and other consequences if the husband 
 
555 Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
556 Id. at 613. 
557 Id. at 616-17. 
558 Id. at 615-16.  
559 Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 903-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).  
560 Id. at 905-08. 
561 Id. at 907. 




was unfaithful.562 After the husband was unfaithful, the wife sought to enforce the 
agreement, to which the court refused.563  
 
In 1969, the California legislature enacted Civil Code § 4506 (now Cal. 
Fam. Code § 2310) and changed the grounds for termination of marriage from a 
fault basis to a marriage breakdown basis. Henceforth, dissolution of marriage was 
based on irreconcilable differences which caused the irremediable breakdown of 
the marriage. 564  The court decided that under § 1667 the agreement was 
unenforceable because it attempted “to impose a penalty on one of the parties as a 
result of that party's ‘fault’ during the marriage.”565 This provision was “contrary 
to the public policy underlying the no-fault provisions for dissolution of 
marriage.”566 The court, quoting In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000), 
noted that “. . . freedom of contract with respect to marital arrangements is tempered 
with statutory requirements and case law expressing social policy with respect to 
marriage.”567  
 
 Two later cases involving divorce also denied enforcement, following the 
principle set forth in Diosdado. First, in In re Marriage of Barapour, No. H025603, 
2004 WL 348969 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004), the wife brought a marital 
dissolution action, but the husband sought to enforce a contract executed by the 
couple in Iran. The contract severely limited the wife’s ground for divorce and 
deprived her of any share in the community property if she sought divorce.568 The 
court held the contract was unenforceable under § 1667.569 The court said that “the 
limitation in the Iranian contract on the wife’s right to seek a divorce directly 
contravenes California’s no-fault divorce policy.”570  
 
 In re Marriage of Mehren and Dargan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) concerned a post-marital agreement under which the husband promised the 
wife all interest in community property if he used illicit drugs. When the husband 
used illicit drugs, the wife sued for divorce.571 Once again, the court ruled that the 
agreement was unenforceable because it violated public policy favoring no-fault 
 
562 Diosdado v. Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
563 Id. at 496-97. 
564 CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (Lexis 2020). 
565 Diosdado, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. 
566 Id. at 497. 
567 Id.  
568 In re Marriage of Barapour, No. H025603, 2004 WL 348969, at *1(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 
2004).  
569 Id. at *3. 
570 Id. at *3-4. 
571 In re Marriage of Mehren and Dargan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 522, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  
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divorce.572 The court relied on Diosdado to decide that the agreement was illegal 
under section 1667, along with pointing out that the provision in § 578 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, “[a] bargain, the sole consideration of 
which is refraining or promising to refrain from committing a crime or tort, or from 
deceiving or wrongfully injuring the promisee or a third person, is illegal.”573  
 
 A marriage dissolution case that showed the limits on the principle of 
Diosdado was Beale v. Beale, No. B177640, 2005 WL 2850976 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 
1, 2005). In the settlement of marriage dissolution, the wife agreed to withdraw a 
police report accusing the husband of domestic violence.574 When the wife failed 
to sign a letter withdrawing the request for action, the court ordered her to sign it 
over the wife’s First Amendment objection.575 A dissenting judge referred to § 1667 
and said that in his opinion the settlement agreement violated that section saying 
that, “[t]he strong public policy of encouraging victims of domestic violence to file 
police reports is set forth in California’s statutes.”576  
 
 As with gambling contracts found unenforceable, California law on the 
enforceability of contracts related to cohabitation or marriage changed significantly 
over time. While marriage is still revered as a valuable social institution, the 
perception of “good morals” has shifted so it does not exclude cohabitation. 
Prostitution is still against “good morals,” but a relationship based on a number of 
different factors will not be considered meretricious. Further, California’s no-fault 
divorce and encouragement of victims of domestic violence to report are considered 
public policy and will render unenforceable a contract contrary to them. These cases 
show that California’s perception of “good morals” has been transformed to give 
women greater rights in contracts concerning cohabitation and marriage. A similar 
shift in the understanding of rights in the context of internet contracts could well 
have significant effects for the enforceability of contracts under the behavioral-
advertising business model.  
 
  2.  Unconscionable Contracts 
 
 We next ask whether a contract to implement the behavioral-advertising 
business model might be found to be unconscionable.The contemporary doctrine 
of unconscionability dates from the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
specifically § 2-302. The UCC was incorporated in the California Civil Code in 
 
572 Id. at 524. 
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574 Beale v. Beale, No. B177640, 2005 WL 2850976, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005). 
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1979 and made unconscionability applicable to all contracts, not just to sales of 
goods. 577  The UCC has been accepted as codifying the common law of 
unconscionability, 578  but one of its purposes was to replace the common law 
practice of courts determining that a particular contract clause was “contrary to 
public policy.”579 As noted below, however, the UCC has not served as a complete 
substitution for inquiries into a contract’s conformity with public policy. In any 
case, the doctrine as applied is inconsistent, not systematic, or even coherent.580  
 California Civil Code §1670.5 states that:  
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract 
or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result.581  
This provision does not explain what is “unconscionable,” but the California 
Supreme Court, in Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6 (Cal. 2016), said that it 
“refers to an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together 
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.”582 Ever 
since Yale Law School Professor Arthur Leff’’s 1967 article “Unconscionability 
and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,”583 courts have divided the analysis of 
unconscionability in a contract into two steps. The first step is to determine whether 
there is “procedural” unconscionability.584 The second step is to determine whether 
there is “substantive” unconscionability. 585  To find that the contract is 
unconscionable, the court should find both procedural and substantive 
 
577 Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 
HASTINGS L. J. 459, 461-62, 464-65 (1995).  
578 De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 422 P.3d 1004, 1011 (Cal. 2018).  
579 CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1670.5 (1979). 
580 See Prince, supra note 577, at 461. 
581 CAL. CIV. CODE, § 1670.5 (1979). 
582Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 12 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. 
Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 194 (Cal. 2013)). 
583 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). 
584 Id. at 487 (procedural unconscionability deals with the process of how the contract is made).  
585 Id. (substantive unconscionability deals with the resulting contract). 
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unconscionability.586 But, California courts have more recently suggested that all 
adhesion contracts are procedurally unconscionable. 587  Thus, for an adhesion 
contract to be found unconscionable in California, only substantive 
unconscionability needs to be proved.588 California case law has defined “adhesion 
contract” to mean “a standardized contract, imposed upon the subscribing party 
without an opportunity to negotiate the terms.”589 The service contract between a 
user and Google or Facebook would be an “adhesion contract” under this 
definition.590   
 Under California case law, procedural and substantive unconscionability 
are still interrelated. Pursuant to the California Supreme Court decision in 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000), 591 the 
degree of procedural unconscionability will affect the degree of substantive 
unconscionability required for a determination that the contract is unconscionable. 
It seems that the Google and Facebook contracts are procedurally unconscionable 
because they are adhesion contracts, but compared with other contracts that are 
procedurally unconscionable, are they more or less substantively unconscionable?  
 It depends on how “oppressive” or “surprising” the terms are. In discussing 
procedural unconscionability, California courts determine whether a contract is 
procedurally unconscionable according to whether there is oppression or 
surprise.592  
 “Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power that results in no 
real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice.” 593  The Google and 
Facebook contracts certainly exhibit “oppression” in the sense used in the cases: 
there is an enormous inequality of bargaining power between them and their users 
and there is no negotiation whatsoever over the terms. The issue of “choice” is not 
 
586 See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 367 P.3d 6, 12-13 (Cal. 2016).  
587 Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("A 
finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability").  
588 See, FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 585 (“Most cases of unconscionability involve a 
combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability, and it is generally agreed that if 
more of one is present, then less of the other is required”). 
589 Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir. 2006).  
590 Professor of Law Nancy S. Kim of the California Western School of Law has suggested 
that, “[i]n addition to the doctrine of unconscionability, courts can apply the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations” to limit the enforcement of adhesive contracts. Nancy S. Kim, Ideology, Coercion, 
and the Proposed Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, LOYOLA CONSUMER L. 
REV. (forthcoming), at 7-9, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577250.  
591 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d at 690.  
592 Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., 199 Cal. Rptr.3d 332, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
593 Id. at 344. 




so clear. Some court cases say there is no choice when the weaker party has no 
“opportunity to opt out” of the unconscionable terms594 or had “no meaningful 
choice but to accept the contract terms.”595 One case states that “oppression” refers 
not only to the lack of power to negotiate the terms of the contract, but also to “the 
absence of reasonable market alternatives.”596  
It might appear that there is “choice” in the sense that there exist other 
search and social media sites and a consumer could choose to use one of these other 
services. Other court decisions, however, have said that “a contract can be 
procedurally unconscionable when the party with substantially greater bargaining 
power presents a take-it-or-leave it contract to a customer—even if the customer 
has a meaningful choice as to service providers,”597 and that the terms of an internet 
service agreement with no opportunity to opt out constitutes “quintessential” 
procedural unconscionability. 598  These decisions suggest that the Google and 
Facebook contracts in their terms for the collection, aggregation, and handling of 
the users’ data would appear to be quite oppressive. 
 The other element in procedural unconscionability, surprise, generally 
“involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a 
prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.”599 California 
courts have also found the surprise requirement satisfied where the reasonable 
expectations of the weaker party were disappointed 600  or where “misleading 
bargaining conduct or other circumstances indicat[e] that a party's consent was not 
an informed choice.”601 What is a “prolix” document? One court found that a 20-
page lease was not long enough to allow a judgment of “surprise.”602 Google’s 
 
594 Jackson v. S.A.W. Entm’t Ltd., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
595 Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
596 Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
597 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F. 3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quotations omitted); see also Gatton v. T-Mobile, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
598 Aral v. Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), abrogated by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempts California's judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class action arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts).  
599 Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting 
Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
600 See Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1085-86 (Cal. C. D. 2011). 
601 Olvera v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  
602See West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), overruled on other 
grounds by Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Assn., 291 P.3d 316 
(Cal. 2013). 
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Terms of Service are about ten pages long.603 The Facebook Terms of Service 
together with the Data Policy are over 20 pages long, but they differ from instances 
of what the courts have previously considered “surprise” which mainly have 
concerned arbitration, limitation of liability, warranty disclaimer, non-compete, and 
other related short provisions hidden in a much longer text. The Facebook Data 
Policy is substantially longer than the Terms of Service. It could be argued that the 
Facebook and Google Terms of Service fail to satisfy the “reasonable expectations” 
of the user or that other circumstances deprived the user of “informed consent,” but 
it is unclear how successful such arguments would be if made by a litigant 
challenging the contract. Case law, however, also supports the argument that failure 
to read a detailed description of terms constitutes “surprise.”604 Most Facebook and 
Google users do not read the Terms of Service or the Data Policy.605 Thus, there is 
an argument backed by case law that could support the belief that their contracts 
with the companies still satisfied the “surprise” component of procedural 
unconscionability.  
 But whether the procedural unconscionability is great enough to lessen the 
relative burden of substantive unconscionability is still difficult to judge. To err on 
the side of caution, we can assume that a claim of substantive unconscionability 
would have to meet the same level of substantive unconscionability as the case law 
suggests has generally been necessary in the past.  
 Under California law, substantive unconscionability is present where the 
unfairness of the contract or one of its terms is extreme.606 The degree of extremity 
has been described in a number of cases as sufficient to “shock the conscience.”607 
Other cases have stated that the contract or one of its terms must be “unduly 
harsh,”608  “unduly harsh or oppressive,”609  or have “overly harsh or one-sided 
 
603 See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/terms 
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D]. 
604 See Sabia v. Orange Cty. Metro Realty, Inc., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014), review granted and opinion superseded sub nom., Sabia v. Orange Cty. Metro Realty, 334 
P.3d 685 (Cal. 2014); Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 411, 413 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008), modified (Mar. 24, 2008).  
605 See Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads the Terms of Service Agreements, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-percent-agree-
terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11. 
606 See e.g., Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 900 (Cal. 2015).  
607 Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Parada v. 
Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743, 759 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).  
608Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Davis v. 
O'Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)).  
609 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002). 




results.”610 An example of contract terms that courts found to shock the conscience 
occurred in a telecom services agreement where the arbitration clause would always 
produce an arbitrator proposed by the telecom company, would preclude 
institutional arbitration rules that would select a neutral arbitrator, and would 
require the arbitrator at the outset to apportion the arbitrator’s fees between the 
parties.611 The court stated that the agreement lay “far beyond the line required to 
render an agreement invalid.”612  
 Another example of a clause that was “overly harsh” or “one-sided” is from 
a telecom service contract. It contained a confidentiality clause that required any 
arbitration to remain confidential.613 The court concluded that:  
[I]f the company succeeds in imposing a gag order, 
plaintiffs are unable to mitigate the advantages 
inherent in being a repeat player [in arbitration on the 
same clause]. This is particularly harmful here, 
because the contract at issue affects seven million 
Californians. Thus, AT&T has placed itself in a far 
superior legal posture by ensuring that none of its 
potential opponents have access to  precedent 
while, at the same time, AT&T accumulates a wealth 
of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its 
own unilaterally crafted contract. Further, the 
unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent 
potential plaintiffs from obtaining the information 
needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or 
unlawful discrimination against AT&T.614  
Neither the Google nor Facebook Terms of Service contain arbitration provisions, 
so these precedents are not directly applicable. They do, however, illustrate the 
extremity that is required to constitute substantively unconscionable conduct.  
 In conclusion, the Google and Facebook Terms of Service are procedurally 
unconscionable because they are contracts of adhesion and exhibit both oppression 
 
610 Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)); see Martinez v. Master Prot. 
Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).  
611 Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F. 3d at 923. 
612 Id. at 926.  
613 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). 
614 Id. at 1152  
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and surprise. Whether they also constitute substantive unconscionability will 
depend on whether these contracts or their terms “shock the conscience” or are 
“overly harsh” or “one-sided.” In deciding whether these contracts are 
substantively unconscionable, one fact that should be considered is the dissimilarity 
of these contracts with the contracts in the case law. None of the California cases 
concern the nature of the services themselves, rather than merely an arbitration, 
limitation of liability, warranty disclaimer, non-compete, or similar clause. 
Although the behavioral-advertising internet services contract should by its very 
nature “shock the conscience,” it is unclear whether such an unprecedented 
argument would fit within the narrow doctrinal confines of “substantive 
unconscionability” as created by California courts. A plausible argument could be 
made, however, that the California courts could currently find that the Google and 
Facebook Terms of Service are substantively unconscionable.  
  3.  Contracts Against Public Policy 
 As noted above, there is some overlap among the categories of contracts 
against good morals, contracts that are unconscionable, and those against public 
policy. The concept of public policy was broadly applied in the 19th century and, 
as noted above, the UCC may have decreased the use of the “public policy” 
category. But it did not eliminate it. Contracts contrary to good morals, such as 
agreements to enforce gambling debts, were not only contrary to Civil Code section 
1667.3, but were also against “public policy” as noted in the discussion above of 
Williar and Metropolitan Creditors. 615  The courts in Marvin, Diosdado, and 
Mehren also referred to the “public policy” of no-fault divorce and the court in 
Beale relied on the “public policy” of encouraging victims of domestic violence to 
file police reports.616  While the public policy exception to the enforcement of 
contracts is similar to that for refusing to enforce contracts contrary to good morals 
and those that are unconscionable, it also differs in important respects. Its scope is 
broader and grants considerable discretion to judges.  
 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178, has tried to summarize the 
reasons for refusing to enforce a contract on grounds of public policy.617 Generally, 
courts will enforce contracts without passing on their substance.618 But, when the 
 
615 See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884); Metropolitan Creditors Service v. Sadri, 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
616 See Beale v. Beale, No. B177640, 2005 WL 2850976 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005. 
617 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see 
generally Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 420 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the rule 
of section 178 of the Restatement is expressed in California Civil Code § 1667).  
618 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, intro. note (AM. LAW. INST. 1981);  




court decides that the interest in freedom of contract is outweighed by some 
overriding interest of society, it may refuse to enforce the contract on grounds of 
public policy.619 “First, a refusal to enforce the promise may be an appropriate 
sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the parties themselves or by 
others. Second, enforcement of the promise may be an inappropriate use of the 
judicial process in carrying out an unsavory transaction.”620 The Restatement sees 
the delicate balancing of these two factors with other factors favoring a transaction 
freely entered into by the parties as the key to the decision on whether to enforce 
the contract or not. This standard is a helpful general statement, but we look at 
California law for a better understanding.  
 California statutes do not contain a general provision covering the “public 
policy” exception to contract enforcement. Civil Code § 1667.2 states that “that is 
not lawful, which is: . . . (2) [c]ontrary to the policy of express law, though not 
expressly prohibited . . . .” This provision does not apply to case law because the 
term “express law” refers only to statutory law.621 Therefore, for this provision to 
apply there must exist a specific statute that does not expressly prohibit the conduct 
that is the basis of the contract, but expresses a “policy” that the contract violates.622 
There does not appear to be any specific California statute that prohibits conduct 
that is the basis of the Google or Facebook service contracts.  
The other relevant California Civil Code provision, § 1668, states that 
contracts exempting a party from responsibility for fraud, willful injury, or violation 
of law are “against the policy of the law.”623 The phrase “the policy of the law” has 
been interpreted to include “public policy.”624 But the scope of this provision is 
quite limited and does not appear relevant to the Google or Facebook user contracts.  
 California case law on “public policy” is not limited to this Code section. 
The California Civil Code contains many different policy reasons for not enforcing 
contracts.625 Some of these rely on statutes, such as the California Government 
Code, which states in § 12920 that “[i]t is hereby declared as the public policy of 
 
619 Id.  
620 Id.  
621 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (West 2020); see Della Zoppa v. Della Zoppa, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 
908 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)  
622 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 (West 2020). 
623 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2020). 
624 See Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 148 (Cal. 
2014) (quoting Civil Code § 1668 and stating “[a]greements whose object, directly or indirectly, is 
to exempt [their] parties from violation of the law are against public policy” [emphasis 
added] (quoting In re Marriage of Fell, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).  
625 See generally, CAL. CIV. CODE (West 2020). 
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this state that . . . ,”(emphasis added) and the California Insurance Code, which 
states in section 676.1 that “[i]t shall be against public policy for a residential 
property insurance policy to provide coverage for liability . . . .”(emphasis added). 
Below we do not discuss the policy reasons based on statutes because they do not 
seem relevant: no federal or California laws prohibit behavioral-advertising internet 
service contracts.  
 California case law has emphasized the role of the legislature in determining 
“public policy.” In a nineteenth century case, Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886), 
the Supreme Court said,  
[T]he policy of the state is not created by the judicial 
department, although the  judicial department 
may be called upon at times to declare it. It can be 
ascertained only by reference to the constitution and 
laws passed under it, or (which is the same thing) to 
the principles underlying and recognized by the 
constitution and laws.626  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, California courts have repeated this 
deference. In Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), the 
court said, “[w]e are mindful of the restraint which courts must exercise in this 
arena, lest they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves 
recognition at law.”627 In Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680 (1992), the court 
said: 
[I]t is generally agreed that ‘public policy’ as a 
concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, 
and that courts should venture into this area, if at all, 
with great care and due deference to the judgment 
of the legislative branch[.]628  
Deference to the legislature means that a contract that violates a specific statute, 
such as the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, is unenforceable because that Act 
declares the policy of maintaining an honest and fair national marketplace in 
 
626 Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. at 702. 
627 Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 163. 
628 Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d at 687, overruled by Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046 
(Cal. 1998).  




securities a “national public interest.”629 And the public policy deference to the 
legislature also applies to administrative regulations issued by administrative 
authorities under authority granted by a statute.630  
 The marijuana case Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 247 Cal. 
Rptr. 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) also gave an eloquent description of the process of 
determining “public policy” in California. The court made a strong argument for a 
narrow interpretation of “public policy:” 
 
The question whether a contract violates public 
policy necessarily involves a degree of subjectivity. 
Therefore, . . . courts have been cautious in blithely 
applying public policy reasons to nullify otherwise 
enforceable contracts. This concern has been 
graphically articulated by the California Supreme 
Court as follows: [i]t has been well said that public 
policy is an unruly horse, astride of which you are 
carried into unknown and uncertain paths, . . . While 
contracts opposed to morality or law should not be 
allowed to show themselves in courts of justice, yet 
public policy requires and encourages the making of 
contracts by competent parties upon all valid and 
lawful considerations, and courts so recognizing 
have allowed parties the widest latitude in this 
regard; and, unless it is entirely plain that a contract 
is violative of sound public policy, a court will never 
so declare. The power of the courts to declare a 
contract void for being in contravention of sound 
public policy is a very delicate and undefined power, 
and, like the power to declare a statute 
unconstitutional, should be exercised only in cases 
free from doubt. . . No court ought to refuse its aid to 
enforce a contract on doubtful and uncertain grounds. 
The burden is on the defendant to show that its 
enforcement would be in violation of the settled 
 
629 See Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b 
(West 2010).  
630 See Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1056, 1061 (Cal. 1998).  
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public policy of this state, or injurious to the morals 
of its people.631  
Despite this cautionary admonition, the court ruled that the contract was 
unenforceable.632  
 Two other California Supreme Court cases have taken a broad view of 
“public policy.” In the first, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of what 
affected the public interest and constituted public policy. In the second, it found 
public policy not in a state or federal statute or regulation, but in the common law.  
 The first case, Tunkle v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441 
(Cal. 1963), is perhaps the most instructive California precedent regarding the 
public policy exception. It concerned the public policy exception, but also relied on 
§ 1668 of the California Civil Code which states that contracts exempting a party 
from liability for future negligence are “against the policy of the law.”633 Mr. Tunkl 
was treated by a charitable research hospital of the University of California and 
died from the hospital’s negligent treatment.634 Before entering the hospital, Mr. 
Tunkl signed a release that covered future negligence by the hospital.635 California 
case law was such that an exculpatory clause could not stand if it “affects the public 
interest.”636 The question was whether the hospital’s release “affected the public 
interest.”637 Justice Tobriner set forth six factors that could indicate that a release 
affects the public interest.638 These factors were: 
 1. Was the hospital a business of the type suitable for public regulation? 
2. Was the service of the hospital of great importance to and a matter of 
practical necessity for the public? 
3. Did the hospital hold itself out as willing to perform services for any 
member of the public? 
 
631 Bovard v. Am. Horse Enters., Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (quoting Moran v. Harris, 182 
Cal. Rptr. 519, 522 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted).  
632 Id. at 346. 
633 Tunkle v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d at 442. 
634 Id.  
635 Id.  
636 Id. at 443. 
637 Id. at 442. 
638 Id.at 445-45. 




 4. Because of the essential nature of its service, did the hospital have a 
 decisive advantage in bargaining strength? 
 5. Did the hospital use a “standardized adhesion contract” that gave no 
 protection against negligence and did not allow the purchaser to pay an 
 additional fee to obtain protection against negligence? 
 6. Was the other party’s “person or property” placed under the hospital’s 
 control?639  
In Tunkl, the hospital satisfied all these factors, but Justice Tobriner made clear that 
not all factors needed to be satisfied to qualify an agreement as “affecting the public 
interest.”640  
 Clearly, Google and Facebook are not hospitals and their contracts do not 
specifically attempt to relieve them from future negligence.641 But in other respects, 
the six factors could be appropriate factors for determining whether their contracts 
“affected the public interest” and could be analogized to contracts against the policy 
of law under section 1668. Certainly, Google and Facebook are businesses suitable 
for public regulation; like utilities, the services they provide are of great importance 
and could be seen as a practical necessity for the public; they offer their services to 
any member of the public with internet access; because of the nature of their 
services, they enjoy a decisive advantage in bargaining strength; they use a 
standardized “adhesion contract” that does not allow the user to opt out of 
surveillance; and the user places his or her “person” (in the sense of the person’s 
extensive personal information) or “property” (the personal data) under the 
companies’ control. Further, Justice Tobriner’s opinion also found that it was 
irrelevant whether the patient was a paying or non-paying patient,642 so the “free” 
service of Google and Facebook should not be a reason to distinguish their cases 
from the logic of the Tunkle decision.  
 
639 Id.  
640 See id. at 444-45. See Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica, LLC, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 202 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (providing an example of contract’s failure to affect the publict interest. “Exculpatory 
agreements in the recreational sports context do not implicate the public interest and therefore are 
not void as against public policy”).  
641 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Oct. 01, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
(providing no mention of negligence); Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 
2020), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US (providing that the terms do not limit liability 
for gross negligence).  
642Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 448 (1963). 
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 The second case that found “public policy” in the common law is Potvin v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060 (2000). After an insurance company deleted 
a doctor from its “preferred provider” lists, he sued citing his common law right to 
a fair procedure and stating that the company should have given him reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.643 The contract between the two allowed its 
termination “without cause.” 644  The doctor argued that the public policy 
considerations supporting the common law right to fair procedure rendered the 
“without cause” clause in the contract unenforceable.645 Justice Joyce L. Kennard 
in her opinion declared that “California courts . . . are loathe to enforce contract 
provisions offensive to public policy” and ruled that the termination clause was 
unenforceable to the extent it purported to limit an otherwise existing right to fair 
procedure under the common law.646 In an extensive dissent, Justice Janice Rogers 
Brown stated that, “[w]e continue to believe that, aside from constitutional policy, 
the Legislature, not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to describe the 
public policy of the state.” 647  Justice Brown quoted from another California 
Supreme Court decision, Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599, XX (1998), to the 
effect that “[h]istorically, this court has been reluctant to declare contractual 
provisions void or unenforceable on public policy grounds without firm legislative 
guidance.” The 4-3 decision in Potvin would seem to indicate the fragile state of 
the expansive interpretation of “public policy” in the California Supreme Court.  
 California law on “public policy” has evolved over the years. It has 
narrowed since the nineteenth century, but still can apply to many different 
situations. As one prominent authority on California law has noted, although 
anything that has a tendency to injure the public welfare is, in principle, against 
public policy, determining which contracts fall into this vague category is very 
difficult.648 The very nature of the public policy exception makes relying on case 
law doubtful. Public policy is a very expansive term that can apply to a wide variety 
of situations and is also variable with time and place. It therefore relies little on 
stare decisis and can allow a judge to be creative.649 Given the unpredictability of 
determining what constitutes “public policy,” the application of “public policy” to 
deny enforceability of the Google and Facebook contracts is certainly plausible.  
 
643 Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060, 1063, (2000). 
644 Id. at 1064. 
645 Id. at 1063. 
646 Id. at 1073. 
647 Id. at 1081 (Brown, J., dissenting) (quoting Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 19 Cal. 4th 66, 71, 
(1998)). 
648 See WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 453 (11th ed. 2018).  
649 Id. 





 D.  ILLEGALITY 
 
  1.  Factors Affecting A Decision on Illegality 
 
 The discussion above has set forth the California law applicable to the 
question of the legality of the behavioral-advertising contracts. There are a number 
of other considerations, however, that could influence a court’s balancing of the 
various factors for and against the legality of such contracts. These are federal 
government inaction, the tradition of judicial activism in California, procedural 
issues, changes in mores, changes to the business model, the threat to personhood, 
threats to a democratic society and democratic theory, paternalism, uncontrolled 
experiment, and bad beliefs and bad behavior.  
 
   a.  Federal650 Government Inaction 
 
 As noted above, when California courts are asked to make new law, they 
often look to the executive and legislative branches for guidance. The absence of 
any such guidance can embolden a court to act to rectify a serious problem. This 
may be true in the case of the loss of autonomy for users of Google and Facebook.  
 
 The executive and legislative branches of the federal government have not 
been active in addressing the dangers caused by behavioral advertising. The federal 
government651 has not enacted any general privacy legislation and it has not moved 
to change the business model of internet service companies like Google and 
Facebook. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the main federal agency dealing 
with Google and Facebook, has recently fined Facebook, and Google’s subsidiary 
 
650 Google and Facebook are active in all 50 states, but only the federal government has the 
authority to institute rules across the whole country and the world. The Attorney Generals of some 
states have shown interest in investigating Google and Facebook, but any actions will probably 
involve antitrust or privacy, not the business model. Kiran Stacey, Kadhim Shubber & Hannah 
Murphy, Big Tech feels heat of five investigations, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2019, at 4. 
651 For the prospects of passage at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020, see Charlie Warzel, Will 
Congress Really Pass a Privacy Bill? N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2019, at A26 and Editorial, Federal 
Privacy Law Can Keep Tech in Check, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2020, at 16. But see the recent Justice 
Department suit against Google. United States v. Google, Dist. Ct., D. C., case 1:20-cv-03010, 
filed 10/20/20; Luigi Zingales, Trump’s Google Lawsuit Could Prove a Poison Pill for Biden, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2020, at A15. 
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YouTube, but has made no effort to change the business model. 652 Government 
inaction stems from many factors, but a few quotations show why effective action 
by the federal government is not likely.  
 
The FTC’s Views:653  
 
 A. “...the FTC staff [in a 2007 staff report] accepted that tracking 
and targeting had become part of the digital landscape, important for present 
and future  business opportunities.” 654  
 
 B. “In a speech given in Washington DC on September 12, [2017,] 
Maureen Ohlhausen, the acting chair of the Federal Trade Commission in 
the US, tried to pour cold water on the idea [that politicians and regulators 
clamp down on Big Tech]. ‘Given the clear consumer benefits of 
technology-driven innovation,’ she said. ‘I am concerned about the push to 
adopt an approach that will disregard consumer benefits in the pursuit of 
other, perhaps even conflicting goals.’”655  
 
 C. “Mr. Kohm, whose division [of the FTC] prosecutes boiler 
rooms, advertising scams, and other financial fraud schemes, responded [to 
questions from FTC employees] that the tech companies were legitimate 
 
652 The FTC fined Facebook $5 billion, but Representative David Cicilline of Rhode Island 
remarked that, “[t]he F.T.C. just gave Facebook a Christmas present five months early . . . . It’s 
very disappointing that such an enormously powerful company that engaged in such serious 
misconduct is getting a slap on the wrist.” Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About 
$5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2019, at A1. Cicilline has been called “Big Tech’s top threat.” 
Steve Lohr, Lawmaker May Be Big Tech’s Top Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2019, at B1. See also 
Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief, USA v. Facebook, 
Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019); Natasha Singer & Kate Conger, Google Is Fined 
$170 Million for Violating Children’s Privacy on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/google-youtube-fine-ftc.html. 
653 Decisions by the FTC that would help resolve the problem of the behavioral-advertising 
business model would be for it to: (1) declare that the contracts underlying it constituted an “unfair 
or deceptive” practice under the FTC Act; (2) prohibit certain “unfair” acts of manipulation under 
§ 5 of the FTC Act; and (3) declare that online profiling advertisements were “unfair.” See Tal Z. 
Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 157, 
186 (2019); Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of 
the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH 1, 
38 (2003). 
654 TUROW, supra note 93, at 175. 
655 Rana Foroohar, Opinion, Big Tech Makes Vast Gains at Our Expense, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/e1b5af54-9a2c-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0. 




businesses offering free services, and it was unclear how they had harmed 
consumers...”656 
 
 D. “The reason the FTC has done little is not because it lacks 
authority, but because its officials simply do not believe there is a problem 
to be solved.”657  
 
Personal Relations:  
 
 A. On September 19, 2019, when Mark Zuckerberg met with 
Donald Trump at the White House, “Mr. Zuckerberg quickly noted that the 
president had the highest level of engagement of any world leader on the 
social network. Mr. Trump—who previously savaged Facebook on a range 
of issues—immediately adopted a new tone, describing the conversation in 
social media posts as ‘nice.’ . . . Mr. Zuckerberg’s simple flattery seems to 
have paid off. Mr. Trump hasn’t publicly castigated the company since, 
and months later, he continues to tell audiences that he is ‘No. 1’ on the 
world’s largest social network.” 658 
 
 B. On October 22, 2019, Mark Zuckerberg had dinner with Donald 
Trump, “[b]ut  looming over the private dinner [was] a question: Did Mr. 
Trump and Mr. Zuckerberg reach some kind of accommodation? Mr. 
Zuckerberg needs, and appears to be getting, a pass both on angry tweets 
from the president and the serious threats of lawsuits and regulation that 
face other big tech companies. Mr. Trump needs access to Facebook’s 
advertising platform and its viral power . . . Mr. Trump…has been notably 
softer on Facebook than on Amazon, Google, Twitter or Netflix at a 
moment when his regulatory apparatus often focuses on the political 
enemies he identifies in tweets . . . The Justice Department is currently 
conducting antitrust investigations of the tech giants.But while Google and 
Amazon face ‘mature investigations,’ the Facebook inquiry is ‘not real at 
 
656 Nicholas Confessore & Cecilia Kang, Data Abuses Define Era, But Will F.T.C. Bite?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2018, at B1. 
657 Mat Stotter, Democrats Need to Tame the Facebook Monster, POLITICO (May 18, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/05/18/democrats-facebook-stoller-226930. 
658 Mike Isaac, Sheera Frenkel & Cecilia Kang, Now More Than Ever, Facebook is a ‘Mark 
Zuckerburg Production,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/16/technology/zuckerberg-facebook-coronavirus.html.  
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all,’ a person who has been briefed on the  investigation said. And 




 A. “This year [2017], Google is on track to spend more money than 
any company in America on lobbying.”660  
 
 B. “The four companies [Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google] 
spent a combined $55 million on lobbying last year [2018], doubling their 
combined spending of $27.4 million in 2016.”661 
 
 C. “Ms. Pelosi [House majority leader] received nearly $43,000 in 
total donations for her 2018 re-election campaign from employees and 
political action committees of Facebook, Amazon and Alphabet, Google’s 
corporate parent—each of which ranked among her top half-dozen sources 
of campaign cash.”662  
 
 D. “Last month, the industry lobbying group, the Internet 
Association, which  represents Amazon, Facebook and Google, awarded 
its Internet Freedom Award to Ivanka Trump, the President’s daughter and 
White House senior adviser.”663  
 E. “During the 2016 election cycle, [Chuck Schumer, Democratic 
Senate leader] raised more money from Facebook employees than any other 
member of Congress...Mr. Schumer also has a personal connection to 
Facebook: His daughter Alison joined the firm out of college and is now a 
marketing manager in Facebook’s New York office . . . .”664 
 
 
659 Ben Smith, What’s Facebook’s Deal with Donald Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/business/media/facebook-donald-trump-mark-
zuckerberg.html. 
660 Teachout, supra note 399. 
661 Cecilia Kang & Kenneth P. Vogel, Tech Titans Build Lobbyist Army, Trying to Repel Threats 
to Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2019, at A1. 
662 Id. at A16. 
663 Id. 
664 Sheera Frankel, et. al., supra note 396; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Stephanie Saul and Kenneth P. 
Vogel, Kamala Harris and Big Tech: Friendly Ties, and Hesitancy to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2020, at B1.  




Regulatory Capture:  
 A. “Google, Amazon, and Facebook are deeply embedded in both 
parties, and their interests will be protected no matter who is in the White 
House.”665  
 
 B. “Big Tech has quietly become the dominant political lobbying 
power in Washington, spending huge amounts of  cash and exerting 
serious soft power in an effort to avoid regulatory disruption of its business 
model, which is now the most profitable one in the private sector.”666 
 
 C. “On March 24, 2015, the Wall Street Journal revealed the 
existence of a leaked report from the competition bureau of the FTC 
recommending that Google be prosecuted for abusing its market position by 
recommending Google services over those of third parties . . . the full 
commission had, in a very unusual manner, overruled the staff 
recommendation and decided against prosecuting Google. The Journal 
alleged that the 230 meetings that Google had had at the White House in the 
run-up to the complaint dismissal had influenced the commission.”667  
 
 D. In 2011, at Senate Judiciary Committee hearings “[i]ndustry 





 A. “Why should Google worry about potential antitrust violations if 
its monitoring Internet access side by side with the DHS and the NSA? [I]t 
may be ‘too important to surveillance’ for the government to alienate the 
firm.”669  
 
 B. “In June of 2013, Glen Greenwald, writing in The Guardian, 
revealed that in 2009, Facebook, along with Google and Apple (and four 
 
665 TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 131. If the Trump campaign believes that Facebook helped win the 
2016 election as noted above, the President would seem to be disinclined to hurt it.  
666 Rana Foroohar, Release Big Tech’s Grip on Power, FIN. TIMES (June 18,2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/173a9ed8-52b0-11e7-a1f2-db19572361bb. 
667 TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 132. 
668 Alvaro Bedoya, Opinion, Why Silicon Valley Lobbyists Love Big, Broad Privacy Bills, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/opinion/silicon-valley-lobbyists-
privacy.html. 
669 PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 50. 
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other online service providers), had given the National Security Agency 
direct access to their worldwide network for the agency’s PRISM spying 
program.”670  
 
 C. “[L]ots of surveillance data moves back and forth between 
government and corporations. One consequence of this is that it’s hard to 
get effective laws passed to curb corporate surveillance—governments 
don’t really want to limit their own access to data by crippling the corporate 
hand that feeds them.”671  
 
Using the Platform to Mobilize: 
 
 A. “On January 17, 2012, the film and music industries backed the 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA): a proposed bill that aimed to crack down 
on copyright infringement . . . . The bill specifically targeted search engines 
such as Google that link to pirate sites. The day after the bill was introduced, 
Google put [an image with the message “[t]ell Congress: please don’t censor 
the web!”] on its search page for 24 hours. The image was viewed by 1.8 
billion people . . . the email servers of Congress were overwhelmed, and on 
January 20, 2012, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Lamar 
Smith, withdrew the bill.”672 
 
 These examples demonstrate that it is difficult to see how the executive and 
legislative branches of government will take the initiative to address the business 
model of Google and Facebook. This leaves the judiciary as a possible actor. As a 
defense lawyer in a recent prominent case remarked in another context, “[t]he court 
has a role to play . . . [i]t is the institution that most people have confidence in in 
these very troubled times.”673 It may also be difficult to see how courts could take 






670 TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 157.  
671 SCHNEIER, supra note 201, at 80.  
672 TAPLIN, supra note 7, at 127-28. Google seems to have used “Travis’s Law” named after Uber 
founder Travis Kalanick who forced New York Mayor Bill de Blasio to retreat from a plan to cap 
Uber’s growth by mobilizing Uber’s constituency online. Farhad Manjoo, The New Urban Power 
Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2018, at B1. 
673 Comment by Reid Weingarten, a lawyer for Jeffrey Epstein. Ali Watkins, Benjamin Weiser & 
Amy Julia Harris, Epstein Accusers Share Their Fury at Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2019, at A19. 




   b.  Tradition of Judicial Activism 
 
 The legal system has been weak in responding to the challenges of the 
unprecedented. But judges have a tradition of responding to new contractual abuses 
with strong criticism. An example is Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in U.S. v. 
Bethlehem Steel, 315 U.S. 289 (1942), in which he criticized the inordinate profits 
of Bethlehem Steel on government contracts:  
 
Today it is held that because the circumstances of 
this case cannot be fitted into a neatly carved 
pigeonhole in the law of contracts, "daylight 
robbery," exploitation of the "necessities" of the 
country at war, must be consummated by this Court. 
It is said that familiar principles would be outraged if 
Bethlehem were denied recovery on these contracts. 
But is there any principle which is more familiar or 
more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-
American law than the basic doctrine that the courts 
will not permit themselves to be used as instruments 
of inequity and injustice? Does any principle in our 
law have more universal application than the 
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in 
which the relative positions of the parties are such 
that one has unconscionably taken advantage of the 
necessities of the other?674 
 
 The California Supreme Court has a reputation as a pioneer in affirming the 
rights of the individual against traditional mores, corporations, and the government. 
The recognition that all adhesion contracts are procedurally unconscionable is one 
example. A major treatise, Farnsworth on Contracts, describes this as California 
having “gone to the extreme.”675 In the Marvin case described above, the California 
Supreme Court recognized the change in society towards cohabitation and broke 
new ground in enforcing an oral contract.676 In three other cases, the California 
Supreme Court took progressive positions to protect the interests of consumers and 
gig workers: People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (Cal. 1971), Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 ( Cal. 2005), and Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (Cal. 2018).  
 
674 U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel, 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942); see also M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of 
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 786 (1969).  
675 FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 278. 
676 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, n.4, 114 (Cal. 1976).  




 In People v. Krivda, the question the California Supreme Court addressed 
was whether a householder has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning 
items that are thrown away in a garbage can, which is then placed adjacent to the 
road to be collected, or in the alternative, if the householder abandoned the trash 
when the householder threw it in the garbage can.677 The Court found that the 
placement of one's trash barrels onto the sidewalk for collection was not necessarily 
an abandonment of one's trash to the police or general public and the defendants' 
reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.678 This decision was a step forward for privacy advocates.679  
 
 In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that a class action 
waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable when it occurred in an arbitration 
clause in a consumer contract of adhesion with small amounts of damages and 
deliberate cheating by the party with superior bargaining power.680 The clause was 
unconscionable because it was, in effect, a violation of California Code § 1668 
regarding exclusion of culpability.681 At the time, this decision was a significant 
victory for consumers.682  
 
 In Dynamex Operations, the California Supreme Court established a clear 
standard for distinguishing independent contractors from employees, a contentious 
issue that had long plagued labor law. Under the ABC test set by the Court the 
hiring entity had to establish three factors to prove that a worker was an independent 
contractor.683 A bill that passed the California Senate in September 2019 accepted 
the ABC test and showed promise of increasing wages and benefits for hundreds of 
thousands of struggling workers, especially those working for the ride sharing 
services Uber and Lyft.684 
 
677 See People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 (Cal. 1971). 
678 Id. at 366. 
679 This decision was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood 486 U.S. 
35 (1988), discussed previously on page 56 which held that a homeowner did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their trash. It is possible that a decision of the California 
Supreme Court holding the Google and Facebook contracts illegal could be overruled by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but generally the U.S. Supreme Court defers to the lower federal courts’ 
interpretation of State law. See e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415, 203 L. Ed. 
2d 636 (2019). 
680 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-63 ( Cal. 2005), 
681 Id.  
682 Later, however, its holding was overruled by an opinion of Justice Scalia in a 5-4 decision by 
the U. S. Supreme Court. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
683 Dynamex Operations West, Inc., v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 957, 416 P. 3d 1 (2018) 
reh’g denied (June 20, 2018).  
684 Miriam Pawel, Opinion, California Calls It ‘Feudalism’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2019, at A27. 





 In 1974, the California Supreme Court did express the need for the law to 
reflect changed circumstances. Justice Tobriner’s opinion in Green v. Superior 
Court, 517 P. 2d 1168 (1974), stated: 
 
In taking a similar step today [responding to the 
changes wrought by modern  conditions by 
discarding outworn common law doctrines], we do 
not exercise a novel prerogative, but merely follow 
the well-established duty of common law courts to 
reflect contemporary social values and ethics. As 
Justice Cardozo wrote in his celebrated essay ‘The 
Growth of the Law’ chapter V, pages 136—137: ‘[a] 
rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts 
themselves, and was supposed in the making to 
express the Mores of the day, may be abrogated by 
courts when the Mores have so changed that 
perpetration of the rule would do violence to the 
social conscience. . . . This is not usurpation. It is not 
even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of 
the same power of creation that built up the common 
law through its exercise by the judges of the past.685 
 
California judicial decisions in the future could also reflect changes in social values 
and ethics to outlaw the manipulation and loss of autonomy inherent in the 
behavioral-advertising business model. 
 
   c.  Procedural Issues 
 
 A court in California will not have the chance to rule on the illegality of the 
Google and Facebook contracts unless someone brings this claim to the court. A 
suit brought by a user of Google or Facebook, could make claims based on contract, 
statutory violation, or tort, while raising the issue of illegality. According to the 
Terms of Service of Google and Facebook, the suit could be brought in either a 
federal court in the Northern District of California or in a state court.686 Ordinarily, 
the plaintiff would have to raise the question of illegality of the contracts, but courts 
 
685 Green v. Superior Court, 517 P. 2d at 1184. 
686 See GOOGLE PRIVACY & TERMS, https://policies.google.com/terms (last visited Oct. 7, 2020), 
and FACEBOOK TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 7, 
2020). 
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do have the authority to raise it sua sponte.687 In a 19th century case, the California 
Supreme Court in discussing its reversal of a case on points which one of the parties 
did not have the opportunity to discuss, said, “the court is bound to satisfy its own 
conscience, and cannot shut its eyes to the fact, although it is not put in issue. A 
court of equity will not allow itself to become a handmaiden of iniquity of any kind. 
It intervenes, not for the sake of the party who is benefited by the intervention, but 
for the sake of the law itself.”688  
 
 A suit claiming the illegality of a contract is usually filed with breach of 
contract as the main claim. But in this case, a claim of breach of contract would 
seem to contradict the claim that the contract was void.689 A claim of illegality 
could be added to current or future suits against Google or Facebook alleging other 
claims under federal statutes (such as the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications 
Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act); California statutes (such as 
the California Computer Crime Law, and the California Invasion of Privacy Act); 
the California Constitution; and the common law. One specific claim could be an 
allegation of a violation of an “autonomy privacy” right. The California Supreme 
Court established a right of “autonomy privacy” in Hill v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Assn., 865 P. 2d 633 (1994). This right concerns an interest in making 
intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, 
intrusion, or interference.690 But the protection of this right “is to be determined 
from the usual sources of positive law governing the right to privacy—common 
law development, constitutional development, statutory enactment, and the ballot 
arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative.”691 This possible claim deserves 
further study. 
 
 Prior cases against Google and Facebook seem to have been brought in 
federal court in California. 692  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
 
687 FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, vol. 2, at § 5.1. 
688 Kreamer v. Earl, 27 P. 735, 737 (1891). 
689 A claim of breach of contract has been made in litigation against Google in In re Google 
Privacy Litigation, Case No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. 2013) at *1. A 
contract-based claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been made 
against Facebook in In re Facebook Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, MDL 2843, 
Case No. 18-MD-2843-VC, First Amended Consolidated Complaint, at v, 
https://cand.uscourts.gov/vc/fbmdl. 
690 Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 865 P. 2d at 654. 
691 Id. at 654-55. 
692 Professor Radin has said that federal courts seem to ignore due process concerns in considering 
whether to declare certain kinds of contracts or clauses unacceptable. She sees the prospect for 
these courts dealing with the issue as “grim,” but does not seem to consider the possibility of 
changing mores as discussed in the text below. Margaret Jane Radin, The Fiduciary State and 
 




plaintiff must show subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and assert a claim 
on which relief can be granted (see Rule 12(b)(6)); otherwise a defendant may ask 
the court to dismiss the suit. Suits against Google, Facebook, and others alleging 
injury to data privacy interests for disclosures of personal information have had 
difficulty in satisfying the requirements for Rule 12 (b) (1) (often called 
“standing”). Unless standing is conferred by a statute or the Constitution, the 
plaintiff must establish it by showing (1) injury in fact, which is neither conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) causation, such that a causal connection between the alleged 
injury and offensive conduct is established; and (3) redressability, or a likelihood 
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.693 In data privacy cases, it 
has been difficult for plaintiffs to show injury-in-fact. As Paul S. Grewal, United 
States Magistrate Judge of the U.S. District Court in Northern California, wrote in 
2013:  
 
[I]n this district’s recent case law on data privacy 
claims, injury-in-fact has proven to be a significant 
barrier to entry. And so even though injury-in-fact 
may not generally be Mount Everest, as then-Judge 
Alito observed, 694  in data privacy cases in the 
Northern District of California the doctrine might 
still reasonably be described as Kilimanjaro.695  
 
 But the climb might not be that steep for two reasons. First, California case 
law on illegal contracts described above seems to indicate that the specific harm of 
the individual contract is not as important as the abstract harm to society as a whole. 
This could be true in a case claiming the illegality of the Google and Facebook 
contracts as well. Second, in In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 192 F. Supp. 3d 
1053 (N.D. Cal. 2016), Judge Ronald M. Whyte said that “a California breach of 
contract claim for nominal damages may support [federal court] standing.”696 In a 
pending case against Facebook, Judge Vince Chhabria ruled that the dissemination 
 
Private Ordering, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 326-27 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew 
S. Gold, eds. 2016). 
693 In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 930 (N. D. Cal. 2015). 
694 Danvers Motor Co. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F. 3d 286, 294 (3rd Cir. 2005). 
695 In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litigation, Case No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499 
(N.D. Cal. 2013). Perhaps a plaintiff alleging contract illegality could avoid a challenge claiming 
no injury-in-fact by asking the court, under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
take “judicial notice” of the Mueller Report and the White House Notice of September 10, 2019, 
and other government reports showing the deleterious consequences of social media, supra note 
393 and accompanying text. For an example of “judicial notice” see In re Yahoo Mail Litigation, 7 
F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1023-24 (N.D. Cal. 2104). 
696 In re Facebook Privacy Litigation, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. 
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of the plaintiffs’ sensitive information to third parties in violation of their privacy 
was sufficient to confer standing.697 Finally, in Patel v. Facebook, Inc. 932 F. 3d 
1264 (9th Cir. 2019), a $35 billion class action suit filed in California federal court, 
the court ruled that a violation of the Illinois biometric-data-privacy statute injures 
an individual’s concrete right of privacy and alleges a concrete injury-in-fact.698 
From these cases it appears that standing is not an insuperable barrier to a suit 
against Facebook or Google. 
 
 Satisfying the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 699 
to allege sufficient facts to avoid dismissal has also been difficult. The applicable 
federal statutes that grant standing, such as the Wiretap Act or the Stored 
Communications Act, often are narrowly drafted with a particular purpose that does 
not cover privacy abuses.700  The Wiretap Act’s definition of “contents” of an 
electronic communication in a way that excludes information that Facebook 
intercepts through the use of cookies has prevented plaintiffs from successfully 
alleging sufficient facts.701 The Stored Communications Act only contemplated 
temporary storage of data, but Facebook’s persistent cookies resided permanently 
on the user’s browser.702 In a suit against Google under the California Consumers 
Legal Remedies Act, the court found that the plaintiffs could present no caselaw to 
support their interpretation of the word “sale” in the Act as including the barter of 
personal information for free services.703 The court added that, “California federal 
courts have expressly rejected defining ‘sale’ as to include ‘transactions’ based on 
non-tangible forms of payment, including internet usage information 
specifically.”704 A suit against Google or Facebook would probably not be able to 
rely on a violation of either the Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act.  
 
 A suit against Google or Facebook should be a class action since Google 
and Facebook have a significant amount of users who have suffered similar harm. 
One hurdle these suits would face is comporting to the requirements of Federal Rule 
 
697 In re Facebook Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, MDL 2843, Case No. 18-MD-
2843-VC, Pretrial Order No. 20, at 14, https://cand.uscourts.gov/vc/fbmdl. 
698 Patel v. Facebook, Inc. 932 F. 3d at 1267. 
699 California has a civil rule that mirrors the Fed. R. Civ. Pro 12(b)(c). See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 438 (West 2019). 
700 See e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 2520 (providing civil remedies for persons who’s “wire, oral, or 
electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this 
chapter [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.]”).  
701 In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
702 Id. at 936. 
703 In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F. 3d. 125, 153 (3rd Cir. 
2015). 
704 Id.  




of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions. For example, the suit would 
have to show that the class is so numerous that joinder of all parties was impractical 
and that there were questions of law or fact common to the class.705 In the past, 
plaintiffs have been able to overcome objections to class certification in suits 
against the companies.706 In Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 F. 3d 
979 (9th Cir. 2015), the court defeated Google’s challenge to class certification that 
asserted the action did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 23 (b) (3) that, “the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.” Additionally, in Patel v. Facebook, 932 F. 3d. 
1264 (9th Cir. 2019), the court rejected Facebook’s challenge to class certification 
that complained that the class action was not “superior to the other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” as required under 
Rule 23(b)(3). Based on the cases out of California, a class certification challenge 
should not be an impossible hurdle for a class action suit against Facebook or 
Google.  
 
 Any individual contemplating such a suit would face a powerful opponent 
in Facebook or Google with virtually unlimited resources, but a class-action law 
firm, such as Edelson PC,707 with possible assistance from organizations such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Center for Democracy and 
Technology could mount an impressive challenge.708 
 
   d.  Changing Mores 
 
 The judicial system has always faced the challenge of its relationship to 
society. Should judges try to foresee the direction society is moving and expedite 
its movement or should they wait until society has already moved and the judicial 
system is already lagging behind? Regardless of a judge’s answer to this question, 
the law must change as society changes. The question is only how quickly. As 
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis declared in their seminal article describing 
the right of privacy, “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law in its eternal youth, grows to meet 
 
705 See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23.  
706 See Patel v. Facebook, 932 F. 3d. 1264 (9th Cir. 2019); Pulaski & Middleman, LLC et al. v. 
Google, Inc., 802 F. 3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). 
707 Conor Dougherty, Jay Edelson, the Class-Action Lawyer Who May Be Tech’s Least Friended 
Man, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2015), http://nytimes.com/2015/04/05/technology/unpopular-in-silicon-
valley.html?_r=0. 
708 All these organizations assisted in the case Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).  
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the demand of society.”709 Speaking of the creation of new rights, they said “[t]his 
development of the law was inevitable.”710 
 
 One of the most important truths of the recent past has been that significant 
change in morals in liberal democracies (e.g., attitudes toward gambling, 
cohabitation, drug use, sexual harassment, and gay marriage) has been possible 
when the society was ready for it. Journalist Malcolm Gladwell’s concept of the 
“tipping point”711 helps to explain many mysterious changes that mark everyday 
life by describing them as epidemics. Three concepts at the heart of this idea are (1) 
contagiousness, (2) little causes have big effects, and (3) change happens at one 
dramatic moment.712 The tipping point suggests that effecting change relies on a 
few dedicated people, the so-called connectors, mavens, and salesmen, and on 
factors such as stickiness and context.713 The tipping point, however, seems to 
apply more to marketing behavior than to moral changes. As to social mores, New 
Yorker writer Adam Gopnik has remarked that the way that change has happened 
is not by hectoring and calling it necessary, but by moving it into the realm of the 
plausible: “once something is plausible...it has a natural momentum toward 
becoming real.” 714  This “natural momentum” is implemented by norm 
entrepreneurs and information cascades as described by Harvard Law Professor 
Cass Sunstein.715 Momentum can be generated by awareness that causes a public 
outcry. Financial Times columnist Rana Foroohar has opined that consumers are 
not troubled by many things, such as algorithmic credit biases, until they are aware 
of them:“I suspect that if we all knew how precisely we are being tracked and how 
richly we are being monetised by the platform tech companies, there would be more 
of a public outcry.” 716 Perhaps Shosanna Zuboff’s book The Age of Surveillance 
 
709 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
710 Id.  
711 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 9 
(2002). These changes can become “behavioral contagion.” ROBERT H. FRANK, UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE 7 (2020). 
712 See GLADWELL, supra note 711, at 9.  
713 See id., 34, 38-59, 60-69, and 70-87. 
714 ADAM GOPNIK, A THOUSAND SMALL SANITITES: THE MORAL ADVENTURE OF LIBERALISM 50 
(2019).  
715 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS 8-10 (2019). Former tech insiders, such as Roger 
McNamee and Tristan Harris, could help promote a “tectonic shift.” Brian Barth, The Defector, 
NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 2019, at 32. Princeton Philosophy Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah has 
suggested that honor, properly understood, can also play a role. It can bind the private and the 
public together and lead from individual moral convictions to the creation of associations, 
meetings, petitions and public campaigns that are essential to the final success of a political 
movement proposing a moral revolution. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW 
MORAL REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN 178 (2010). 
716 Rana Foroohar, America’ new antitrust agenda, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2019, at 9.  




Capitalism will serve as the information industry’s Silent Spring as suggested by 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle.717 Or maybe Professor Liao, mentioned above, will decide 
that new information has persuaded him that we have a moral duty to leave 
Facebook.718  
 
 Seeing the Google and Facebook behavioral-advertising contracts as 
immoral, unconscionable, and against public policy would be a moral change that 
could occur as the result of a combination of factors. These could include the 
constant drip of privacy violations by Google and Facebook, a growing public 
understanding of the risks of collection and use of personal data,719 an especially 
egregious and personally compelling addiction story, or the results of a study on 
the neurological effects of digital addiction.720 One can see the beginnings of such 
a change. In 2016, the positive press that the tech giants had enjoyed turned 
negative.721 In 2017, Rana Foroohar, speaking of Google, Facebook, and Amazon, 
said that they “are increasingly being seen not just as business threats, but moral 
hazards as well.” 722  In the past four years the share of Americans who think 
technology companies have a negative impact on the U.S. has nearly doubled.723 In 
2019, Nir Eyal, wrote a book on how to free oneself from tech addiction and B. J. 
Fogg, the creator of “captology,” has said that “[a] movement to be ‘post-digital’ 
will emerge in 2020 . . . . We will start to realize that being chained to your mobile 
phone is a low-status behavior, similar to smoking.”724 
 
 
717 Chris Hoofnagle, “Zuboff’s book is the information industry’s Silent Spring.” Dust jacket, 
ZUBOFF, supra note 56.  
718 See Liao, supra note 316 and surrounding discussion. 
719 For example, Americans might have a better appreciation of the possible negative 
consequences if they learned how the extensive repositories of personal data available not only 
from the public sector, but also from the private sector enabled the Nazis to efficiently round up, 
transport, and seize the assets of Jews. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143-44 (2000).  
720 A speculative example of a future scientific study: The question of whether the millennial 
generation lacked fully mature prefrontal cortexes and the accompanying executive function and 
judgment. Is it possible that the maturing of the prefrontal cortex can only occur within a specific 
critical period in adolescence; that the dopamine effects of intense screen interaction by 
adolescents adversely affect the prefrontal cortex and prevent its maturation during this time 
window; and as a result, the prefrontal cortex of a generation of adolescents that engaged in much 
screen time may never fully mature?  
721 Rurik Bradbury, Twilight of the Tech Idols, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2019, at A27. 
722 Rana Foroohar, Silicon Valley has too much power, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2017, at 9. 
723 Pilita Clark, Facebook’s biggest threat is its chief’s fatal self-belief, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2019, 
at 18. 
724 See Nellie Bowles, 5 Years After ‘Hooked,’ Author Has Antidote to Tech Addiction, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2019, at B1. 
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 But it seems likely that such a change would come only after current users 
and institutions that support Google and Facebook recognize the immorality of the 
behavioral-advertising business model. Achieving this recognition would require 
an effort by church members to ask whether their church’s use of Facebook was an 
endorsement of the ethics of the company’s business model; by school students to 
ask their schools why a profit-making company with an immoral business model is 
given the advantage of free publicity by the school;725 and for university students 
and alumni/ae to question why the university is promoting the use of Facebook, but 
not that of Apple versus Dell computers. Students and alumni/ae could also 
question their universities as to whether the schools are undermining their mission 
and demeaning students and alumni/ae by promoting a service with the values 
expressed in Mark Zuckerberg’s messages quoted above (contempt, not respect, for 
a user’s dignity, privacy, and autonomy). Efforts such as these by norm 
entrepreneurs could change the moral climate and provide an environment in which 
the employees of Facebook and Google could find social support for a decision to 
leave the companies.726  
 
We may be seeing this change happening now. New Yorker writer Andrew 
Marantz has noted that “[w]ithin just a few years, the general public’s attitude 
toward social media has swerved from widespread veneration to viral fury.”727 In 
May, 2019, noted digital commentator Wade Roush wrote, “[w]ithout revenue from 
emotion-pumped advertising, Facebook would wither and there could never be 
another social-networking-company that reaches its planetary scale. But I believe 
those would be good things.”728 In such an environment, a judge’s decision to find 
the contracts illegal could find social acceptance. 
 
Some would find it ironic that the norm entrepreneurs leading this change 
might rely on Google and Facebook to destroy their business model; others might 
 
725 Some promising signs: Mark Zuckerberg’s alma mater, Exeter, has established a course in the 
Religion Department “Religion 597: Silicon Valley Ethics: Case Studies in the World of High 
Tech” taught by Peter Vorkink, an Episcopal Priest, that poses questions such as “Have we 
unwittingly paid for convenience with the erosion of fundamental values?” The course is 
reportedly very popular, https://www.exeter.edu/academics/courses. Further, at Harvard 
University, where Mark Zuckerberg studied, the course “Tech Ethics” taught by Michael Sandel is 
now the most popular undergraduate course. Lawrence Bacow, Allston in focus, HARV. MAG., 3 
(Nov.-Dec., 2019). Finally, in 2018, Sergei Brin’s and Larry Page’s alma mater, Stanford, planned 
an initiative to focus on “ethics, society and technology.” Andrew Jack & Hannah Kuchler, 
Stanford to add ethics to its technology teaching, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 2018, at 4. 
726 For an example, see Editorial, Employees can help to make Big Tech ethical, FIN. TIMES, July 
22, 2019, at 16. 
727 Andrew Marantz, The More Things Change, NEW YORKER, Sept. 30, 2019, at 74. 
728 Roush, supra note 311, at 28 (emphasis added). For a boycott of Facebook by advertisers, see 
Tiffany Hsu & Mike Isaac, Count Us Out, Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2020, at B1.  




find it unrealistic. The above discussion suggests that these companies might adjust 
their algorithms to decrease or eliminate cascades that criticize or threaten their 
current business model. 729  Or they might use professional “influencers” to 
counteract the efforts of the norm entrepreneurs.730 But we will never know because 
either their algorithms are closely guarded business secrets, or because artificial 
intelligence has made them unexplainable to humans. 731  The fact that these 
companies are able to take these actions strengthens the argument of this essay: that 
the behavioral-advertising business model is immoral, and contracts implementing 
it are contrary to good morals, unconscionable, and contrary to public policy. 
 
   e.  Changes to the Business Model 
 
 Changes in the environment could force changes to the business model of 
Google and Facebook that would render nugatory any court decision on 
illegality.732  Although Mark Zuckerberg has vowed not to change Facebook’s 
business model,733 change could arise from a number of sources. 
 
 First, the business model may be inherently defective. Growth has been the 
lifeblood of the behavioral-advertising business model. The market-based system 
forces the companies to keep growing. But as Brian Wieser, an analyst at Pivotal 
Research, has said of Facebook and Twitter, “there are limits to growth; the market 
cannot grow forever. The faster they’ve been growing in recent years, the sooner 
 
729 Siva Vaidhyanathan’s hope that “[w]e could even use Facebook to mount campaigns to rein in 
Facebook” seems unrealistic. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Don’t Delete Facebook. Do Something About 
It., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/opinion/sunday/delete-
facebook-does-not-fix-problem.html. 
730 See Annalisa Quinn, Everyone Wants to ‘Influence’ You, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/magazine/everyone-wants-to-influence-you.html. 
731 John Herrman, a technology reporter for The New York Times, has asserted that “[w]e may 
never understand the extent of Facebook’s influence on our politics—and not because Facebook 
doesn’t know, but because it does.” John Herrman, How Secrecy Fuels Facebook Paranoia, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Jan. 20, 2019, at 18. 
732 Changes greater than simply to the business model are possible. See GEORGE GILDER, Life 
After Google (2018) (foreseeing the end of Google’s dominance in a future of the blockchain and 
its derivatives). Also, four pending cases against Google may cost it some money, but they seem 
unlikely to affect the business model because they all target specific acts, rather than the business 
model itself. See Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, Case No. 19-CV-04311 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 
2019); Arizona v. Google LLC, Case No. 2020-006219 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 2020); Brown et al. v. 
Google LLC et al., Case No. 20-03664 (N.D. Cal. 2020); McCoy v. Alphabet Inc. et al., Case No. 
5:20-CV-05427 (N.D. Cal. 2020).  
733 See Richard Waters, Tim Bradshaw, Barney Jopson & Hannah Kuchler, Zuckerberg faces 
Capitol Hill grilling, FIN. TIMES: THE WORD (Apr. 10, 2018, at 3:43PM), http://blogs.ft.com/the-
world/liveblogs/2018-04-11/.  
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they were getting there.”734 By 2018, Facebook had almost fully saturated its most 
important markets in the United States and Europe.735 It may also have "reached 
the limit of how much advertising its newsfeed can show.”736 Growth has been 
slowing and it has been opined that Facebook, in order to mitigate the possibility 
of running out of new users, should mine more data from current users.737 Further, 
the numbers of users may be incorrect if one considers the number of fake accounts. 
In 2019, it was reported that Facebook deleted 800,000 “false” accounts a quarter, 
equivalent to one-third of its monthly active users, and that fake review pages were 
rife on Facebook.738 Facebook has tried to lessen the impact of declining growth in 
users by trying to engage them more while also gathering more data from them, but 
this has been met with resistance from users.739  
 
 The current business model is under question. According to Jaron Lanier, 
the only hope for social networking sites from the business point of view is for the 
appearance of a “magic formula” which provides an acceptable method of violating 
privacy and dignity. 740  Otherwise, he believes that Google’s and Facebook’s 
business model of free information, surveillance, and manipulation, with 
insufficient user rights is not sustainable as technology advances. He asserts that 
giant remote companies owning everyone’s digital identities become “too big to 
 
734 See Kate Conger, Snapʼs Drop in Active Users Could Signal a Social Media Peak, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/technology/snapchat-users.html.  
735 See Mike Isaac, Its Woes Mounting, Facebook Reports Slowing User Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
31, 2018, at B7; Mike Isaac, Facebookʼs Vision for the Future: Less News Feed, More Stories, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/technology/facebook-earnings-
growth.html.  
736 Hannah Kuchler, Facebook investors wake up to era of slower growth, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/84a9e6c8-9075-11e8-b639-7680cedcc421. 
737 See, LEX, Facebook/EU: bare-faced cheek, FIN. TIMES, (Apr. 19, 2018) (“Much is made of the 
idea that Facebook will run out of new users in three years if uptake continues at its present 
pace.”); Hannah Murphy, Facebook’s growth slows as it reaches maturity, FIN. TIMES, at 14 (Jan. 
31, 2020). 
738 See LEX, Facebook: false friends, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1-2, 2019, at 16; Kate Beioley, Fake review 
pages rife on Facebook, says charity, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2019, at 12; Elaine Moore, FT Big 
Read. Social Media, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2019, at 8; Nicholas Confessore, Gabriel J. X. Dance, 
Richard Harris & Mark Hanse, Buying Online Influence from a Shadowy Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
28, 2018; at A1; Jack Nicas, Calculating How Much of Facebook Is Phony, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2019, at B1; and Tim Bradshaw, Fraudsters milk ‘tens of billions’ from companies via fake clicks 
to online ads, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2019, at 1. 
739 See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, Don’t Trust Facebook With Your Love Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 
2019, at A22; Jamie Condliffe, Facebook’s New Privacy Idea? An Instagram app could promote 
constant sharing updates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2019, at B4; Jamie Condliffe, The Week in Tech: 
Are You Ready for Facebookʼs Future?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2019 at B4. 
740 LANIER, supra note 42, at 55.  




fail,” and this degrades both markets and governments.741 If it cannot come up with 
a broader business model, “[t]he death of Facebook must be an option if it is to be 
a company at all.” 742 In a similar vein, writer Annalee Newitz has declared that 
“[s]ocial media is broken . . . nothing lasts forever. Facebook and Twitter are slowly 
imploding.” 743 After talking with fiction writers and algorithmic experts, she has 
written that media companies need to figure out how to make money from helping 
consumers protect and curate their personal data.744 “Slow media,” or platforms 
limiting how quickly content circulates might be one solution. 
 
 Second, society’s views of Google and Facebook could change. Today they 
are accepted as independent, private entities even though they possess unparalleled 
power and wealth. As noted above, they are used so widely that they can be seen 
as utilities. Mark Zuckerberg has called Facebook a utility; Jaron Lanier has 
remarked that it is becoming more like an electric utility every day.745 It is a piece 
of necessary infrastructure, and government needs to assure the availability of such 
a utility for citizens and businesses. Facebook and Google are utilities that citizens 
depend on, but which they do not understand and are ripe for manipulation and loss 
of autonomy. These companies would seem to be ripe for strict governmental 
regulation like other utilities. However, regulation could result in significant 
changes to the business model. Or Congress might “get really ambitious” and “fund 
a rival to compete with Facebook or Google, the way the Postal Service competes 
with FEDEX and U.P.S.”746 
 
 Third, ad blocking software could affect the behavioral-advertising business 
model. Some suggest this software will doom the model to extinction. 747  One 
survey found that 47% of Americans already use ad blocking software. 748 But 
websites have taken countermeasures including preventing users with ad-blockers 
 
741 Id. at 204. 
742 LANIER, supra note 42, at 250; see also West, supra note 232, at 404 (asserting that an 
American company today can expect to stay on the S&P 500 for only about eighteen years); Wu, 
supra note 37, at 261 (the “dinosaur effect” suggests that it might be at its largest size right before 
extinction). 
743 Annalee Newitz, Nothing Lasts Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2019, at SR 1. 
744 Id. One critic, Robert B. Reich, has suggested legislation to prevent Google and Facebook from 
using the aggregations of personal information. ROBERT B. REICH, THE COMMON GOOD 172 
(2018). 
745 Lanier, supra note 43, at 250. 
746 Marantz, supra note 282, at SR6. 
747 ANDREW ESSEX, THE END OF ADVERTISING 15-27 (2017). 
748 Alexander Zambrano & Caleb Pickard, A Defense of Ad Blocking and Consumer Inattention, 
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from accessing their sites.749 It seems likely that advertising will survive, and some 
will try to take advantage of the selection process involved in ad-blocking. For 
example, Google introduced ad-blocking software on Chrome, but was hit with 
ethical questions—was its ad-blocking unfairly advantaging Google?750 It is not 
clear that ad blocking software will doom the behavioral-advertising business 
model.  
 
 Fourth, Facebook could face a permanent decline in its advertising revenue 
if it fails to prevent a boycott by advertisers upset at its failure to tamp down hate 
speech on the platform. Advertisers have expressed concern that their 
advertisements were appearing on the platform next to hate speech and 
misinformation and they have received pressure from politicians, supermodels, 
actors and others.751 In June 2020, more than 300 advertisers agreed to boycott 
Facebook and as a result the company lost $75 billion in market value in one 
week.752 Facebook has agreed to make certain changes, like adding labels to certain 
posts, but this is unlikely to satisfy the advertisers. Any substantive changes would 
contradict the business model, which allows hate speech and fake news, because 
relatively they generate more engagement, more personal data, and more 
advertising revenue.  
 
 Initial indications are that the COVID-19 pandemic devasted many 
consumer companies but does not seem to have negatively influenced the big tech 
firms.753 Consumers isolated at home spend more time on their devices, and Google 
benefits from the increased use of mobile phones and growing share of Android 
 
749 Devin Coldeway, Thousands of Major Sites Are Taking Silent Anti-Ad-Blocking Measures, 
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/27/thousands-of-major-sites-are-
taking-silent-anti-ad-blocking-measures/.  
750 David Mayer, Why Google’s Ad-Blocking in Chrome Might Prove Awkward for the Company, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 15, 2008), http://fortune.com/2018/02/15/google-chrome-ad-blocking-2/. 
751 See e.g., Kari Paul & Alex Hern, Verizon Pulls Ads From Facebook Over Inaction on Hate 
Speech, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jun/25/verizon-advertising-facebook-hate-speech-
boycott (discussing the issues that Facebook has been having with advertisments pulled from their 
website).  
752 See Tiffany Hsu & Mike Isaac, Count Us Out, Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2020, at B1; 
Tiffany Hsu & Mike Isaac, Advertiser Exodus Snowballs as Facebook Struggles to Ease 
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/technology/facebook-advertising-boycott.html; Hannah 
Murphy, Facebook faces reckoning over hate speech, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 2020, at 7. 
753 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Jack Nicas, Steve Lohr & Mike Isaac, Big Tech Could Emerge From 
Coronavirus Crisis Stronger Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-facebook-amazon-youtube.html; 
Peter Eavis & Steve Lohr, Big Tech Firms Tighten Grip on a Pandemic-Stricken Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2020, at A1. 




app sales.754 But Facebook is perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the pandemic as 
two shifts have boosted it. First, users confined to home have rediscovered 
Facebook messaging and video calls, which reached record levels.755 Second, there 
was an unprecedented increase in the consumption of news articles on Facebook.756 
This is a significant change because sharing of news stories had declined on 
Facebook for many years.757 Further, it seems that users are looking for more 
authoritative news sources.758 If this is due to adjustments to Facebook’s algorithms 
to promote more high-quality content, then it might affect the company’s business 
model.759  
 
   f.  Threat to Personhood 
 The huge troves of data that result from the behavioral-advertising model 
raise questions not only of autonomy, but also of personhood. What is a person? 
Certainly, the physical body, including the brain, is, and always has been, the 
primary focus, but personhood760 can also include some other things, including 
data.  
 In 1982, Professor Radin was among the first legal scholars to examine the 
connection between personhood, property, and the market. She divided property 
into two types: fungible and personal.761 She suggested that some property interests 
can become personal because they are so closely associated with the individual that 
without them the individual would not have the opportunity to become a fully 
developed person.762 These personal property rights should be protected against 
invasion by government or by conflicting fungible property claims of other people. 
She asserted that for an object close to the personal end of the continuum from 
 
754 Id.  
755 Kevin Roose & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Coronavirus Revives Facebook as a News 
Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), 
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756 Id.  
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760 See Thomas D. Williams & Olof Bengtsson, Personalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 
11, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/, (the discussion of personhood assumes the personalist view, 
that “personhood [...] gives meaning to all of reality and constitutes its supreme value. Personhood 
carries with it an inviolable dignity that merits unconditional respect. [A person’s] dignity is 
inherent and sets itself beyond all price. The language of dignity rules out the possibility of 
involving persons in a trade-off, as if their worth were a function of their utility. Every person 
without exception is of inestimable worth, and no one is dispensable or interchangeable”).  
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Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12 
124 
 
personal to fungible, there could be a prima facie case against taking it.763 The 
premise underlying her personhood perspective is that, to be a person, an individual 
needs some control over resources in the external environment and this control can 
take the form of property rights.764 We can assert that this property right is an 
inalienable property right. One’s personhood should not be monetizable or 
alienable as proposed by universal commodification.765  
 This conception of personhood as including certain forms of property is 
applicable to our current digital environment. In discussing this environment, Colin 
Koopman, Philosophy Professor at the University of Oregon, has asserted that our 
digital information is active in making us who we are and the formats structuring 
data help shape who we are. 766  He concludes that our information composes 
significant parts of our very selves and that, “we are cyborgs who extend into our 
data.” 767  Professor John Cheney-Lippold of the University of Michigan has 
asserted in his book We Are Data, that, “[i]n the present day of ubiquitous 
surveillance, who we are is not only what we think we are. Who we are is what our 
data is made to say about us.”768 We have algorithmic identities that are statistically 
ordained by correlation and nothing else 769  and they constitute part of our 
personhood. University of Maryland Law Professor Julie Cohen has said that, 
“networked information technologies do not simply empower the networked self; 
they configure it.”770 Sherry Turkle has noted that the concept of “second self,” 
which was the title of her book, does not go far enough:“[o]ne is tempted, to speak 
not merely of second self, but of a new generation of self, itself.”771  
 Our personhood is changing as we spend more and more time online, and 
our personal data that constitutes part of our personhood are considered fungible 
property and subject to the market. Digitization seems to make personhood 
 
763 Id. at 1015. 
764 See id. 
765 RADIN, supra note 410, at 9, 56; see also HARCOURT, supra note 27, at 26 (“the massive 
collection, recording, data mining, and analysis of practically every aspect of our ordinary lives 
begins to undermine our sense of control over our destiny and self-confidence, our sense of self. It 
begins to shape us, at least many of us, into marketized subjects”). 
766 COLIN KOOPERMAN, HOW WE BECAME OUR DATA: A GENEALOGY OF THE INFORMATION 
PERSON vii., 8 (2019). 
767 Id. at 8.  
768 CHENEY-LIPPOLD, supra note 116, at xii. 
769 Id. at 58; see also, LANIER, supra note 42, at 20 (criticizing this phenomenon, saying, “[t]he 
deep meaning of personhood is being reduced by illusions of bits.” Of Facebook, he has said, 
“[w]hatever a person might be, if you want to be one, delete your accounts. LANIER, supra note 8, 
at 139.”).  
770 Cohen, supra note 231, at 46. 
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alienable. As New Yorker writer Jia Tolentino has written, Mark Zuckerberg 
“understood better than anyone that personhood in the twenty-first century would 
be a commodity like cotton or gold.”772 But, commodification is the antithesis of 
personhood as a supreme value which rules out the possibility of involving persons 
in a trade-off, as if their worth were a function of their utility. Making personhood 
marketable is a contradiction with personhood as we have known it; personhood, 
the supreme value, becomes a mere commodity.  
 Professor Charles Fried has described well the ultimate value of personhood: 
 
All other moral values gather their moral force as 
they determine choice. By contrast, the value of 
personhood...far from being chosen, is the 
presupposition and substrate of the very concept of 
choice. And that is why the norms surrounding 
respect for person may not be compromised, why 
these norms are absolute in respect to the various 
ends we choose to pursue.773  
 
Shoshanna Zuboff has interpreted this threat to personhood as one to our humanity: 
“an information civilization shaped by surveillance capitalism will thrive at the 
expense of human nature and threatens to cost us our humanity.”774  
 The changes in personhood can also be seen from the perspective of 
neuroscience. Our closest relative in the animal kingdom is the chimpanzee, but the 
prefrontal cortex of a chimp occupies only 17% of the adult brain versus 33% in 
humans.775 Our prefrontal cortex makes us unique; it makes both the biological 
human being and the moral person. 776  And this particular organ exhibits 
neuroplasticity.777 Under the influence of more and more screen time, the prefrontal 
cortex is changing: Susan Greenfield has called this “mind change” by analogy to 
climate change.778 “Mind change” is an umbrella term that describes how modern 
technologies are changing the functional state of the human brain.779 She believes 
that these changes in the brain, like climate change, may have serious and pervasive 
 
772 Tolentino, supra note 250, at 171; see also, HARCOURT, supra note 28, at 167 (“we have gotten 
used to the commodification of privacy, of autonomy, of anonymity”). 
773 FRIED, supra note 23, at 29. 
774 ZUBOFF, supra note 56, at 347. 
775 GREENFIELD, supra note 227, at 88. 
776 See Id. at 88-89. 
777 NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 26 (2010).  
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consequences. 780 Specifically, dopamine can disable the prefrontal cortex, and the 
underactivity of this key area can have a profound effect on holistic brain operations 
and contribute to a mindset where sensory trumps cognitive and individual identity 
is less emphasized.781 She has noted that our new technologies have opened our 
brains to manipulation as never before in human history782 and predicted that, given 
the malleability of the human brain and the large number of hours spent in front of 
screens, the minds of the future will be very different from any others in human 
history.783 If that seems overly dramatic, she warns that we cannot afford to be 
complacent and assume that our brains are inviolate—to do so would result in a 
world in which our key values would be lost forever.784 
 Among these key values would be personhood itself. When our computer 
tools and our digitized data become so integrated with us that they are part of us, 
we become the very tools themselves. In such case, it seems likely that our 
personhood would cease to be an end in itself and would become merely a device 
to be used, a tool to be exploited. 785  A business model—and a contract that 
implements it—that promotes changes in personhood of this type are repulsive. This 
may help persuade a judge to seize the opportunity to declare such a contract illegal. 
   g.  Threats to Democratic Society and Theory 
 
 The threat to democracy in the form of election interference was described 
above. In addition, there are two additional threats to democracy from the 
behavioral-advertising business model. This model and the contracts implementing 
it pose threats to a democratic society and also to the philosophical foundations of 
democracy.  
 
    i.  Democratic Society 
 
 A number of scholars have warned about threats to a democratic society. 
Debra Satz has commented that “particular markets can . . . even undermine the 
conditions for a democratic society.”786 Sherry Turkle posed the question: “[w]hat 
is democracy without privacy?”787 Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts 
of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for the Internet and Society concluded that, 
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“the basic business of Facebook, when applied to political communication, presents 
a long-term threat to democracy.”788  
 
 One of the earliest scholars to pose the issue was Professor Paul M. 
Schwartz of Berkeley Law School, who issued a prophetic warning in 1999:  
 
The utilization of information technology in 
cyberspace will act as a powerful negative force in 
two ways. First, . . . it will discourage unfettered 
participation in deliberative democracy in the United 
States. Second, the current use of  information 
technology on the Internet can harm an individual’s 
capacity for self-governance. These two negative 
effects are significant because our nation’s political 
order is based both on democratic deliberation and 
on individuals who are capable of forming and acting 
on their notions of the good.789  
 
 More recently, Stanford Law Professor Nathaniel Persily has described 
some of the threats to a democratic society in his article “Can Democracy Survive 
the Internet?”790  He has drawn attention to a number of factors from the 2016 
presidential election: virality is now the coin of the campaign realm; the internet 
uniquely privileges above all outrageous campaign messages; viewers have 
considerable difficulty distinguishing between real and fake news; the prevalence 
of false stories online erects barriers to educated political decision making; 
democracy depends on both the ability and the will of voters to base their political 
judgments on facts; and the politics of never-ending spectacles.791 He specifically 
criticizes Google’s search engine.792 The strength of such a search engine comes 
from the relevance of its search results, but “one man’s relevant result . . . is 
another’s filter bubble”—so the search for campaign information will lead the user 
in a direction determined by the user’s prior searches. 793  In a similar fashion, 
Facebook does not prioritize the search for the truth, but instead provides the most 
engaging and meaningful experience to a user.794 Users often find false, negative, 
 
788 BENKLER, FARIS & ROBERTS, supra note 13, at 270. 
789 Schwartz, supra note 265, at 1647. 
790 Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet? 28 J. OF DEMOCRACY 63 (Apr. 2017). 
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or otherwise outrageous speech to be more engaging and meaningful.795 These 
downsides of Google and Facebook are the result of the behavioral-advertising 
business model that relies on addictive engagement. 
 
 Another internet critic who has described the threats to a democratic society 
is Zeynep Tufekci. Her comments concern the consequences and power of big data 
analytics made possible by the following conditions of behavioral advertising: (1) 
availability of big data; (2) a shift to individual marketing; (3) the potential and 
opacity of modeling; (4) the use of behavioral science in the service of persuasion; 
(5) dynamic experimentation; and (6) the growth of new power brokers on the 
internet who control the data and algorithms (such as Google and Facebook).796 
Three consequences of big data analytics are problematic for a democratic society 
because they undermine the civic experience.  
 
 The first consequence is deep and individualized profiling and targeting 
which allows for unprecedented focusing of advertising. Specifically, it allows 
candidates for office to focus their attention and resources on “swing” districts at 
an individual level and ignore unlikely or unpersuadable voters. 797  Previously 
inefficient data practices made such precision difficult and limited it to small local 
areas.798 
 
 The second consequence is the opacity of surveillance that derives from the 
information asymmetry and secrecy that are inherent in big data analytics. This 
opacity takes advantage of a heuristic bias in humans.799 People will respond less 
positively to a message that they perceive as intentionally tailored to them. A 
hidden message that is indirect is more persuasive. 
 
  The third consequence is the assault on democratic deliberation, on the 
Habermasian public sphere.800 It is the destruction of “status free” deliberation of 
 
795 See ANDREW MARANTZ, ANTISOCIAL: ONLINE EXTREMISTS, TECHNO-UTOPIANS, AND THE 
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN CONVERSATION 80 (2019) (writing that three MIT computer 
scientists found that the fake news on Facebook is consistently more likely to go viral than the 
truth.); see also Foroohar, supra note 91, at 8 (citing studies showing that fake news is 70 percent 
more likely to be shared than real news).  
796 Tufekci, supra note 367. 
797 Id.  
798 Id. 
799 Id.  
800 Id. Tufekci mentions only Jurgen Habermas, but democratic deliberation is something 
championed by others. See e.g., JOHN DEWEY, 8 THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1954, 101-03 (1986); 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 447-48 (2005). 




ideas on their own merit regardless of who uttered them.801 We now live in what 
she calls an “anti-Habermasian public sphere” in which all interactions are between 
individuals who are known quantities—the ideas they express are invariably linked 
to their personal backgrounds and reasoned debate and the public interest suffer.802 
 
 Of course, the threats posed to democracy do not all come directly from the 
behavioral-advertising business model. Think, for example, of the design of online 
spaces that favors consumers over citizens and corporate interests over the public 
interest; the lack of mutual respect in online discussions; trolling and flaming in 
online forums; and the online echo chambers that promote polarization.803 This 
activity is not the direct result of the business model, but the business model 
facilitates much of this activity. 
 
 Marshall McLuhan suggested what is perhaps the most disheartening 
description of the situation for a democratic society: “[o]nce we have surrendered 
our senses and nervous systems to the private manipulation of those who would 
benefit by taking a lease on our eyes and ears and nerves, we don’t really have any 
rights left.”804  
 
    ii.  Democratic Theory 
 
 The behavioral-advertising business model poses not only the practical 
threat to democracy in the election process and to a democratic society as noted 
above, but also in the theory of liberal democracy. The formation of liberal 
democracy was a complex process, but it can be said that modern liberal democracy 
started with the insistence on equality of all persons, asserted certain basic human 
rights, and then concluded with the argument for self-government.805 The rhetorical 
tool used to explain self-government was the concept of contract. This is tied 
closely to the idea of consent. The theorists of government, such as Hobbes and 
Locke, assumed that men could take on obligations only if these were freely 
assumed.806 Thus, all obligations appear under the name of promises and a man can 
be held to what he promised because he himself created the promise.807 The most 
common way for a person to consent was through a contract. Thus, they adopted 
the concept of contract to their vision of how men transitioned from a state of nature 
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to a government.808 Locke was particularly insistent on the concept of consent. He 
wrote that “[n]o body doubts but an express Consent, of any Man, entering into any 
Society, makes him a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of that 
Government” and “[t]he Liberty of Man in Society, is to be under no other 
Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the Common-wealth.”809 
Hobbes wrote that “A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude 
of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, ...”[emphasis added].810 
Consent confers legitimacy.811 
 
 The emphasis on consent and contract presupposed at least one fact about 
men in a state of nature: they were free. Their consent had to be the result of their 
free choice. Both Locke and Hobbes assumed that at the moment of entering into 
the contract for government, men were free. Locke wrote that “[t]he Natural Liberty 
of Man is to be free from any superior Power on Earth, and not to be under the Will 
or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his 
Rule.”812 Hobbes wrote that “[a] Free-Man, is he, that in those things, which by his 
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to doe what he has a will to.”813  
 
 In the twentieth century, Harvard Philosophy Professor John Rawls also 
adopted the contract concept in conceiving his theory of justice.814 Instead of a state 
of nature, he invented an original position of equality, not as a historical condition 
of culture but as a hypothetical situation. Like Hobbes and Locke, the obligations 
of the members of his society are self-imposed and they are “autonomous”815 
(“autonomy” being the twenty-first century equivalent of the seventeenth century 
“freedom” of Hobbes and Locke).816 For Rawls, the relevant agreement or contract 
that the members of society make, however, is not to enter a given society or choose 
a given form of government, but to adopt certain moral principles.817 
 
808 See Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA. OF PHIL. (Oct. 6, 
2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#ConsPoliObliEndsGove. 
809 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2nd Treatise 283, 347 (1988) (emphasis 
added).  
810 THOMAS HOBBES, 2 HOBBES’ LEVIATHAN 161 (1909). 
811 PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 31 (2018). 
812 LOCKE, supra note 809, at 283 (emphasis added). 
813 HOBBES, supra note 810, at 161 (emphasis added). 
814 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14 (1999).  
815 Id. at 12.  
816 Of course, the concept of “freedom” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the 
exact equivalent of our current concept of “autonomy.” Christman, supra note 128. But it seems 
likely that before the invention of the term “autonomy” in the nineteenth century, the term 
“freedom” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries encompassed what the term “autonomy” 
expresses today. 
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 As Professor Rawls makes clear, the concept of contract is hypothetical, not 
historical.818 This is also true of the contract theories of Hobbes and Locke.819 But 
there is a logical paradox in using a hypothetical contract theory with an assumption 
of a state of nature (Hobbes and Locke) or original position (Rawls).820 If citizens 
are using the internet more and more (including the services of Google and 
Facebook), then it seems likely that they are sacrificing more and more of their 
autonomy. Even more so if important functions of their life are conducted online 
and involve the use of these services. Given the addiction, surveillance, and 
manipulation noted above, are they free or autonomous persons as assumed by 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls? Do they have the basic prerequisites that philosophers 
of liberal democracy have posited as necessary for the establishment of a 
representative government or a theory of justice?821 Of course, if the concept of 
contract is only an abstraction, there is only a philosophical inconsistency, not an 
actual one. But this philosophical contradiction should alert us to a real problem: 
the commonsense conclusion that a business model that contradicts the intellectual 
foundations and rationale of democracy is unacceptable. This fact could be helpful 
to influence a judge trying to determine whether the contracts of Google and 
Facebook are illegal. 
 
  h.  Paternalism 
 
 Another factor that could influence a judge is paternalism. A judge would 
not want to be accused of paternalism in ruling that the contracts of Google and 
Facebook were illegal. Philosophy Professor Emeritus at the University of 
California, Davis, Gerald Dworkin, has defined “paternalism” as “the interference 
of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and defended or 
motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected 
from harm.”822 This concept seems to date from the nineteenth century. In the 1840s 
and 1850s, there was an attempt to prevent the overtly political uses of law and to 
 
818 Id. at 10.  
819 For a discussion of the hypothetical versus historical view of contract, see JOHN DUNN, THE 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 40-42 (1996).  
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J. W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 4 (1936).  
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create a system of legal thought free from policymaking.823 For the new market 
regime, new rules of contract, property, and commercial law devoid of paternalistic 
and protective doctrines gained prominence. Deviations from market principles 
came to be seen as abnormal and improper. Paternalism acquired a negative 
connotation that characterizes it today.824  
 
 In light of this negative connotation, contemporary scholars have struggled 
to explain and justify paternalism. Harvard Law Professor Duncan Kennedy 
proposed that paternalism was necessary when a person underestimated the risks 
associated with certain behavior or exhibited recklessness.825 He believed there was 
no overarching test that would tell us when paternalism was appropriate, he 
advocated an ad hoc approach.826 Other scholars have expressed similar views. 
Yale Law School Professor Anthony Kronman in his discussion of paternalism 
tried to “reintroduce” the concept of judgment into thinking about contract law.827 
He did not try to justify every paternalistic rule but thought that judgment could 
lead us in certain cases to limit by an inalienable entitlement a person’s contractual 
powers, as in cases of slavery or peonage.828 Dan W. Brock, Professor Emeritus at 
Harvard Medical School, has suggested that paternalism concerns the conflict 
between two values, autonomy and well-being.829 Thus, it requires a determination 
of which value we take to be more important in a particular situation. Associate 
Professor Shmuel I. Becker of Victoria University of Wellington and Professor 
Yuval Feldman of Bar-Ilan University School of Law have proposed a democratic 
justification of paternalism. They assert that legal rules that express concern for 
consumers’ wellbeing can be seen as an exercise in self-government. 830  They 
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 A group of scholars associated with the University of California, Berkeley, 
have tried to turn the table on those accusing others of paternalism. They have 
suggested that the term “paternalism” should apply to the activities of tech 
companies implementing behavioral advertising. 832  When applied to modern 
privacy regulations the label is misplaced because these regulations do not make 
choices for consumers, but enable choices. 833  They assert that the term 
“paternalism” is more appropriately applied to the tech companies using behavioral 
advertising to push personalization even where consumers express preferences 
against it.834  
 
 But perhaps the most cogent response to an accusation of paternalism in a 
judge’s finding that the behavioral-advertising contracts are illegal would be the 
self-contradiction stated by John Stuart Mill. 835  If a person cannot voluntarily 
abdicate his liberty, as Mill noted, then it should also be true that allowing a person 
to alienate her autonomy is to deny her autonomy.836 Thus, it must be allowed to 
restrict a person’s autonomy to preserve that very autonomy. Autonomy, like 
personhood, is a supreme value. Humans take autonomy as a supreme value 
because our culture and history tell us so, although this principle, like all others, 
ultimately ends up grounding on something arbitrary, but essential.837  
 
 A judge applying good judgment to a decision to declare the behavioral-
advertising contracts illegal would find support in the commonsense logic of Mill’s 
self-contradiction to reconcile any concern about paternalism. 
 
   i.  Uncontrolled Experiment 
 
 A number of commentators have stated the obvious fact that our experiences 
with Google and Facebook are a novel experiment in human behavior. But they 
 
832 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Ashkan Soltani, Nathaniel Good, Dietrich J. Wambach & Mika D. 
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have also questioned the nature and consequences of this experiment. For example, 
Tufts University Professor Maryanne Wolf put the issue in an academic context: 
 
No self-respecting internal review board at any 
university would allow a researcher to do what our 
culture has already done with no adjudication or 
previous evidence: introduce a complete, quasi-
addictive set of attention-compelling devices without 
knowing the possible side effects and ramifications 
for the subjects . . . .838    
 
New York Times journalist Max Fisher, speaking of the tech giants, has questioned 
the experiment’s results: “[w]hether they set out to or not, these companies are 
conducting the largest social re-engineering experiment in human history, and no 
one has the slightest clue what the consequences are.”839 
 Roger McNamee has found the consequences so far to be negative: “[w]e 
are running an uncontrolled evolutionary experiment, and the results so far are 
terrifying.”840  
 
 Sean Parker, calling himself a “conscientious objector” to social media, has 
expressed concern about the consequences for the next generation: “God only know 
what it’s doing to our children’s brains.”841  
 
 Shoshanna Zuboff has called Facebook’s operation a “vast experiment in 
behavior modification...on the broadest possible social and psychological 
canvas.”842 
 
 And as Susan Greenfield has mordantly observed: 
 
In any case, we cannot afford to wait for a generation 
to come to a dysfunctional maturity, or rather 
immaturity, to have unwittingly served as the guinea 
pigs in an informal experiment, before we devise 
 
838 MARYANNE WOLF, READER COME HOME 125 (2018). 
839 Max Fisher, Social Re-engineering, From Myanmar to Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/technology/personaltech/social-media-effect-
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means enabling us to harness the clear benefits of the 
screen but at the same time to minimize the risks.843  
 
 Sheila Jasanoff, Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the 
Harvard Kennedy School, has asked: “[i]s it fitting that societies of such infinitely 
creative capacity as ours should reflect on the ethical implications of such far-
reaching technological experiments only after a threat to human dignity comes 
knocking at the door?”844   
 
 Silicon Valley entrepreneur and critic Andrew Keen has claimed that “by 
so radically socializing today’s digital revolution, we are, as a species, collectively 
jumping off a cliff.”845  
 
 Common sense in this situation would suggest the application of the 
precautionary principle to this uncontrolled experiment. This principle states that a 
lack of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to protect 
against risks.846 Cass Sunstein has objected that this principle is useless because it 
forbids all course of action.847 But a mild, banal version of it would be appropriate. 
The application of the precautionary principle to this uncontrolled experiment 
would suggest that in the face of the threats to democracy, the legal system, and 
personhood, we should not allow the manipulation and loss of autonomy inherent 
in the behavioral advertising business model. One way to prevent these harms 
would be for a court to declare the contracts illegal.  
 
 Our experiences with Google and Facebook can also be seen as an 
experiment in another sense—as an initial trial in the use of artificial intelligence—
perhaps a precedent. Professor Russell proposes a new approach to artificial 
intelligence he calls “provably beneficial machines.” 848  He has warned of the 
danger of enfeeblement of human capabilities and the loss of autonomy when 
artificial intelligence becomes more widespread. 849  He has suggested that the 
solution to this problem is cultural, not technical: “[w]e will need a cultural 
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movement to reshape our ideals and preferences towards autonomy, agency, and 
ability and away from self-indulgence and dependency . . . .”850 If we fail to resist 
the loss of autonomy from the behavioral-advertising of Google and Facebook in 
our initial trial with artificial intelligence, there does not seem to be much hope in 
resisting the even greater dangers of the much improved AI that will confront us in 
the future. Declaring the contracts illegal would be a precedent-setting move to 
reshape our ideals and preferences.  
 
   j.  Bad Beliefs and Bad Behavior 
 
 A final factor that may influence a judge’s decision on the illegality of 
Google’s and Facebook’s user contracts is a combination of bad beliefs and bad 
behavior—the ignorant and arrogant attitudes of the founders and the shady 
practices and broken promises that have plagued the two companies.  
 
 The founders share a set of bad beliefs—market values—that weaken moral 
sanctions, sabotage their own legitimacy, and make an argument against their 
business model more attractive. These include the following: 
 
1. “Valley denizens . . . tend to believe that their 
priorities should override the privacy, civil liberties, 
and security of others. They simply can’t imagine 
that anyone would question their motives, given that 
they know best. Big Tech should be free to disrupt 
government, politics, civic society, and law, if those 
things should prove to be inconvenient.” 851 
 
2. “Rules are made to be broken” and “It is better to 
ask for forgiveness than to beg for permission.”852 
 
3. “‘Who will stop me.’ [sic] This became the central 
tenet of Internet disrupters . . . .”853  
 
4. “What I’m struck by is the lack of intellectual 
modesty in the computer science community.”854 
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5. “We fail to ask, on a more fundamental level, if 
there are limits appropriate to the human condition, a 
scale conducive to our flourishing as the sorts of 
creatures we are. Modern technology tends to 
encourage users to assume that such limits do not 
exist; indeed, it is often marketed as a means to 
transcend such limits.”855  
 
 Bad beliefs led to bad behavior. An example is the bait-and-switch strategy 
both companies used over many years.856  Professor Hoofnagle has called both 
Facebook and Google “a kind of privacy long con.” 857  Facebook changed its 
disclosure settings over time to make user profiles much more public but claimed 
that users wanted to be “more open.”858 Google proudly claimed its opposition to 
intrusive advertising and its support for objective search results, but over time it 
secretly began using behavioral data in search.859 The two companies lured users 
into a relationship that they promised would be different from their competitors, 
but they later went on to imitate their competitors. 
 
 Google’s violations of users’ trust seem to be less egregious, but more 
insidious, than those of Facebook. Google’s violations include the episodes 
described below: 
 
1. “[C]ustomers were never asked if Google Street 
View cameras could take pictures of their front 
yards and match them to addresses in order to sell 
more ads. [Google] adhered to the maxim that says 
it’s better to ask for forgiveness than to get 
permission—though in truth they weren’t really 
doing either.”860  
 
2. “Google suffered a major blow on Tuesday after 
European antitrust officials fined the search giant a 
 
855 L. M. Sacasas, The Tech Backlash We Really Need, THE NEW ATLANTIC (Spring 2018), 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-tech-backlash-we-really-need.   
856 Hoofnagle, supra note 405, at 353-354.  
857 Id. 
858 See id. at 181-82.  
859 See discussion infra pp. 10-20. 
860 FOROOHAR, supra note 91, at 47. 
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record $2.7 billion for unfairly favoring some of its 
own services over those of rivals.”861  
 
3. “What we are witnessing is the computational 
exploitation of a natural human desire: to look 
‘behind the curtain,’ to dig deeper into something 
that engages us. As we click and click, we are 
carried along by the exciting sensation of 
uncovering more secrets and deeper truths. Youtube 
leads viewers down a rabbit hole of extremism, 
while Google racks up the ad sales.”862  
 
4. “The program, known as Duplex, is an automated 
voice assistant capable of making hair 
appointments, booking restaurant reservations and 
conducting other tasks over the phone . . . . At no 
point in the demo were the receptionists on the other 
end of the calls informed that they were talking to a 
computer rather than another human . . . . The 
onstage demo of Duplex drew lots of oohs and aahs 
. . . . But the demo . . . raised a lot of hackles. Zeynep 
Tufekci, a professor and writer, called Duplex 
‘horrifying’ and said Google’s willingness to use A. 
I. to fool humans—and to brag about its ability to 
do so on stage at a public event—showed that 
‘Silicon Valley is ethically lost, rudderless and has 
not learned a thing.’”863  
 
5. “European authorities fined Google a record $5.1 
billion…for abusing its power and ordered the 
company to alter its practices . . . . ‘Google has used 
Android as a vehicle to cement the dominance of its 
search engine,’ said Margrethe Vestager, Europe’s 
antitrust chief. ‘These practices have denied rivals 
the chance to innovate and compete on the merits. 
They have denied European consumers the benefits 
 
861 Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion in E.U. Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-fine.html. 
862 Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2018, at SR 6. 
863 Kevin Roose, Critics Say Google’s A.I. Phone Calls Have Everything, Except Ethics, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2018, at B6. 




of effective competition in the important mobile 
sphere.’”864  
 
6. “In the first major example [of how European 
regulators would use their newfound authority 
against the most powerful technology companies], 
the French data protection authority announced 
Monday that it had fined Google 50 million euros, 
or about ‘$57 million, for not properly disclosing to 
users how data is collected across its services . . . to 
present personalized advertisements.’”865  
 
7. “A collective lawsuit against Google for allegedly 
tracking the personal data of 4m iPhone users can 
proceed in the UK courts, three judges have 
ruled.”866  
 
8. “Google agreed on Wednesday to pay a record 
$170 million fine and make changes to protect 
children’s privacy on YouTube, as regulators said 
the video site had knowingly and illegally harvested 
personal information from children and used it to 
profit by targeting them with ads.”867  
 
9. “Australian regulators on Tuesday accused 
Google of misleading consumers about its 
collection of their personal location information 
through its Android mobile operating 
system . . . .”868  
 
864 Adam Satariano & Jack Nicas, E.U. Fines Google with $5.1 Billion in Android Antitrust Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/google-eu-android-
fine.html.  
865 Adam Satariano, Google Is Fined 57 Million Euros Under Europe’s Data Privacy Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/technology/google-europe-gdpr-
fine.html.  
866 Jane Croft, Google faces UK Class Action Over Collecting iPhone Data, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a0a0a1ac-e4ff-11e9-b112-9624ec9edc59.  
867 Natasha Singer & Kate Conger, Google Is Fined $170 Million for Violating Children’s Privacy 
on YouTube N.Y TIMES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/google-
youtube-fine-ftc.html.  
868 Isabella Kwai, Australia Says Google Misled on Phone Tracking, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 30, 2019, at 
B6. 




10. “[Google] was a culture in which the metrics 
were always right. The company was simply serving 
users, even if that meant knowingly monetizing 
content that was undermining the fabric of 
democracy.”869  
  
 A partial listing of Facebook’s prevarications include the 
following870: 
 
1. “‘The past decade shows that user concerns over 
privacy appear to have little teeth on changing how 
[Facebook] behaves, aside from a recycling of 
contrite statements and promises to do better from 
its C.E.O.’ she [Zeynep Tufekci] said.”871  
 
2.”’For a leader [Sheryl Sandberg] of the most 
profitable company of its size in the history of 
capitalism, who has herself personally garnered 
over $1bn in stock gains based on the company’s 
success, to claim that the business side of the 
company, which she runs, has never worked to 
maximise its profits, seems disingenuous to say the 
least,’ Mr. Kirkpatrick [author the The Facebook 
Effect] said.”872  
 
3. “’The thing that is concerning here is that 
Facebook said it had totally  turned off the 
permission to share data for the friends of people 
who had an app but in the case of hardware 
 
869 FOROOHAR, supra note 91, at 53. 
870  See e.g., LEVY, supra note 139, at 273-4; Natasha Lomas, A Brief History of Facebook’s 
Privacy Hostility Ahead of Zuckerberg’s Testimony, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/10/a-brief-history-of-facebooks-privacy-hostility-ahead-of-
zuckerbergs-testimony/.  
871 Sheera Frenkel, Facebook, Stung by Data Harvest, Says It Will Centralize Its Privacy Settings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2018, at B6. 
872 Hannah Kuchler, Facebook determined to regain its balance, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7/8, 2018, at 12. 




manufacturers they didn’t do that,’ he [Sandy 
Parakilas, a former Facebook employee] said.” 873 
   
4. “After stalling for weeks, Facebook eventually 
agreed to hand over the Russian posts to Congress. 
Twice in October 2017, Facebook was forced to 
revise its public statements, finally acknowledging 
that close to 126 million people had seen the 
Russian posts.”874  
 
5.”’At the same time that Facebook was publicly 
professing their desire to work with the committee 
to address these issues, they were paying a political 
opposition research firm to privately attempt to 
undermine that same committee’s credibility,’ 
Senator Mark Warner of Virginia, the top Democrat 
on the panel, said in a statement. ‘It’s very 
concerning.’”875  
 
6. “In the [Senate Intelligence Committee] reports, 
Google, Twitter and Facebook . . . were described 
by researchers as having ‘evaded’ and 
‘misrepresented’ themselves and the extent of 
Russian activity on their sites. The companies were 
also criticized for not turning over complete sets of 
data about Russian manipulation to the Senate.”876  
 
7. “For years, Facebook gave some of the world’s 
largest technology companies more intrusive access 
to users’ personal data than it had disclosed.”877  
 
8. “The agency [FTC] found that Facebook’s 
handling of user data violated a 2011 privacy 
 
873 Hannah Kuchler, Tim Bradshaw, & Aliya Ram, Facebook denies misuse of user data in Apple 
and Amazon pacts, FIN. TIMES, June 5, 2018 at 16. 
874 Sheera Frankel, et al., supra note 396. 
875 Jack Nicas & Matthew Rosenberg, How Facebook’s Attack Dog Tried to Undermine Senators, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2018, at B5. 
876 Sheera Frenkel, Daisuke Wakabayashi & Kate Conger, Reports Detail Russian Trolls and 
Foot-Dragging by Tech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2018, at B1. 
877 Gabriel J. X. Dance, Michael La Forgia & Nicholas Confessore, Facebook Offered Users 
Privacy Wall, Then Let Tech Giants Around It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2018, at A1. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12 
142 
 
settlement with the F. T.C. That earlier settlement, 
which came after the company was accused of 
deceiving people about how it handled their data, 
required the company to revamp its privacy 
practices.”878   
 
9. “Facebook…agreed to pay $550 million to settle 
a class-action lawsuit [Patel v. Facebook, 932 F. 3d. 
1264 (9th Cir. 2019)] . . . the suit said the Silicon 
Valley company violated an Illinois biometric 
privacy law by harvesting facial data from the 
photos of millions of users . . . without their 
permission . . . Facebook has said the allegations 
have no merit.”879  
 
10. “Facebook promised users that it would not 
share their personal information with advertisers. It 
did.”880  
 
Of the two companies, it appears that Google has not faced severe criticism for its 
misconduct. Roger McNamee believes this is because Facebook’s conduct is so 
much worse than Google’s.881  
 
  2.  Consequences of Illegality 
 
   a.  Contract Unenforceable and Void  
 
 A court, in weighing the pros and cons of declaring the Google and 
Facebook contracts illegal, would not be oblivious to the consequences of a 
decision that the contracts were illegal. To analyze the consequences, we can start 
with some basic questions. If a contract is “unlawful” is that the same as “illegal”? 
If a contract is unlawful or illegal, is it merely “unenforceable” or is it “void”? If 
void, is it so from its inception or only at a later time?  
 
 
878 Cecilia Kang, $5 Billion Fine for Facebook on User Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2019, at A1. 
879 Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Privacy Suit Has Big Sting for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2020, at B1. 
880 PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 144. 
881 MCNAMEE, supra note 58, at 260. 




 Black’s Law Dictionary882 calls an “illegal contract” one whose formation 
or performance is expressly forbidden by statute or where a penalty is imposed for 
doing the act agreed upon; “unlawful” would involve acts not positively forbidden 
but disapproved by law and not recognized because they are against public policy883 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “unenforceable contract” as meaning that the 
contract has no legal effect or force in a court action; a “void contract” as one having 
no legal force or binding effect.884 California case law and the Civil Code use both 
“void” and “unenforceable.” 
 
 The California Civil Code contains provisions concerning both contracts 
that are unenforceable and contracts that are void. For example, California Civil 
Code § 1670.5, specifies that a court will not “enforce” an unconscionable contract. 
California Civil Code § 1598 states that contracts in which the object is unlawful, 
impossible, or unascertainable are “void,” and § 1916-2 states that a usury contract 
is “void.” The word “void” in the cases and Civil Code refers to “void” in the strict 
sense, and does not include the sense of “voidable” (meaning that a defect in the 
contract can be cured to make it effective).885 It is not clear whether the term “void” 
refers to a time period beginning with the inception of the contract or a later time, 
but it seems logical for it to refer to the inception unless the context requires a 
different meaning.  
 
 As noted above, California Civil Code § 1667 defines “unlawful” contracts 
and § 1599 states that “that part of a contract which is unlawful is void.” Although 
the cases noted previously often refer to contracts that are contrary to good morals, 
unconscionable, or against public policy as being “unenforceable,” the contracts 
are also void under § 1599.  
 
 The concept of voidness is important for its consequences when dealing 
with the Google and Facebook contracts. If the contract were found void, then the 
consent found in the Terms of Service of Google and Facebook would also be 
 
882 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1667 forbids contracts that are against good morals, unconscionable, or 
contrary to public policy. Such contracts thus qualify as “illegal” under the BLACKS LAW 
DICTIONARY definition of “illegal contract.” See Illegal Contract, infra note 883.  
883 Illegal Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Unlawful, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).  
884 Unenforceable Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); Void Contract, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
885 Id. at 1573. 
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void. 886  The companies would then have no legal basis for gathering and 
monetizing personal information.  
 
 The California Civil Code has one provision on unjust enrichment that 
potentially could apply to the situation with Google and Facebook. CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1589 (Consent by Acceptance of Benefits) states that: “[a] voluntary acceptance 
of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising 
from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person 
accepting.”  
 
 Clearly, the users of Google and Facebook accept the benefit of the search 
or social media services and this acceptance could be interpreted as “consent” to 
their obligation to allow their persona data to be collected and monetized by the 
companies. A serious question arises however as to the extent the “the facts” are 
“known” to the users. Further, the collection and monetization of the personal 
information leading to the loss of autonomy could be seen as sufficient justification 
for finding the “transaction” immoral and against public policy.887 
 
   b.  Statutory Violation or Common Law Tort?  
 
 Assuming that the consent in the Terms of Service was void or the 
transaction itself was void, the question would be whether the gathering and 
monetization of the personal information would constitute a civil or criminal 
statutory violation or a tort.  
 
 The applicable civil legislation would be privacy legislation. There is no 
federal general privacy statute. A number of federal statutes protect privacy in 
specific sectors, but they do not cover all commercial entities in their collection and 
 
886 The current consent in Google’s Terms of Service is the statement, “[t]his license allows 
Google to: host, reproduce, distribute, communicate, and use your content.” Google, Google 
Terms of Service (August 17, 2020), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/F9LT-BF8D]. The current consent in Facebook’s Terms of Service is the 
statement, “[b]y using our Products, you agree that we can show you ads that we think will be 
relevant to you and your interests. We use your personal data to help determine which ads to show 
you.” Facebook, Facebook Terms of Service (August 17, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/EJN3-ATBQ].  
887 The acceptance of benefits can have other consequences. For a short period in 2014, General 
Mills provided in its terms of service that anyone who received something of value (including 
“liking” General Mills on Facebook) could not sue it. It does not appear that anything similar 
appears in the Terms of Service of Google or Facebook. There would seem to be a question of 
whether such a term would also be against public policy. See SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 26. 




use of personal information.888 Currently, none of these statutes that protect certain 
areas of privacy have been used successfully to attack the business model of Google 
or Facebook for their use of personal data. California is reputed to have the 
strongest privacy statutes in the country, but these statutes still have limitations.889 
California’s Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 that came into effect in January 2020 
gives users of Google and Facebook more rights over personal data, but it does not 
specifically attack, or cover, their business model.890 These statutes do not purport 
to give users a right to sue Google or Facebook for use of personal data collected 
from users. These statutes, therefore, would not help determine the possible liability 
of Google and Facebook for collection and use of the personal data.  
 
 The other statutory basis under which a claim might allege a violation would 
be “petty theft” under California’s Penal Code.891 Professor Lori Andrews, Director 
of the Institute for Science, Law and Technology at Illinois Institute of Technology, 
has described the practice of behavioral advertising as “theft.” She explains that: 
 
If someone broke into my home and copied my 
documents, he’d be guilty of trespass and invasion of 
privacy. If the cops wanted to wiretap my 
conversation, they’d need a warrant. But without our 
knowledge or consent,892  virtually every entry we 
make on a social network or other website is 
surreptitiously being tracked and assessed. The 
 
888 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 876 (2018). A survey 
of these statutes could reveal whether any one of them conditions legality of the activities they 
cover on consent. If so, then a court decision declaring the Google and Facebook internet service 
contracts illegal would also make the companies’ conduct under the relevant statute illegal. 
889 Id. at 789. 
890 See Natasha Singer, Advocates Behind California’s Landmark Privacy Law Aim to Toughen It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2019, at B3; Natasha Singer, Weighing How to Comply ‘With a New 
Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 30, 2019, at B1; see also Natasha Singer, Why California Has 
Better Data Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2019 (showing efforts to broaden privacy rights by 
ballot initiative); Nicholas Confessore, Big Tech’s War on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 19, 
2018, at 28. The essence of the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CAL. CIVIL CODE 
§1798 (2018)) is the obligation to “inform” the consumer (§ 1798.100), while the consumer has a 
“right to request” (§ 1798.120 (a)) that the business that “sells” personal information not sell it to 
third parties. Google and Facebook claim that they do not “sell” personal information to third 
parties. Further, the burden is on the consumer to proactively assert his or her rights. A criticism of 
the Act is that it creates too much work for too many people. 
891CAL. PENAL CODE § 488 (1927). 
892 As explained above, the consent would be void if the contract containing the consent was void. 
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information is just as sensitive. The harms are just as 
real. But the law is not as protective.893  
 
She then concludes that “[t]he guiding force behind this enormous theft of private 
information is behavioral advertising.” 894  Her conclusion of “theft” has been 
explained in advance by her comment that “the law is not as protective.”895 
 
 Professor Cass Sunstein, commenting on manipulation, has asserted that 
where the manipulator is focused on his own interests rather than on those of the 
chooser, “a self-interested manipulator can be said to be stealing from people—
both limiting their agency and moving their resources in the preferred direction.”896 
Given the manipulative nature of the contracts implementing the behavioral-
advertising business model, the internet service contracts of Google and Facebook 
should meet this standard.  
 
 It does not appear that Facebook or Google has faced serious charges of 
theft. Professors Andrews and Sunstein have highlighted the moral deficit in 
behavioral advertising that would support an argument that the contracts of Google 
and Facebook are contrary to good morals, unconscionable, and against public 
policy. 
 
 The other possible liability would be under tort law. Current tort law has a 
restricted scope. Depriving a person of autonomy through the collection and 
aggregation of personal information does not yet qualify as a tort. Common law 
courts have, however, created new torts when the need arises.897 The tort that is 
analogous is that of privacy and this tort is particularly salient for these purposes. 
First, the Restatement of Torts (Second) seems to invite lawyers and judges to find 
new torts to fit new circumstances. It lists the four typical privacy torts: 
unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; appropriation of the other’s 
name or likeness; unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; and 




893 ANDREWS, supra note 292, at 18; see also FOROOHAR, supra note 91, at 47 (calling these 
situations “lawful theft”).  
894 ANDREWS, supra note 292 (emphasis added), at 18.  
895 Id.  
896 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCE 99 (2016) (emphasis added). 
897 RADIN, supra note 329, at 198 (proposing a new tort of “intentional deprivation of basic legal 
rights”). 
898 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A. 




Other forms may still appear, particularly since some 
courts and in particular, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, have spoken in very broad general 
terms of a somewhat undefined ‘right of privacy’ as 
a ground for various constitutional decisions 
involving indeterminate civil and personal rights. 
These and other references to the right of privacy, 
particularly as a protection against various types of 
governmental interference and the compilation of 
elaborate written or computerized dossiers, may give 
rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability 
for invasion of privacy listed in this Section or the 
establishment of new forms. Nothing in this Chapter 
is intended to exclude the possibility of future 
developments in the tort law of privacy.899  
 
 Second, the history of the right of privacy demonstrates how courts can 
respond to changing circumstances and social mores. The current privacy law in 
the United States originated in a famous law review article written by Samuel D. 
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890. They opined that “[p]olitical, social, and 
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its 
eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”900 They saw the development 
of new rights as “inevitable,” the newest being the right to privacy, or the “general 
right of the individual to be let alone.”901 Although the New York Court of Appeals 
rejected any such right a few years later, this narrow right of protection against the 
intrusive interests of both the press and its readers was enacted into law over the 
succeeding decades by many state legislatures. 902  Over the years, judicial 
interpretation expanded the scope of the right of privacy to include the right of a 
woman to make her own decisions about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. 
In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun writing for the United States Supreme Court in 
a 7-2 decision, found such a right of privacy in the Constitution, even though no 
general right of privacy was explicitly mentioned there. 903  This decision 
demonstrates that courts have been willing to accept the challenge posed in the 
 
899 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
900 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 709. 
901 Id. at 205. 
902 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 424 (2000). 
903 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
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Restatement and recognize new forms of the privacy tort when changes in society 
make it appropriate.904  
 
 To date, the judiciary has not recognized harm to autonomy as a tort.905 
Until the recognition of such a tort, the closest analogy is unauthorized disclosure 
of personal information. As lawyers Charlene Brownlee and Blaze D. Waleski have 
noted, occurrences of unauthorized access to and misuse of personal information 
have increased because of the prevalence of data aggregation and advanced 
technologies to automate the collection, access to the information, and use of this 
information, particularly over the Internet.906  The growing number of lawsuits 
caused by breaches of data security have alleged various offenses: negligence, 
intentional or negligent breach of privacy, violation of promises made to customers, 
invasion of privacy, possessory rights, breach of contract, violation of unfair trade 
practices and violation of a specific legislative act. None of these causes of action 
would seem to explicitly fit deprivation of autonomy, but they provide some helpful 
lessons for how to frame an autonomy tort suit. 
 
 Previously scholars have analyzed the collection and aggregation of 
personal information, but they did not agree on the nature of the problem. Professor 
Jerry Kang of UCLA Law School saw the issue as one of surveillance in tension 
with human dignity and proposed a rule that personal information may be processed 
only in functionally necessary ways. 907  Professor Daniel Solove of George 
Washington Law School on the other hand believed that the problem was not 
surveillance but a problem with the helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability one 
experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has vast dossiers on 
individuals.908 Fordham Law Professor Joel R. Reindenberg suggested that the lack 
of participation by citizens in decisions about the gathering of their information is 
inherently manipulating citizens.909Berkeley Law Professor Paul M. Schwartz, 
 
904 However, Paul M. Schwartz had a more pessimistic outlook on this issue in 1999, that “unless 
courts expand these [privacy] torts over time, which is unlikely . . . .” Schwartz, supra note 265, at 
1634.   
905 See e.g., Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 835 (1994) (declaring 
California has recognized a constitutional “autonomy privacy” right). 
906 BROWNLEE & WALESKI, supra note 408, at § 7.04a. 
907 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1263 
(1998). 
908 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001). 
909 Joel R. Reindenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private 
Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 539 (1995). 




however, saw the problem as a lack of privacy protection that exposes information 
about a person’s communication and consumption of ideas.910  
 
 Other scholars have suggested the creation of new specific forms of tort. 
Professor Jessica Litman of Wayne State proposed a tort of breach of confidence 
or breach of trust.911 Professor Andrew J. McClurg of Florida International College 
of Law has suggested a tort of appropriation.912 Sarah Ludington, Senior Lecturing 
Fellow at Duke Law School, has promoted the idea of a tort of misuse of Fair 
Information Practices (transferring the principles of Fair Information Practices in 
the Privacy Act of 1974 from the public sector to the private sector).913 
 
 These proposals and suggestions indicate the direction that tort law could 
take to adjust, as it has in the past, to changing social mores and circumstances. 
Such adjustment is likely to take time. It seems unlikely that currently the Google 
and Facebook behavioral-advertising contracts would be found to involve theft or 
a tort—but they could still be found void. Is there an alternative business model 
that would serve users but not violate California standards of good morals, 
unconscionability, and public policy?  
 
   c.  Alternative Business Model914 
 
 Any court presented with the task of deciding whether the Google and 
Facebook contracts were illegal would consider the effect on users. The court would 
want to consider whether there was an alternative business model that would not 
violate California standards of good morals, unconscionability, and public policy. 
 
910 Schwartz, supra note 265, at 1646. 
911 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000). 
912 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to 
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2003). 
913 Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for Misuse of Personal Information, 66 
MD. L. REV. 140 (2007). 
914 Assuming that the new business model would be that of Google and Facebook, some have 
suggested challenging or rivaling such companies using public funding. See Diane Coyle, We need 
a publicly funded rival to Google and Facebook, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d56744a0-835c-11e8-9199-c2a4754b5a0e; see also Evgeny Morozov, 
The case for publicly enforced online rights, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/5e62186c-c1a5-11e8-84cd-9e601db069b8. Others have suggested an 
“alt-Facebook” nonprofit. Tim Wu, Don’t Fix Facebook. Replace It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/opinion/facebook-fix-replace.html. 
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There is an alternative—a subscription model.915 This model was available to the 
founders of Google and Facebook, but was ignored in favor of the despised, but 
useful, advertising model. In 2015, Mark Zuckerberg justified the rejection of the 
subscription model. When a new Facebook employee suggested a subscription 
model to him, Mark stopped the employee with the comment, “Facebook’s mission 
is to make the world more open and connected. I don’t understand how 
subscriptions would make the world either more open or more connected.”916 
 
 A subscription model would avoid the moral and legal problems of 
behavioral advertising. The user would no longer be a product, but would become 
a customer. Google and Facebook would look to the customers, not advertisers, as 
the source of their revenue and the focus of their attention. They would use the 
personal data of their customers only to improve services for the customer, not 
monetize it through behavioral advertising. The companies would no longer have 
an incentive to addict the customers to use of their services. They would not collect 
and maintain enormous amounts of personal data. They would not addict, surveil, 
or manipulate their users. They would not compromise the users’ autonomy. The 
contracts would not be found contrary to good morals, unconscionable, or against 
public policy. This poses a “wishful and wistful” question: would we prefer a paid 
option for social media?917  
 
 The major difference in the subscription model is, of course, that the 
customer has to pay. That change is likely to be unwelcome to users. Free services 
have become a virtual right, although they are an anomaly created by the distinctive 
environment of the early internet. The long period of free access to services in the 
late 1990s accustomed users to free services.918 As a result, some observers believe 
the subscription model is unrealistic. Former Facebook manager Antonio Garcia 
Martinez has disdainfully dismissed the idea of a paid option, saying, “[o]h, and 
spare me your claims that you’d be willing to pay for Facebook instead of seeing 
ads. It’s not even clear what Facebook should charge you.”919  
 
 
915 SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 276; see also, id. at 346 (comments by journalist David Roberts 
stating “[a]s soon as you’re ad-based, attention is your currency. You’re not trying to improve 
your customers’ lives. You’re trying to get them to look at you as often as possible, and you’re 
fated to be distracted and annoying.”). 
916 LEVY, supra note 139, at 388. 
917 WADHWA & SALKEVER, supra note 5, at 35. 
918 ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 211 (2018). 
919 GARCIA MARTINEZ, supra note 2, at 325. 




Additionally, New Yorker reporter Ken Auletta believes that, given 
stagnant incomes and already large subscription payments, the economics do not 
support this “noble idea.” 920  He cites a Brookings study reporting that, after 
adjusting for inflation, American wages have risen only 0.2 percent over the past 
forty years, and today the average household already pays monthly subscription 
charges of $267 per month not including electricity, gas and other unavoidable 
monthly bills.921 But he does not try to estimate what subscriptions to Google and 
Facebook would cost. One study found that the average American spends more than 
$1,300 on digital media a year.922 Others have made estimates of the value of the 
services: $8,500/year for search and $300/year for social media as what users would 
accept as payment to quit using them.923 Another calculation in 2017 was for the 
average ad revenue per user: for Facebook, the average revenue per U.S. user was 
$6/month, but it was suggested that few would agree to pay in exchange for the 
protection, rather than the monetization, of their personal information.924 In a 2015 
suit, plaintiffs alleged that the monetary value of the information of each user each 
year was $59.20.925 Zeynep Tufekci has stated that she would be happy to pay more 
than 20 cents per month (estimated to be Facebook’s profit per user per month) for 
a Facebook or a Google that did not track her, upgraded its encryption and treated 
her as a customer whose preferences and privacy matter.926 
 
 But if the subscription model is unrealistic, why is it successful? Consider 
the subscription services for internet connectivity, cellphone service, and a number 
of internet service providers, such as HBO, Netflix, Spotify, and Patreon, are 
currently successfully selling subscriptions for online services.927 The Financial 
Times in discussing ad-driven online businesses said that “[n]ews sites that have 
 
920 See KEN AULETTA, FRENEMIES: THE EPIC DISRUPTION OF THE AD BUSINESS (AND EVERYTHING 
ELSE) 312 (2018). 
921 Id. at 313. 
922 Kevin Roose, Online Cesspool Got You Down? You Can Clean It Up, for a Price, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/13/magazine/internet-
premium.html. 
923 Tim Harford, Treat social media like email and search engines, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/a9ac257e-4897-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99b3. 
924 Editorial, Digital Privacy is more than just opting in or out, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6bb17082-15f1-11e7-80f4-13e067d5072c. 
925 See In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litigation, 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
926 Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg, Let Me Pay for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-mark-zuckerberg-let-me-pay-for-
facebook.html; see also KUANG, supra note 214, at 275. 
927 For discussion on the most popular video streaming subscription services, see Todd Spangler, 
Best Video Streaming Services: Netflix, HBO Max, Disney Plus, Hulu, Amazon, Apple Tv Plus, 
VARIETY (May 25, 2020), https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/best-video-streaming-services-
2020-1234615484/.  
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prospered have done so on subscriptions, not ads.”928 In 2018, New York Times 
tech columnist Farhad Manjoo discovered the beginning of a remarkable 
renaissance in art and culture based on subscription payments929 and observed that 
the way to save a local newspaper is to have people pay for it—$5 or $10/month or 
more.930 One small example he cites is the news service The Information, which 
charges $399/year for a subscription, has a subscriber base of 10,000 and a positive 
cash flow.931 Subscriptions are now being considered a status symbol.932 Perhaps 
the most promising subscription model would be one that was combined with a 
progressive, digital-ad revenue tax, as suggested by Nobel Prize winning economist 
Paul Romer. The tax would encourage the breakup of Google and Facebook into 
smaller companies and make it easier for new companies to enter the market.933 In 
fact, social media platforms such as Vero and Idka already exist934 and a new 
platform, Openbook, was started in 2018.935 
 
 The subscription model also has the potential to change the psychology of 
the relationship of users to each other and to Google and Facebook. It seems 
plausible that a subscription model could discourage some of the negative behavior 
that is so common on Facebook. When the user has a commercial relationship rather 
than enjoying a “free ride,” it seems likely that the user would be more responsible. 
But, further research is needed here. A starting point for such an effort could be to 
examine the experience of the existing subscription social media platforms.  
 
 In weighing the pros and cons of finding the behavioral-advertising 
contracts illegal, a judge would need to understand what the harm to users would 
be. The existence of the subscription model would not completely change the 
services the companies offered, and customers would still be able to communicate 
with friends they currently communicate with. The other services could continue as 
 
928 LEX, Facebook: regulation=validation, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c6dd9d12-3c12-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4. 
929 Farhad Manjoo, How the Internet Is Saving Culture, Not Killing It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/technology/how-the-internet-is-saving-culture-not-
killing-it.html. 
930 Farhad Manjoo, A Crazy Idea for Funding Local News: Charge People for It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/technology/funding-local-news-charge-people-
money.html. 
931 See https://www.theinformation.com/.  
932 Roose, supra note 922. 
933 Paul Romer, A Tax That Could Fix Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/opinion/tax-facebook-google.html. 
934 Maija Palmer, Are there any viable alternatives to Facebook?, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/057fb3e8-474e-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb. 
935 Hannah Kuchler, Privacy pioneers plan ‘zero tracking’ rival to Facebook, FIN. TIMES (July 16, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/fb5235e4-8564-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929. 




well. Further, asking a customer to pay for a service is not something exceptional 
or extraordinary; it is the way the market economy works.936 The subscription 
model would eliminate the huge profits that both companies have enjoyed, but 
leaders of both companies have been aware of the moral deficiencies of advertising 
from the very beginning. The declaration that the contracts are illegal and the need 
to change to a subscription model should not come as a big surprise to both 
companies. 
 
   d.  Ownership of Data937 
 
 The subscription model would renew the question of ownership of the 
personal data of the customers. Yuval Noah Harari believes this may be the most 
important political question of our era.938 Warren and Brandeis in their seminal 
article said that “where the value of production [of a literary or artistic composition] 
. . . is found . . . in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent 
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the 
common acceptation of that term.”939 But as early as 1971, Harvard Law Professor 
Arthur Miller noted that one of the most facile approaches to safeguarding privacy 
was the notion that personal information is a type of property.940 Later, in 2011, 
Lori Andrews suggested resort to “novel legal theories to give people a property 
right over their own data.”941 Currently, the United States, unlike other Western 
countries, does not have a basic data protection law.942 There is no legal right to 
personal data in the United States. The result is that different laws determine the 
privacy of different types of information. In 1998, UCLA Law School Professor 
 
936 Jim Chappelow, Market Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketeconomy.asp.  
937 There is also a question as to whether attention should be a market commodity. In 1996, 
Professor Radin criticized this notion, saying, “[w]here attention is property, noncommodified 
political and social ideas and interactions may wither.” Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in 
Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM. 509, 517 (1996). Google states in its Terms of Service that, “[y]our 
content remains yours…[,]” but if the contract is void, then this statement would seem to have no 
legal effect. See GOOGLE TERMS OF SERVICE, https://policies.google.com/terms. Facebook’s terms 
of use have also stated “[y]ou own all of the content and information you put on Facebook . . . .” 
HARTZOG, supra note 9 at 318 (citing FACEBOOKS STATEMENT OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 
https://ww.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf). Professor Julie Cohen has suggested that there is a 
stalemate on the legal status of personal data but that such data is (de facto if not de jure) 
proprietary information property. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUST AND POWER, 25, 44 (2019). 
938 HARARI, supra note 204, at 80.  
939 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 709, at 200-01. 
940 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 
211 (1971).  
941 See ANDREWS, supra note 292, at 43. 
942 See SCHNEIER, supra note 201, at 200. 
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Jerry Kang outlined the basic conflict: users assumed that their data belonged to 
them, the collectors of the information asserted equal rights in the data because it 
arose from a mutual interaction.943 In practice, who holds the data decides how to 
exploit it.  
 
 The discussion above on “digital exhaust” and “dumpster diving” would 
suggest an analogy to abandoned property. Are the users of Google and Facebook 
effectively abandoning their personal information as if they were placing it for 
disposal outside the curtilage of their home? If so, it would presumably belong to 
the first person who found it—probably Google and Facebook. That result would 
be harsh, and to date does not seem to have been suggested seriously.944  
  
 Proposals for property legislation have been made for many years. In 1967, 
Alan Westin, Professor of Public Law at Columbia, suggested that legislation 
should define personal information as a property right. 945  In 2011, Paul M. 
Schwartz developed a model of “propertized personal information” that (1) limited 
the alienability of personal information; (2) established opt-in default rules; (3) 
created a right to rescind data trade agreements; (4) conferred liquidated damages 
to successful litigants to effectively deter violations ; and (5) defined institutional 
roles in regulating the information market.946 One recent proposal by University of 
Chicago Booth School Professors Luigi Zingales and Guy Rolnik is for a Social 
Graph Portability Act that would give Facebook users ownership of all the digital 
connections that they create (their “social graph”).947  
 
 The concept of ownership raises the question of the purpose of granting 
ownership rights. Proponents of ownership rights often have seen them as a way to 
protect privacy. Both Arthur Miller and Lori Andrews proposals were seeking to 
protect people’s privacy. Others have noted that the purpose of creating property 
rights in data can be to facilitate alienability. Wayne State Law Professor Jessica 
Litman has said, “[w]e deem something property in order to facilitate its 
transfer.”948 She believes that “[t]he market in personal data is the problem. Market 
solutions based on a property rights model won’t cure it; they’ll only legitimize 
 
943 See Kang, supra note 907, at 1246. 
944 See K. Reed Mayo, Virginia’s Acquisition of Unclaimed and Abandoned Personal Property, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 409, 413 (1986). The described scenario would probably not qualify as 
theft under California’s Penal Code. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 485 (1927) (“Theft; 
appropriation of lost property with knowledge or means of inquiry as to true owner”). 
945 See generally, ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 262 (1967).  
946 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004). 
947 Luigi Zingales & Guy Rolnik, A Way to Own Your Social-Media Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2017, at 23. 
948 Litman, supra note 911, at 1296. 




it.”949 She has proposed a model under which personal information could not be 
property, and it would be illegal to buy it or sell it.950  
 
Jerry Kang also hypothesized that viewing personal data as a civil or human 
right would entail a rule of inalienability, though he summarily rejected such a 
possibility because it would risk “surrendering control over information privacy to 
the state”.951Berkeley Law Professor Pamela Samuelson has written, “the common 
justification for granting property rights—to enable market allocations of scarce 
resources—does not apply to personal data. What is scarce is information privacy, 
not personal data.”952 She notes that it would be unusual for a property rights regime 
to establish a rule or strong presumption against alienability and suggests that if we 
consider information privacy as a civil liberty, then, just as it does not make sense 
to commodify voting rights, it would not make sense to propertize personal data.953  
 
Stanford Law Professor Mark A. Lemley believes that creating an 
intellectual property right in individual data is “a very bad idea.”954 To quote Bruce 
Schneier’s comments on privacy, “[t]he . . . fundamental problem is the conception 
of [autonomy] as something that should be subjected to commerce in this way. 
[Autonomy] needs to be a fundamental right, not a property right.”955 To paraphrase 
Nicholas Carr, we should not come to see autonomy as something to be traded for 
apps and amusements.956  
 
 True to Jessica Litman’s concern, recent discussion on ownership has been 
conducted in terms of payment. If the users’ data is so valuable, then shouldn’t they 
 
949 Id. at 1301 (emphasis added). 
950 Id. at 1302. 
951 Kang, supra note 907, at 1266.  
952 Samuelson, supra note 719, at 1138. 
953 Id. at 1143. She concedes that one type of property might be considered: “droit moral” or 
“moral rights.” Under French law, moral rights conceive of artistic and literary works as 
emanations of the author’s personality and can include rights of attribution, integrity, divulgation, 
and withdrawal. Two advantages of such a moral rights-like approach over a contract rights 
approach would be that they could be asserted against infringers who were not parties to a contract 
and that an injured party could seek an injunction rather than damages. Most importantly, moral 
rights in France are inalienable and, presumably, any similar American right should also be 
inalienable. But Professor Samuelson believes that a general grant of property rights in personal 
data might be constitutionally questionable. Id. at 1146-47, 1141.  
954 Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV 1545, 1547 (2000). 
955 SCHNEIER, supra note 201, at 201. 




Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet — Vol. 12 
156 
 
be paid for it? Jaron Lanier voiced support for this idea, attributing it to Ted Nelson, 
a formative figure in the development of online culture.957 Lanier wrote, “[i]n a 
world of digital dignity, each individual will be the commercial owner of any data 
that can be measured from that person’s state or behavior.”958 
 
 The term “commercial owner” seems to emphasize the right to alienate the 
data. Lanier was originally concerned with finding ways to compensate artists, 
authors, and other creative people.959 The individual would receive nanopayments 
proportional both to the degree of contribution and the resultant value.960 It is not 
clear whether search history or social media data would warrant nanopayments. 
One effort to theorize how such a scheme would work is that of Professor Eric 
Posner, and E. Glen Weyl, a principal researcher at Microsoft, who have proposed 
the commodification of personal data through online auctions in “radical 
markets. 961  But Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington have identified the 
problem with Lanier’s proposal to compensate artists, authors and other creatives: 
it suggests that “the only way to address the inequities of the information economy 
is for the consumer to be fully engaged in the commercialization of identity.962 
Lanier’s proposal is misguided because it rationalizes and justifies the 
commercialization of a person’s autonomy.  
 
 
957 LANIER, supra note 42, at 100-01. 
958 LANIER, supra note 43, at 20; see also Jaron Lanier & E. Glen Weyl, A Blueprint for a Better 
Digital Society, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/a-blueprint-for-a-
better-digital-society. 
959 See LANIER, supra note 42, at 101(“I believe most people would embrace a social contract in 
which bits have value instead of being free. Everyone would have easy access to everyone else’s 
creative bits at reasonable prices—and everyone would get paid for their bits. This arrangement 
would celebrate personhood in full, because personal expression would be valued”). 
960 Id.  
961 POSNER & WEYL, supra note 918, at 205-49. 
962 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 200, at 667. Two other problems with payment are 
reciprocity and risk assessment. As Gillian Tett, the Financial Times Editor-at-Large US, has 
predicted, if the tech giants started paying for the data, then they would they also start charging for 
the formerly “free” services. One can imagine a new form of debt peonage where Google or 
Facebook charges more for the service than the user will be able to earn in payments in 
data.Gillian Tett, Should Amazon and Google pay us for the data? FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2018, at 
10; Samuelson, supra note 719, at 1145. (identifying the difficulty for individuals judging risks in 
selling property rights in personal data); see also Joshua Adams, Getting Cash for Our Data Could 
Actually Make Things Worse, THE GOOD MEN PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2020), 
https://goodmenproject.com/feaured-content/getting-cash-for-our-data-could-actually-make-
things-worse/. 




 History tells us that autonomy has for centuries been a fundamental right 
that cannot be commercialized. It is something that is beyond the scope of market 
thinking. It is a “basic right.”963 It is an inalienable right. It is a human right.  
  
 Of course, not every bit of personal information is crucial to a person’s 
autonomy—it is a question of aggregation and scale. Standards for data collection 
and use have been suggested: those in the 1973 Code of Fair Information Practices, 
those in the 2012 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, those of Paul Schwartz, Jerry 
Kang’s concept of allowing the processing of personal information only in 
“functionally necessary ways,”964 and those described by Zeynep Tufekci.965 They 
could serve as the start of a discussion—not on Facebook or Google—but rather on 
the extent to which collection and aggregation of personal data can be done without 
causing the contract with the customer to be judged illegal and void. Together with 
a fiduciary duty, such standards could help resolve many of the current privacy 
issues.  
    e.  Bankruptcy  
 
 The overwhelming portion of the income of Google and Facebook currently 
comes from advertising and it seems unlikely that a subscription model would 
generate the same profits as behavioral advertising. Thus, a decision that declared 
the contracts of the behavioral advertising model illegal would have catastrophic 
consequences for both companies. They could include:  
 
i. The bankruptcy of the two companies.  
 
The loss of the overwhelming portion of their income, their inability to use 
the users’ data to sell advertising would in all likelihood quickly lead to the 
bankruptcy of the companies. This would be a case of true “disruptive 
innovation.”966 
 
ii. The conversion of the companies to a subscription business model.  
 
The conversion of the companies to a subscription model would be a 
decision by each company. If they could devise a business model that did 
 
963 SATZ, supra note 27, at 95. 
964 Kang, supra note 907, at 1271. 
965 Zeynep Tufekci, What Should They Ask Zuckerberg? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2018, at A25 
(proposing that data collection only happen if (1) it is done through an “opt in;” (2) if users can 
access the data the company is collecting; and (3) the data is only used for specifically enumerated 
purposes). 
966 Harvard Business Review, Disruptive Innovation Explained, YOUTUBE (Mar. 30, 2012) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDrMAzCHFUU&feature=emb_logo. 
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not involve exploiting the users’ personal data, the contracts implementing 
that model would presumably not be found illegal. The interest of users in 
continuity of service would be preserved, but users would have to pay for 
the service.  
 
iii. The creation of a limiting principle on the collection of the users’ 
personal data. 
 
The illegality of the present contracts would be based on the fact that the 
companies developed a business model that collected more data than 
necessary for the maintenance and improvement of their services to the user.  
A limiting principle for the collection of data, such as that of the suggestion 
of Jerry Kang,967 would need to be accepted.  
 
iv. The imposition on the companies of a fiduciary duty in the handling of 
the users’ personal data.  
 
In order to protect the interests of the users, the bankruptcy court should 
permanently enjoin the companies from using the data or algorithms based 
on it for advertising purposes. The court or the legislature should then 
establish a fiduciary duty in Google, Facebook, and other collectors of 
personal data.968 Courts can establish a fiduciary relationship by applying 
the principles of fiduciary relationship or applying similarities to traditional 
fiduciary relationships. 969  Fiduciary duties are imposed on many 
professions, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, and roles, such as 
agents, executors, and trustees. Once the sensitivity and power of personal 
data are recognized, it is clear that the collector and holder should bear a 
fiduciary duty. 
 
   f.  International Consequences 
 
 A decision declaring the user contracts of Google and Facebook illegal and 
the ensuing bankruptcy of both companies would have greater impact abroad than 
 
967 Kang, supra note 907, at 1271. 
968 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183 (2015-2016); SCHNEIER supra note 201, at 204-05; see generally Jonathan Zittrain, 
Facebook Can Still Fix This Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/07/opinion/sunday/zuckerberg-facebook-privacy-congress; 
Merryn Somerset Webb, Data Gatherers should be regulated like financial advisers, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 2018, at 1; Sylvie Delacroix & Neil Lawrence, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2019, at 8 (suggesting data trusts are a way to deal with data vulnerability). 
969 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 62, 65, 68 (2011).  




in the United States. This is for two reasons. First, the number of users of both 
companies’ services are more numerous abroad than in the United States. Google’s 
search service has over one billion users worldwide,970 but it has only 246 million 
users in the United States.971 Of Facebook’s 2.41 billion users, only 220.5 million 
are in the United States. 972  The impact of the companies abroad is far more 
extensive than in the United States.  
 
 Second, the impact is often more extreme abroad. In the United States, 
unrestrained or violent messages that have occurred on Facebook have inspired 
some radical rightwing violence, but abroad the reaction has been much worse. In 
countries with weak institutions, Facebook’s behavioral-advertising business 
model has been much more destructive.973 This business model requires ever more 
data gleaned from ever more engagement. Facebook’s algorithm-driven newsfeed 
emphasizes whatever content draws the most engagement from users and that 
content is often the most negative and provocative, stirring primitive emotions of 
anger and fear. Facebook not only amplifies existing prejudices within a filter 
bubble and boosts extremists, it also changes the way they see others and incites 
them to violence. In countries like Sri Lanka, India, Libya, and Myanmar, Facebook 
users have incited massacres of Moslems, the Rohingya, and other minorities.974 
Mary Fitzgerald, an independent researcher on Libya, told reporters for The New 
York Times in 2018 that, “[s]o many times over the past seven years . . . I heard 
people say that if we could just shut down Facebook for a day, half of the country’s 
problems would be solved.”975  
 
 
970Anita Balakrishna, Here’s how billions of people use Google products, in one chart, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/18/google-user-numbers-youtube-android-drive-photos.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2020).  
971 J. Clement, Google Statistics and Facts, STATISTA (Feb. 2, 2019), 
https://www.statista.com/topics/1001/google/. 
972 J. Clement, Number of Facebook users worldwide 2008-2019, STATISTA, (July, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/; 
MCNAMEE, supra note 58, at 228 (noting the United States and Europe are its most profitable 
markets). 
973 Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, In Search of Facebook’s Heroes, Finding Only Victims, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2018, at A2; see Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, As Attacks on Refugees Rise, A 
Link Is Uncovered: Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2018, at A1(discussing how violence is not 
limited to countries with weak institutions). 
974 Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Facebook Rumors Fuel Thirst for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2018, at A1; Vindu Goel & Shuhasini Raj, How WhatsApp Leads Mobs To Kill in India, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2018, at B4; Declan Walsh & Suliman Ali Zway, Libyan Fighters Wield 
Facebook Like a Weapon, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2018, at A1; Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook 
Admits Role Platform Had in Fueling Violence in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, at B2.  
975 Walsh & Zway, supra note 974, at A10. 
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 But Facebook does not seem willing to change, much less shut down. One 
reason is that Mark Zuckerberg strongly believes in free speech even when people 
do not tell the truth. Steven Levy writes that “[h]e held a Panglossian view of the 
goodness of humanity, and felt that people would sort out for themselves what was 
true.”976 Mark Zuckerberg told Steven Levy, “[t]he big lesson from the last few 
years is we were too idealistic and optimistic about the ways that people would use 
technology for good and didn’t think enough about the ways that people would 
abuse it.”977  
 
But as in the case of the micro megaphone, this ignores the architecture of 
the technology and the surrounding circumstances. Professor Russell has suggested 
that access to true information is a prerequisite for freedom of thought, but observed 
that unfortunately democracies “seem to have placed a naïve trust in the idea that 
the truth will win out in the end.”978 They—and Mark Zuckerberg—do not seem to 
grasp that the “truth value of information is not the same as its economic value.”979  
 
 Another reason is the immoral business model. As noted above, Andrew 
Marantz has called Facebook’s refusal to censor hate speech immoral.980 Maria 
Ressa, the chief executive of the Philippines-based new website Rappler, gave a 
reason why Facebook will not act: “[i]f Facebook wanted to solve this they could, 
but doing it would curb growth . . . troll armies have real engagement.”981 Zeynep 
Tufekci has asked why Facebook can’t discover problems itself and take action. 
Her answer: “follow the money: Silicon Valley is profitable partly because it 
employs so few people in comparison to its user base of billions of people. Most of 
its employees aren’t busy looking for such problems.” 982  The change to a 
subscription model would eliminate the need for more engagement, more 
provocative content, and more data collection. It could help mitigate the problem 
of hate speech generally and particularly of violence incited on Facebook in 
countries with weak institutions.  
 
 Facebook’s experience abroad reminds us of the lesson of the car 
megaphone: contrary to Mark Zuckerberg’s belief, frictionless connection and 
 
976 LEVY, supra note 139, at 357. 
977 Id. at 523. 
978 RUSSELL, supra note 248, at 108.  
979 SEYMOUR, supra note 359, at 148. 
980 See Marantz, supra note 282. 
981 John Reed & Hannah Kuchler, Facebook’s Asian balancing act, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2018, at 7. 








radical transparency are not always positive. Whether the results are positive or 
negative depends on the architecture of the technology and the surrounding 
circumstances. In the experience of Facebook’s foreign usage, it is clear that the 
lack of social and political institutions that could provide some friction to 
communication through Facebook led to vicious attacks on minority groups. This 
is simply a more extreme version of the negative consequences of Facebook’s use 
in the United States. 
 
PART THREE: CONCLUSION 
 
I.  MORALITY 
 The behavioral-advertising model now predominates for internet service 
contracts. Google and Facebook were the most successful innovators of this model 
and have suffered the most criticism of it. But the critics have not analyzed the 
business model from the perspective of morality or law. Specifically, there is little 
discussion on whether the business model is immoral or illegal and whether the 
contract between the user and the company might be defective. The absence of such 
a perspective seems to be due to market imperialism (that is, the predominance of 
market reasoning), particularly in law schools, during the last fifty years. Market 
imperialism has crowded out moral analysis and espoused universal 
commodification. The result has been a new business model that violates the user’s 
inalienable right to autonomy. It is this violation that makes the contracts 
implementing this business model both clearly immoral and plausibly illegal.  
 The central problem of the behavioral-advertising business model is 
advertising. Philosophers in the 1980s believed that persuasive advertising was 
immoral because it manipulated people and reduced autonomy. The advertising 
they criticized was that on radio and television. These medias had no way of directly 
collecting personal information on users, so manipulation was more theoretical than 
actual, but the public was left with concerns about the probity of advertising. The 
founders of Google (Larry Page and Sergey Brin) and of Facebook (Mark 
Zuckerberg) were strongly opposed to advertising because they saw it as sleazy and 
distracting. For the Google founders it also posed a moral dilemma—the potential 
for advertising to compromise the integrity of the search engine. Mark Zuckerberg 
seems to have been concerned about advertising only because it affected user 
experience. He expressed contempt for concern about the key moral issue at the 
time—users’ privacy. 
 The founders were able to maintain their disdain for advertising during the 
early years. At that time, the ads, similar to those on radio or television, were not 
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very effective commercially or bad morally. Ironically, it was only when the ads 
became truly abusive in exploiting the users’ personal information to manipulate 
and weaken their autonomy that the founders stopped criticizing advertising.  
 Two things: grandiosity and public listing, changed the founders minds. 
First, the founders were exemplars of the “e-personality,” the unwitting creation of 
extensive online interaction. A key characteristic of the e-personality is grandiosity, 
and the founders had oversized ambitions. The Google founders’ grand scheme was 
to “organize the world’s information and make it universally available and useful.” 
Mark Zuckerberg’s was “to make the world more open and connected.”  Larry 
Page, considering the fate of Nicola Tesla, the brilliant inventor who died in 
poverty, believed he needed abundant resources to avoid the same destiny. Both he 
and Sergey Brin felt they had to build a huge company to realize their dreams. To 
make the world more open and connected, Mark Zuckerberg needed a company of 
worldwide scope.   
 Second, the founders realized that they needed substantial funds to expand 
and gain the scale they required. They understood that the most practical way to do 
this was to take their companies public on Wall Street. Google went public in 2004, 
Facebook in 2012. But as public companies, they were subject to the demands of 
their investors for a more profitable business model.  
 The solution was the behavioral-advertising business model that Google 
pioneered. Under this new advertising model, advertisers bid in an auction on 
search words to win the right to place their ads alongside search results. At the 
beginning the ads were not directed to specific individuals, but Google learned that 
it could mine the data “surplus” (more data than needed to serve users) to target 
individual users. This was the birth of “surveillance capitalism.” When Sheryl 
Sandberg moved from Google to Facebook in 2008, she brought the behavioral-
advertising business model with her. 
 This business model is immoral because it uses addiction, surveillance, and 
manipulation to deprive the user not only of privacy, but of autonomy. While 
addiction is generally associated with substances, “behavioral addiction” has now 
achieved recognition and is included in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Google and Facebook 
website designers include social validation loops and intermittent reinforcement to 
“hook” users and cause addiction. This process involves fast-paced screen 
interaction that excites and arouses, causing the release of dopamine that underlies 
systems for reward and addiction and inhibits the prefrontal cortex. The result is 
addiction to short-term, dopamine-driven feedback loops—addiction to Google and 




Facebook. Arguments that users should exercise self-discipline fail when the user’s 
environment has been engineered to make sure that choices are not free and when 
the latest findings of psychology on human weaknesses are applied in the design of 
the platforms of Google and Facebook. Addiction is a paradigm threat to personal 
autonomy. 
 Obtaining the data necessary to the behavioral-advertising business model 
requires watching and tracking—surveillance. Facebook has been called the 
biggest surveillance-based enterprise in history. 983  It not only collects the 
information of its users, it also obtains personal information on people who are not 
on Facebook. Information is power and more information is more power. Facebook 
and Google, which have unparalleled data bases on individuals, also have power 
over these individuals.  
Given that the government has access to this information, every Google and 
Facebook user is potentially subject to a careful review of their data for potential 
evidence of criminal offenses. It also creates an enormous temptation to use the 
data for the benefit of the companies, for “dirty tricks,” and for undermining critics, 
and influencing—or even blackmailing—legislators, administrators, and judges. 
Any accusation of such conduct could be met with a flat refusal to make available 
the relevant evidence—an algorithm—because it was a confidential business secret.  
 Addiction and surveillance allow manipulation. Manipulation is the treating 
of another person not as a fellow rational agent, but as a device to be operated. 
Manipulation violates another person’s autonomy. It is easier to successfully 
manipulate people when using something that is new and poorly understood. The 
overwhelming majority of internet users have no formal training in it and lack a 
knowledge of how Google and Facebook are manipulating them. Once surveillance 
capabilities are in place, the next step is to modify the user’s behavior to benefit 
Google and Facebook.  
 Philosophers have not reached consensus on the precise nature of threats to 
autonomy. But it is clear that we take the natural environment as given, and do not 
consider it as limiting our autonomy. But, when the environment is intentionally 
arranged to influence the individual in a way that is beneficial to the influencer and 
detrimental to the individual, the individual is manipulated, and autonomy depleted. 
As we adopt a digital form of life, our environment online is intentionally arranged 
by Google and Facebook for their benefit. Our online experiences are shaped to fit 
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the commercial interests of Google and Facebook and we pay with an erosion of 
our autonomy.   
 Autonomy depletion is in large part determined by the economics of the 
business model. The amounts Google and Facebook earn from each user is paltry, 
so they need to gather as much personal data as possible from hundreds of millions 
of users who are continuously engaged on the platform. The economic imperatives 
of this business model lead to the exploitation of human weaknesses and immoral 
behavior, such as treating users as lab rats, and using surveillance and data 
collection to manipulate children. The lack of criticism about the depletion of 
autonomy from religious, educational, and civil institutions may be due to the belief 
that the new technology was both good and inevitable. This lack of criticism also 
suggests that these institutions have so valued the instrumental advantages of the 
platforms that they have ignored their moral responsibilities to their members, 
students, and citizens. Silence on the moral defects of the platforms may also be 
attributed to silent intimidation caused by the fear of a troll swarm, bot armies, or 
DoS attacks instigated or encouraged by the platforms. 
 The grandiose goals of the founders do not excuse the immorality of the 
business model. These goals were based on a faulty presumption: that innovation 
has only positive effects. This belief shows a dangerous, adolescent understanding 
of human nature. The simple example of the car micro megaphone tells us that 
connecting people is not necessarily positive; it depends on the architecture of the 
technology and whether if facilitates positive or negative traits of human nature. 
Facebook and Google are not necessarily good; it depends on how they affect 
people, and how people use the platforms.  It depends on the conclusion of our 
moral intuitions, not the novelty of the technology. 
 The collection, aggregation, and handling of personal data do not seem, so 
far, to have caused high levels of concern among users, perhaps because they do 
not sense the addiction, surveillance, and manipulation. Maybe users will awake to 
the use of their data exhaust only when they are made aware of the collection of 
other more concrete forms of exhaust, such as their DNA in their hair and the 
microbiome in their stool. Morally, the collection of their personal data is more 
damaging than the collection of their DNA and microbiome, although less noticed, 
because it leads to diminished autonomy.  
 The business model of surveillance capitalism is morally reprehensible in 
another respect: it poses a threat to democratic elections. The threat is twofold. 
First, behavioral advertising preferences inflammatory and provocative expression 
and promotes virality. Political messages that are false and misleading are shared 




most widely and most often. Second, the data and algorithms of behavioral 
advertising have enabled attacks on American democracy by influencing elections, 
particularly the 2016 presidential election. A 2019 Presidential Notice has stated 
that foreign interference in American presidential elections constitutes “an unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security . . . of the United States.” 
 Concerns about morality have followed Google and Facebook from their 
very beginnings. This should not surprise us if we remember that Mark Zuckerberg 
was “just not a fully formed individual, from an ethical standpoint.” Democratic 
Congressman Tom Lantos of California told the tech companies during a televised 
hearing in 2017, “[w]hile technologically and financially you are giants, morally 
you are pygmies.”984 Internet critic Professor Zeynep Tufekci of the University of 
North Carolina noted in May, 2018 that “Silicon Valley is ethically lost, rudderless 
. . . .”985 It should not surprise us that Google and Facebook’s business model is 
immoral. In fact, the essential characteristics of the advertising-based business 
model entail moral challenges both in its early stage when privacy is the major 
issue, and at a later stage when microtargeting diminishes autonomy through 
techniques of behavior modification: addiction, surveillance, and manipulation. 
Universal commodification is morally wrong, 986  and this includes the 
commodification of our personal data through behavioral advertising. Grave threats 
to human dignity, democracy, and the rule of law follow directly from the demands 
of this business model for ever more personal data. The business model itself is 
wrong and its inevitable effects are antithetical to a free, democratic society of 
autonomous individuals.  
 
 For Larry Page, Sergey Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg the ends were 
grandiose, but naïve; the means expedient, but immoral. In advertising, they first 
rebuffed the bad, but then welcomed worse. And grandiosity—together with 
misplaced faith in technology—helped them to forget and to ignore the moral 
issues. In a moment of reflection last year, Mark Zuckerberg mused that, “[o]ne of 
the most painful lessons I’ve learned is that when you connect two billion people, 
you will see all the beauty and ugliness of humanity.”987 But he did not mention, as 
 
984 Andrew Jacobs, Suit Asks Yahoo to Refill Fund for China Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
2017, at B3.  
985 Kevin Roose, Critics Say Google’s A.I. Phone Calls Have Everything, Except Ethics, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 14, 2018, at B6 (quoting Zeynep Tufekci). 
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987 MARANTZ, supra note 795, at 74; see also MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON VALLEY 
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he might have fifteen years ago, the inevitable connection between advertising and 
the ugliness. Clearly, over the last decade what has become suddenly normal—a 
business model that divests users of privacy and autonomy through intentional 
addiction, pervasive surveillance, and constant manipulation—is morally wrong.988  
 What are the implications of this immorality? First, it is clear that the 
theoretical judgment that the business model and the contracts are immoral does 
not by itself cause any change. For change to occur, several things must happen. 
Users must be persuaded of this immorality and choose to act on it as members of 
educational, religious, and civic organizations. The legal implications, of course, 
will become clear only when and if a court rules that the contracts are illegal under 
the contract law of California (where Google and Facebook’s headquarters are 
located). But there could be serious business consequences before such a ruling. If 
the value of a stock is a reflection of the estimated risk and reward, it seems likely 
that the stock price of the two companies does not reflect an unacknowledged threat 
to the business model of the companies. The realization that the business model is 
potentially subject to a devastating attack on the legality of the contracts that 
implement it should affect the price of the stock.   
 Another implication of this moral judgment should be a restraint on the 
companies’ (and Silicon Valley’s) libertarian philosophy of “move fast and break 
things,” of “who will stop me?” and of “creative disruption.” The companies may 
achieve a new awareness that innovation is not always positive, that the application 
of new technology in ways that are detrimental to human flourishing can bring 
misfortune to those who do it. Young digital entrepreneurs, if not the founders, may 
learn that if they “move fast and break things,” eventually society will “brake”—if 
not “break”—them. If hubris was the true sin of the founders, perhaps they could 
learn some humility.  
 The immorality of Google’s and Facebook’s business model, not the 
ingenuity or convenience of the technology, should also be the underlying 
presumption of every discussion, every examination, every congressional hearing 
about the role of these tech behemoths in our society. The unease that citizens and 
congressmen feel about the two companies is essentially a moral concern, but 
market thinking’s dominance has made people hesitant and inartful in expressing 
this concern. Senators and representatives in hearings should seize the initiative to 
raise the issue of morality—something the founders are unfamiliar with and 
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uncomfortable with—and put them on the defensive, asking them to justify 
themselves to society.  
 Perhaps we can revise the famous quotation about wealth creation attributed 
to Honoré de Balzac and say that, “behind every great fortune lies not an equally 
great crime, but an equally great moral failure.” 989  
II.  LEGALITY 
 
 Commentators and academics have raised the issue of the legality of the 
activities of both Google and Facebook under privacy and antitrust law, but no one 
has analyzed the legality of the business model. This essay has analyzed the 
immorality of the behavioral-advertising business model of surveillance capitalism 
from another legal perspective—that of contract law. Once we understand that this 
business model is immoral, then we must ask what we, as a society, will do about 
it. Some may say that the business model is the natural consequence of market 
forces, and is therefore efficient and acceptable. But the legal system, specifically 
contract law, tells us that certain contracts are so pernicious that society will not 
enforce them. Among those contracts are those that deprive people of inalienable 
rights.  
 The inalienable rights stated in the Declaration of Independence, and in 
many state Constitutions, were basic to the creation of the United States. These 
rights were not some anomaly or minor exception to a world of market thinking, no 
generous concession granted by market analysis. Nor do they constitute an instance 
of “market failure.” They were the most basic and most important aspects of the 
social and political lives of citizens. Citizens could not lose them even through full, 
free, and informed consent. These rights were beyond the reach of the market; 
society had decided that they should not be commercialized. These inalienable 
rights depend on the autonomy of each citizen. The formative philosophers of 
liberal democracy, Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls, all posited that autonomous 
individuals were necessary for a representative government and a theory of justice.  
 
 American history tells us that contractual relationships depriving people of 
their autonomy were very common in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. But 
as society progressed, the inherent evil in these contractual relationships led courts 
to declare them illegal and null and void. Slavery was the most obvious example, 
but several forms of bondage were common in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. In the nineteenth century another form of contractual bondage became 
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common in the United States—the contract of peonage, a contract under which 
advances of money, often for transportation, were repaid by labor in the home, 
farm, or worksite. What made peonage intolerable to the legal system was not the 
physical conditions under which the peons worked, but the loss of autonomy. In 
this respect, peonage was similar to slavery. But peonage was a greater threat to 
democracy than slavery because the peons were citizens who could vote and, 
because of their loss of autonomy, their masters could exert undue influence over 
their votes. For these reasons, peonage was outlawed by statute and courts found 
contracts of peonage null and void in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  
 
 The internet service contracts of Google and Facebook, through addiction, 
surveillance, and manipulation, also deprive the users of their autonomy. From a 
historical perspective, the users of these platforms are essentially “digital peons,” 
and, like peons, they have voting rights. Clearly, these companies are not leading 
society into a bright future of individual choice and freedom. They are taking us 
backwards to a society in which large numbers of citizens are subject to contracts 
of bondage. In the twenty-first century, we may see a society in which, as in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a majority of citizens live under contracts of 
bondage. The behavioral-advertising business model is not progress, but regress; 
not moral advance, but moral retreat. If we define progress as human flourishing,990 
then surely surveillance capitalism is a step back. The illusion of progress is a cruel 
joke.  
 Both Google and Facebook are based in California and the standard Terms 
of Service in their internet service contracts specify that any suits against them must 
be brought in a court in California. The law of California governs the service 
contracts. The contract law of California provides three bases for a court to declare 
a contract illegal and therefore null and void. These are: (1) violation of good 
morals; (2) unconscionability; and (3) conflict with public policy.991  The legal 
meanings of “good morals” and “unconscionability” are different from those of 
common usage, but still carry moral opprobrium.  
 No California cases seem to have addressed the internet service contracts, 
but many are helpful in hypothesizing how an internet service contract case could 
be resolved. California law on illegal contracts has evolved over the last few 
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decades and could evolve further. First, as to good morals, California cases on 
gambling and marriage indicate that courts will hold a contract illegal if it involves 
addiction (in the case of gambling) or unduly restricts the rights of women (in the 
case of marriage). If a California court were to accept addiction as an integral part 
of the behavioral-advertising business model and the internet service contract 
supporting it, then the court could well find the contract against good morals.  
 Second, California law holds a contract unconscionable if it is both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Google and Facebook Terms 
of Service are procedurally unconscionable because they are contracts of adhesion, 
and exhibit both oppression and surprise. Whether they also exhibit substantive 
unconscionability depends on whether these contracts or their terms: “shock the 
conscience,” are “overly harsh,” or “one-sided.” It seems clear that the behavioral-
advertising internet services contract should by its very nature “shock the 
conscience,” but it is unclear whether such an unprecedented argument would fit 
within the narrow doctrinal confines of “substantive unconscionability” as created 
by California courts. A reasonable argument could be made, however, that the 
California courts could currently find that the Google and Facebook Terms of 
Service are substantively unconscionable.  
 Third, California courts have recognized that the scope of “public policy” 
is very broad and vague. At times, the courts have been reluctant to find that a 
particular contract is against public policy, but they have often followed the axiom 
that “whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds of 
public policy.” Given the unpredictability of determining what constitutes “public 
policy,” it seems that the application of “public policy” to deny enforceability of 
the Google and Facebook contracts is plausible.  
 In addition to the California statutory and case law on contracts, there are a 
number of other background factors that would influence a court in deciding 
whether to rule that the Google and Facebook contracts are illegal. There is a 
growing perception that these companies are violating the public trust, but have 
such overwhelming influence in the executive and legislative branches of the 
federal government that probably only the judicial branch is able to nullify their 
business model. This perception together with the historical judicial activist role of 
California courts in the development of the law could persuade a California judge 
that it would be appropriate for a court to act in view of the paralysis by the other 
branches of government. Changes in mores and business could also influence a 
court to take action by ruling the contracts illegal.  
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The public perception of the companies has become less favorable in the 
last few years, and as users learn more about the use of their personal data, the 
chances of a major public relations disaster increase. Once a movement gathers 
momentum—becomes plausible and reaches a tipping point—it becomes 
inevitable. Judges are sensitive to such changes in public opinion.  
Another change that could affect a judge’s decision is a variation in the 
business model of the two companies. The current business model, which is 
dependent on continuous growth, may not be sustainable; the companies could be 
turned into public utilities; or their business model might be destroyed by ad 
blocking software. Any one of these changes could render moot a decision on 
contract illegality.  
 Other factors could influence a judge to rule against the companies. These 
include the loss of personhood, which would become data and cease to be an end 
in itself. Personhood would become merely a device to use used; a tool to be 
exploited. Other possibly influential factors are threats to democratic society and 
theory. The big data analytics enabled by the huge data troves of the behavioral-
advertising business model undermine the civic experience that is essential to a 
democratic society. Further, the behavioral-advertising business model, by 
depleting autonomy, negates the intellectual foundations and rationale of 
democracy. The fact that the companies’ internet business model is essentially an 
uncontrolled experiment on human beings suggests an application of the 
precautionary principle—limiting the manipulation of people. Finally, the two 
companies’ long record of arrogant behavior and unrepentant violations of public 
commitments992 would make a decision contrary to their interests seem like cosmic 
justice. These factors would not directly cause a judge to issue an otherwise 
unsupportable decision, but, they make it more likely that a judge would rule 
against the companies where the case against them, although unprecedented, was 
reasonable.  
 What are the implications of contract illegality? Cosmic justice comes with 
severe consequences for the companies and challenges for society. First, if the 
contracts are illegal, they are null and void and without legal effect. The contracts’ 
consent provisions granting the companies the right to collect and use the data 
would be null and void. The companies would have no legal right to collect and 
monetize the users’ personal data. 
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 Second, the collection and monetization of the persona data could be a 
statutory violation or a tort. The legal system would need to clarify the nature of 
the statutory violation or tort.  
 
 Third, without a legal right to the data and the possibility of statutory 
violations or tort prosecutions, the companies would have to change their business 
model. The most likely alternative would be a subscription model that would not 
involve the exploitation of addiction, surveillance, manipulation, and loss of 
autonomy. 
 Fourth, the illegality of the current contracts would raise the question of the 
ownership of the personal data collected by the companies. Scholars have suggested 
a number of alternative arrangements for the rights to the data. As society discusses 
these alternatives, it will be important to understand that the user’s rights in data 
must be seen has a human right that is inalienable. Restrictions on alienation must 
be maintained to avoid manipulation and loss of autonomy.  
 Fifth, the two companies would suffer the loss of their principal sources of 
revenue, payment for advertisements, and would probably go bankrupt. Some 
would see this as a case of true “disruptive innovation.”  
 Sixth, a limiting principle on the collection of the users’ personal data would 
be necessary. One suggestion is that of the collection of personal data for use only 
in “functionally necessary ways.” Society would have to debate and work out this 
limiting principle.  
 Seventh, fiduciary duties similar to those imposed on doctors, lawyers and 
accountants in the handling of the users’ personal data would need to be placed on 
the companies. Again, this is a challenge that society would have to address. 
 This essay is not intended to suggest that the two companies’ contracts will 
be found illegal tomorrow. Public mores and the law have not developed to that 
extent. But, it is the intent of this essay to suggest that in the future such a decision 
is plausible and, as time proceeds, perhaps more and more likely.  
 
 In addition to these challenges arising from the illegality of the contracts, 
this essay on the morality and legality of the behavioral-advertising business model 
suggests some other, larger challenges for society: 
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1. Can we reap the advantages of the market while 
keeping its activities confined to the goods proper to 
it?993  
 
2. “Should human beings in the twenty-first century 
accept a world in which their lives are unceasingly 
appropriated through data for capitalism”?994 
 
3. “When presented with a new technology, can we 
ask whether it serves human purposes?”995 Can we 
ask whether it brings out the best or the worst in 
human beings? 
 
4. “Can we design systems that utilize our data 
collectively for the benefit of society as a whole, but 
at the same time protect people individually?”996  
 
5. In the future when we will confront the extreme 
dangers of much-improved artificial intelligence 
combined with other new technology and a deeper 
understanding of human weaknesses, does our 
experience with the behavioral-advertising business 
model suggest that we can sufficiently reshape our 
ideals  and preferences towards autonomy, agency, 
and ability and away from self-indulgence and 
dependency so as to maintain our commitment to the 
autonomy of the individual human?997 
 
 This essay ends not with a question, but a suggestion. Russell Baker, the 
straight-talking founder of Baker & McKenzie, the largest and most international 
law firm in the world, once visited Harvard Law School to give an informal 
luncheon talk to the East Asian Legal Studies program at the invitation of Professor 
Jerome Cohen. The topic of his talk was the law firm’s Tokyo office, which 
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consisted primarily of Japanese lawyers with one or two Americans. After he had 
finished, one student asked him what he thought of those American lawyers who, 
because of a special privilege under the American Occupation of Japan, had been 
granted the right to practice Japanese law even though they did not read or speak 
Japanese. Mr. Baker responded: “[w]ell, I have a suggestion for those lawyers. Take 
a pickaxe and shovel and go earn an honest living!” To right another wrong, we can 
tell Larry Page, Sergei Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg: “Your aversion to advertising 
was right. Your embrace of it was wrong. Take a subscription model and go earn 
an honest living!”998 
 
998 An appropriate messenger for this suggestion to Mark Zuckerberg would be his Harvard 
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